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"Even as corporateprofits are as high as ever, a small but growing
group of big corporationsarefleeing the country to get out ofpaying
taxes. They're keeping most of their business inside the United States,
but they're basically renouncing their citizenship and declaring that
they're based somewhere else, just to avoidpaying theirfair share.
. . [Wihen some companies cherrypick their taxes, it damages the
country'sfinances.It adds to the deficit. It makes it harderto invest in
the things that will keep America strong, and it sticks you with the tab
for what they stash offshore. Right now, a loophole in our tax laws
makes this totally legal-and I think that's totally wrong. You don't
get to pick which rules you play by, or which tax rate you pay, and
neither should these companies.
. . . [Sitopping companiesfrom renouncing their citizenshipjust to get

"

out ofpaying theirfair share of taxes is something that cannot wait.
-Barack Obama, President of the United States
INTRODUCTION

S

have recently embraced a
public corporations
EVERAL prominent
(and newsworthy)
type of transaction known as a "tax
noteworthy
inversion." In a typical inversion, a U.S. multinational corporation
("MNC") merges with a foreign company. The entity that ultimately
emerges from this transactional cocoon is invariably incorporated
abroad, yet typically remains listed in U.S. securities markets under the
erstwhile domestic issuer's name. When structured to satisfy applicable
tax requirements, corporate inversions permit domestic MNCs eventual'President Barack Obama, Weekly Presidential Address: Closing Corporate Tax Loopholes (July 26, 2014) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
2014/07/26/weekly-address-closing-corporate-tax-loopholes).
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ly to replace U.S. with foreign tax treatment of their extraterritorial earnings-ostensibly at far lower effective rates.
Most regulators and politicians have reacted to the inversion invasion
with alarm and indignation, no doubt fearing the trend is but a harbinger
of an immense offshore exodus by U.S. multinationals. This reaction, in
turn, has catalyzed myriad calls for tax reform from a variety of quarters,
ranging from the targeted tightening of tax eligibility criteria,2 to moving
the United States to a territorial tax system,' to declaring (yet another)
tax "holiday" for corporate repatriations,4 to reducing significantly (if
not entirely) American corporate tax rates.s Like many debates in tax
policy, there remains little consensus about what to do (or whether to do
anything at all).
This Article analyzes the current inversion wave (and reactions to it)
from both practical and theoretical perspectives. From a practical vantage point, I will argue that while the inversion invasion is certainly a
cause for concern, aspiring inverters already face several constraints that
may decelerate the trend naturally, without significant regulatory intervention. For example, inversions are but one of several alternative tax
avoidance strategies available to MNCs-strategies whose relative merits differ widely by firm and by industry. Inversions, moreover, are invariably dilutive and usually taxable to the inverter's U.S. shareholders,
auguring potential resistance to the deals. They virtually require "strategic" (as opposed to financial) mergers between comparably sized companies, making for increasingly slim pickings when searching for a
dancing partner, and a danger of overpaying simply to meet the compa-

2E.g., Stop Corporate Inversions Act of 2014, S. 2360, 113th Cong.
(as proposed by Sen.
Carl Levin (D-MI) and introduced, May 20, 2014).
Mihir A. Desai, A Better Way to Tax U.S. Businesses, Harv. Bus. Rev., July-Aug. 2012,
at 135, 135, 137-38; Economic Growth and Family Fairness Tax Reform Plan, United States
Senate Office of Marco Rubio 1, 12 (n.d.), available at http://www.rubio.senate.gov/
public/index.cfn/files/serve/?File id=2d839ffl-f995-427a-86e9-267365609942.
4 James Hohmann, Rand Paul Seeks Corporate Tax Deal with Obama, Politico (Jan. 20, 2015,
7:59 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/01/rand-paul-corporate-tax-deal-obama- 1144
13.html.
E.g., N. Gregory Mankiw, How to Fix the Corporate Tax? Repeal It, N.Y. Times, Aug.
24, 2014, at BU7 (advocating a 0% rate). The Obama administration's 2016 Budget, in contrast, proposes a more modest reduction (to 28%), paired with a flat tax on all offshore income, as well as a transition tax for previously earned offshore income. See Office of Mgmt.
& Budget, Exec. Office of the President, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal
Year 2016, at 56-57 (2015), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/
budget/fy2016/assets/budget.pdf.
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rable size requirements. They involve regulatory risk from competition
authorities, foreign-direct-investment boards and takeover panels (not to
mention from tax regulators themselves). They frequently provide only
partial relief from extraterritorial application of U.S. taxes, especially for
well-established U.S. multinationals. And finally, tax inversions can introduce material downstream legal risk, since they move the locus of
corporate internal affairs out of conventional jurisprudential terrain and
into the domain of a foreign jurisdiction whose law is-by comparison-recondite and unfamiliar.
Moving beyond these practical considerations, I will also consider the
inversion wave through a theoretical lens, drawing insights from regulatory competition theories in public finance. Specifically, I will advance
the notion that regulatory competition among jurisdictions can play out
not only through tax policy, but also simultaneously through other nontax channels, such as corporate law and governance rules. Applying this
framework, I will show that a strong domestic corporate governance regime can provide a plausible buffer against a tax-induced incorporation
exodus: Although U.S. multinationals clearly dislike high tax rates, they
have traditionally valued the strength of U.S. corporate law and governance, particularly within Delaware. And, since U.S. tax policy explicitly
ties tax residence to the state of incorporation, domestic tax authorities
have enjoyed market power in keeping rates comparatively high while
attracting and retaining domestic incorporations. In other words, the
United States has for a long time remained somewhat insulated from ruinous tax competition because tax residency was "bundled" with corporate law in a unitary regulatory package. Viewed from this perspective,
the most radical tax reform proposals currently being championed seem
overzealous at best, and may even prove counterproductive.
Nonetheless, the recent pace of inversion activity plausibly suggests
that America's traditional market power in regulatory competition has
begun to slip. Although there are likely many contributing causes for
this slippage, I will argue that a seemingly inconspicuous institution has
played an under-acknowledged role: securities law. During the last fifteen years, a series of significant regulatory reforms-such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20026 and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 7-have suffused U.S. securities regulations with an unprecedented array of

6

Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (enacted July 30, 2002).
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (enacted July 21, 2010).
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corporate governance mandates, ranging from board independence requirements to compensation reforms to internal financial controls to
proxy access. Historically, state law served as the dominant (if not sole)
arbiter of corporate governance. Federal law's creeping displacement of
state law has consequently "unbundled" domestic tax law from domestic
corporate governance regulation, since most U.S. securities regulations
apply to all listed companies, irrespective of their tax residence.8 Hence,
regardless of whether recent securities law reforms have been prudent or
misguided, I argue that federalization has effectively (if unwittingly) undermined the United States' ability to withstand tax competition from
abroad.
If securities market regulation helped dig this hole, then might it also
provide the needed tools to refill it? My analysis will suggest that it
does, and that we should consider altering the regulatory landscape in
two possible ways: either (1) the United States should begin to tax listed
companies (regardless of residence) for their consumption of federal
corporate governance law, granting allowances for U.S. corporate income taxes paid; and/or (2) federal law should cede corporate governance back to the states by rolling back the federal governance mandates
of the last fifteen years. Which of these alternatives (or combination of
them) is most attractive turns on several factors, including practical implementation constraints, the value (if any) created by recent federal
governance mandates, and the difficulty of coordinating governmental
actors at the state and federal level.
Moreover, to the extent my unbundling hypothesis is valid, it suggests
that tax reform responses to "inversionitis" must also anticipate downstream implications for corporate governance. Although some modest
tax reforms may be warranted (for example, measured reductions in
headline tax rates), the most radical tax reform proposals currently on
the table (such as moving to a territorial system, or eliminating U.S. corporate income taxes altogether) are unlikely to help, and could well
prove deleterious: Not only do such radical reforms seem likely to cost
the U.S. Treasury sizable future tax revenues, but they respond to the
unbundling phenomenon not by rebundling tax and governance, but rather by severing the link completely. A plausible long-term effect of
While certain U.S.-traded foreign companies can obtain "Foreign Private Issuer" ("FPI")
status-exempting them from various U.S. securities law mandates-the structure of most
U.S. inversions makes FPI status an unrealistic option for the surviving entity. See infra note
165 and accompanying text.
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such radical reform strategies is that the variety and quality of corporate
governance regimes worldwide will atrophy-an outcome that is as undesirable for the global economy as it is for the United States.9
Several caveats deserve explicit attention before proceeding. First,
this is by no means the lone article to note the simultaneous operation of
tax and corporate law within a setting of international regulatory competition.o Although most prior contributions compare tax competition and
corporate chartering competition in relative isolation, a handful also explicitly consider their mutual interaction. Notable among them is an article by Mitchell Kane and Edward Rock, who observe that the marriage
of tax residency rules with corporate law in regulatory competition can
have distortive effects, inducing corporations to make inferior jurisdictional choices when incorporating in order to reduce tax liability. Concluding that such distortions undermine a competitive chartering market,
they propose "severing" tax residence rules from corporate law regimes,
hinging the former on the locus of firms' real economic activity and the
latter on the place of incorporation." Although I commence from a similar motivation as do Kane and Rock, my analysis will depart from theirs
in several ways. They do not, for example, consider how the steady encroachment of securities law has materially altered the tax/governance
competitive landscape. More significantly, my analysis will suggest that
regulatory competitive forces actually push in the opposite direction
9 My argument shares certain commonalities with the familiar "Tiebout" model in public
finance, where local communities offer differentiated packages of public goods and taxes,
and heterogeneous individuals self-sort by migrating to the site offering the package most
suited to their preferences. See generally Wallace Oates, The Many Faces of the Tiebout
Model, in The Tiebout Model at Fifty 21, 22, 27 (William A. Fischel ed., 2006) (explaining
and offering an overview of the Tiebout framework, as well as contributions to it in recent
economic literature). In the canonical Tiebout framework, local public goods and taxes are
naturally bundled for geographical reasons. With regulatory competition, in contrast, bundling can be a design feature. See Suzanne Scotchmer, Local Public Goods and Clubs, in 4
Handbook of Public Economics, at 1997, 2030-31 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein
eds., 2002).
1o See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Tax Coordination and Tax Competition in the European Union: Evaluating the Code of Conduct on Business Taxation, 38
Common Mkt. L. Rev. 677, 677-79 (2001); Jens Dammann, A New Approach to Corporate
Choice of Law, 38 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 51, 77-79 (2005); Mitchell A. Kane & Edward B.
Rock, Corporate Taxation and International Charter Competition, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 1229,
1229-34 (2008); Wolfgang Sch6n, Playing Different Games? Regulatory Competition in
Tax and Company Law Compared, 42 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 331, 359-60 (2005); Joel P.
Trachtman, International Regulatory Competition, Externalization, and Jurisdiction, 34
Harv. Int'l L.J. 47, 50, 59 (1993).
" Kane & Rock, supra note 10, at 1232, 1283.
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from the Kane/Rock proposal. In other words, even if differential tax
levies "distort" incorporation choices, the bundling of corporate governance and tax regimes can make chartering competition more (not less)
robust, affording jurisdictions a means by which to appropriate some of
the social value created by their investments in legal/regulatory infrastructure-incentivizing them in the process to differentiate their governance/tax offerings, thereby enriching the portfolio of choices available to companies and adding to overall economic welfare.12
Second, as noted above, this Article uses a regulatory competition
framework to analyze how tax and corporate law may evolve simultaneously. That framework allows for the possibility that such competition
can motivate at least some jurisdictions to "race to the top" by installing
and maintaining governance regimes that increase firm value and attract
incorporations. While some version of this view is common within the
academic literature, 3 others are more pessimistic about the merits of jurisdictional competition in corporate law, arguing, for instance, that because managers steer incorporation decisions, competition will tend to
"race to the bottom," catering to managerial preferences, not overall
company value (or even share value).1 4 Still others have expressed ambivalence about whether either extreme account tends to prevail categorically." The analytical framework developed below is broad enough to
allow for any of these possibilities, including settings where agency
costs dominate incorporation choices for some firms, inducing some jurisdictions to use their bundled taxing authority to extract a portion of
the managerialvalue they create. Indeed, at its most general level, my

12 It is worth observing that in any market (incorporation markets included), differential
prices technically "distort" consumer choice. Many consumers, for instance, purchase Chevrolets even though they would prefer Bentleys (but for the price difference). Such price rationing can be perfectly consistent with robust competition. More to the point, my analysis
will suggest that even when competing jurisdictions' marginal cost of corporate law provision is approximately zero (as is plausibly the case here), differential prices-and the distortions they induce-may still be worth bearing when such prices enable providers to capture
their quasi-fixed investments in regulatory quality.
13 See, e.g., Kane & Rock, supra note 10, at 1239; Roberta Romano, Law as a Product:
Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. Econ. & Org. 225, 280-81 (1985); Ralph K.
Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. Legal
Stud. 251, 254-56 (1977).
14 E.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on
State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1435, 1441 (1992).
15 See Gillian K. Hadfield & Eric L. Talley, On Public Versus Private Provision of Corporate Law, 22 J.L. Econ. & Org. 414, 415-16 (2006).
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analysis presumes a type of hybrid setting where some companies are
attracted to corporate governance regimes that maximize overall company value, while others prefer systems that cosset managerial interests.16
Third, my analysis will generally presume that jurisdictions set policies noncooperatively, so as to serve their individual jurisdictional interests. While such an approach is a serviceable description of the status
quo," it downplays the possibility of cooperative accords struck between otherwise competing jurisdictions that would effectively neutralize-or at least dampen-the oppositional landscape (for example, international accords among OECD countries setting uniform policies on
tax rates or profit shifting)." Such cooperative approaches could have
desirable characteristics (at least in some circumstances),' 9 and they are
certainly worth considering. It nevertheless remains an open question
whether such accords are attainable in the short term and durable over
the medium to long term. In any event, my analysis is perhaps better
viewed as assessing an appropriate response for the United States in the
absence of (or as a backstop to) such international accords.20

Specifically, the framework I develop below presumes firms to be heterogeneous in how
they value governance, with some being more attracted than others to governance regimes
that increase overall company value; this heterogeneity plausibly reflects varying degrees of
agency costs across firms. Consequently, jurisdictions within this setting also tend to behave
heterogeneously, differentiating their regulatory offerings from one another, thereby making
the "race" (to the extent one exists) more multi-faceted than either extreme account allows.
That said, for those jurisdictions catering to firms dominated by agency costs, the governance systems that emerge need not be socially desirable in a larger sense,
17 See Eric Toder & Alan D. Viard, Major Surgery Needed: A Call for Structural Reform
of the U.S. Corporate Income Tax 19-20 (Apr. 2014) (unpublished manuscript, available at
htt ://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfmn?ID-413090).
See Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 9-13 (2013), OECD, www.oecd.org/
ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf; Dhammika Dharmapala, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting: A Simple Conceptual Framework 3 (U. of Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 703, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-2497770.
19 A potential downside of cooperative accords is that they provide a platform for inefficient price fixing in tax levies, converting regulatory competition into de facto monopoly.
See Andrew P. Morriss & Lotta Moberg, Cartelizing Taxes: Understanding the OECD's
Campaign Against "Harmful Tax Competition," 4 Colum. J. Tax L. 1, 33-34 (2012).
2o It bears noting that many observers remain skeptical that the OECD's ongoing attempt to
craft a Base Erosion and Profit Shifting ("BEPS") protocol will ever prove successful. See
Mike Godfrey, Business Leaders Doubt Global Agreement on BEPS, Tax-News.com (August
11, 2015), http://www.tax-news.com/news/BusinessLeadersDoubtGlobalAgreementOn_
68830.html).
BEPS
16

2015]

CorporateInversions

1657

Finally, it is important to note that the progressive federalization of
corporate law chronicled here has not taken place in isolation. Rather, it
is one of several pertinent changes to the strategic landscape surrounding
comparative corporate governance and tax over the last decade and a
half. Most conspicuously, several developed countries outside the United States have progressively walked down their own headline tax rates
during this time, gradually enlarging the evident "gap" between American tax rates and those of its closest international comparators. 2' Along
with the stockpile of retained foreign earnings that American MNCs
have steadily built up, this widening gap in headline rates has no doubt
altered the economic calculus that underlies inversion decisions. My argument is not that the federalization of governance has been more important than these tax changes in driving inversions per se, but rather
that it has greatly facilitated and simplified that calculus: Governance
federalization has materially reduced the incremental costs of inverting,
just as comparative tax changes have gradually enhanced the corresponding benefits. These simultaneous forces, I argue, have reinforced
one another (perhaps unwittingly and unnecessarily).2 2 An appropriate
regulatory response, therefore, should be mindful of both of them as

well.23
The remainder of this Article will proceed as follows: Part I will provide a high-level overview of how the corporate tax system in the United
States interacts with the structuring of both foreign and domestic MNCs.
Of particular interest here are the creative (yet fragile) ways that domestic MNCs utilize special ownership structures and intercompany transactions-short of an inversion-to minimize and/or defer tax liabilities.
While such strategies can be effective, they can also impose risks and
costs. In Part II, I will add inversion calculus to the mix, documenting
the advantages such transactions can sometimes have over more traditional tax management techniques. At the same time, however, the relative advantages of inversions simply do not translate to all firms and all
settings. The Part will close by describing how securities law has, over

21

See infra Figure 1.

22 In Part III, I will provide empirical evidence that governance considerations and tax
concerns both warrant consideration in assessing the attractiveness of inverting.
23 In contrast, a regulatory change concentrating solely on taxes-such as a transition to a
territorial tax regime-would do nothing to address the unbundling phenomenon. As I show
below, such reform myopia could plausibly prove destructive of economic welfare over the
long term.
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the last fifteen years, incrementally displaced and preempted state corporate law through a series of federal corporate governance mandates. Notably, these mandates apply to all public companies, whether incorporated/taxed in the United States or not. Part III will turn to my core
conceptual arguments, presenting and analyzing a simple, gametheoretic framework for analyzing multi-attribute regulatory competition
in tax and corporate governance offerings. Here I will demonstrate how
a leader in providing strong corporate law and governance rules (such as
the United States) may be able to withstand even substantial international tax competition without being drawn into a ruinous arms race in setting tax rates. Significantly, however, my analytic framework will expose a key necessary condition for the United States to enjoy such
competitive insulation: It must be able to bundle tax and nontax regulatory attributes into a single, conjoined regulatory package. Troublingly,
many of the most radical reform efforts recently proposed lose sight of
this point, and they would ultimately have the effect of unbundling tax
and governance even further. Myopic attention to tax competition, while
eschewing its interaction with other regulatory dimensions, is both
shortsighted and misguided. Part IV then applies the insights of this
framework, considering two plausible reform approaches from a securities market perspective.24
I.FEDERAL TAXATION OF MULTINATIONAL ENTITIES: A HIGH-LEVEL
PRIMER

In order to appreciate the role that inversions play in multinational
corporate structuring-as well as to assess the prospects of success for
proposed reforms-one must first understand some of the basic contours
of U.S. tax law, specifically as applied to U.S. and foreign multinationals. These basic characteristics animate myriad corporate tax minimization and avoidance strategies-ones that include (but are hardly limited
to) inversions. This Part endeavors to provide this overview at a high
level, focusing on the details that are most central to the enterprise in

24 A technical appendix following Part IV provides some of the more general arguments
underlying the regulatory competition model developed in the text. See infra Appendix A.
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)

this Article. (I do not endeavor to provide a comprehensive roadmap to
all relevant dimensions of international corporate tax.2 5
Although all international tax regimes necessarily share some similarities, a great part of unlocking the inversions puzzle hinges on differences-and particularly those differences that distinguish the domestic
U.S. approach from those of most other jurisdictions. In relation to its
comparators, the American regime is relatively unique in its combination of three central traits: (1) relatively high "headline" tax rates; (2) incorporation-based tax residency rules; and (3) worldwide (rather than
territorial) reach. These three traits conspire to create significant returns
for effective tax avoidance strategies. I discuss each of these considerations (and their joint consequences) below.
A. Nominal Tax Rates
Consider first the nominal corporate tax rates imposed by the United
States. For ordinary "C" corporations, the United States imposes entitylevel taxation on the net earnings a corporation generates prior to distributions to shareholders (such as through dividends or share repurchases). The imposition of entity-level tax itself does not make the United
States unique. What does, however, is the significant heft of the rate that
U.S. corporations must pay on such earnings. Although federal corporate
income tax rates vary according to pre-tax corporate earnings from a low
of 15% to a high of 39% , the dominant tax bracket for most moderatesized (or larger) corporations is 35%, which takes effect once the corporation's taxable net earnings exceed approximately $18.3 million per
year.2 6 This figure, moreover, excludes state corporate tax, which itself
ranges between 0% and 9%. All told, most U.S. corporations of any material size face a marginal "headline" tax rate (state and federal combined) hovering around 40%.27

25 Those seeking more in-depth overviews should consult detailed corporate structuring

treatises, such as Martin D. Ginsburg, Jack S. Levin & Donald E. Rocap, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Buyouts (Feb. 2012).
26 See I.R.S. Instructions for Form 1120, at 17 (2014), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/

irsqdf/i1120.pdf.
See Corporate Tax Rates Table, KPMG, http://www.kpmg.com/globallen/services/tax/
tax-tools-and-resources/pages/corporate-tax-rates-table.aspx (last visited Mar. 26, 2015).
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Figure 1: Headline Marginal Tax Rate (Selected Countries)
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Headline tax rates in the United States have always been high relative
to other jurisdictions, but in recent years the gap has widened. As Figure
1 illustrates, the combined headline rate in the United States far exceeds
that in a host of other comparator jurisdictions, a list that significantly
includes the destinations of several recent inversion transactions (such as
Ireland at 12.5%, the UK at 21% and falling, and Canada at 26.5%).28
Moreover, as illustrated in the figure, many of these comparator jurisdictions have been progressively reducing their headline tax rates over the
last fifteen years. And, unlike individual taxation, where income may be
taxed at different rates depending on its source (for example, ordinary
income versus short-term dividends versus capital gains and long-term
dividends), corporate income tax rates generally apply to all sources of
income. Although a variety of accounting and financing strategies exist
to reduce U.S. corporations' effective taxes well below the headline rate
(described at greater length below), U.S. corporations still bear a significant tax bill for any remaining net taxable earnings they recognize.

28 See id.
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B. Residency Rules
In addition to its high rates, the United States explicitly links a corporation's "residency" for tax purposes to its jurisdiction of incorporation.29 Delaware-incorporated entities, for instance, are treated as United
States residents for tax purposes, even if they have very little operational
or managerial activity in the United States. Here the United States appears to be in a slight minority, although some other countries also mandate an "incorporation" rule to determine tax residency.30 Several other
variations appear to be slightly more common, such as pegging a corporation's tax residency on the location of its corporate "headquarters."
This latter inquiry tends to focus on where "central management and
control" rest, which often coincides with the place the board generally
meets and (possibly) where central management's offices are located."
In yet other jurisdictions hybrid approaches prevail, where corporations
can be deemed residents if either they are incorporated there or their
headquarters are located there.32
C. Worldwide Income
Finally, U.S. tax rates have historically applied to a corporation's
worldwide income, not just that portion that is generated within domestic borders. Hence, it matters not whether most of the profits of a U.S.
corporation are generated from its activities here or abroad-the U.S. tax
code will eventually attempt to reach and tax all its earnings (subject to
some important caveats, discussed below)." Although the United States
is not unique in taxing worldwide corporate income, it is in a distinct
minority. Most other states in the developed world utilize a "territorial"
approach to taxing MNCs, in which they tax only that portion of the
corporation's net income deemed to be generated within the relevant tax
jurisdiction, substantially exempting distributions from controlled foreign subsidiaries. 4
I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4) (2012).
Donald J. Marples & Jane G. Gravelle, Cong. Research Serv., R43568, Corporate Expatriation, Inversions, and Mergers: Tax Issues 12 (2014).
" See, e.g., Robert Couzin, Corporate Residence and International Taxation 25 (2002).
32 Id. The U.K. and Ireland, while traditionally embracing a hybrid rule,
are trending prospectively towards a place of incorporation rule. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
13 See I.R.C. § 951 (2012) (discussed infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text).
34 Beyond the United States, the only other OECD countries that utilize a worldwide tax
regime are Chile, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Korea, Poland, and Mexico. All others are general29
30
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Over the years, the heterogeneity of worldwide and territorial tax
rules (as well as residency tests) has necessitated several compromises
within many jurisdictions' codes. For example, for countries using a territorial regime, it is critical to determine exactly which revenues and
costs are generated within each relevant territory. Elaborate rules that
endeavor to prevent "base shifting" to low-tax locations have attracted
(and continue to attract) significant attention among reformers. Although
the worldwide income taxation approach in the United States does not
have to contend as centrally with base-shifting problems, it necessarily
confronts the fact that controlled foreign companies ("CFCs") are themselves generally subject to the tax codes of their foreign domiciles, paying taxes on that basis. Accordingly, the U.S. tax code (as well as other
worldwide tax regimes) grants a credit for foreign taxes already paid,
and the foreign operations are liable only to the extent that tax liability
under U.S. law would exceed that amount. (Given the high marginal
rates in the United States-see above-that is frequently the case.) Second, income recognition rules within the U.S. tax code tend to permit
American multinationals to defer U.S. recognition of earnings in their
CFCs, so long as those earnings remain within the foreign subsidiary's
coffers and are not "repatriated" to the U.S. parent (through, for example, a dividend or share repurchase).

ly classified as territorial systems. Thornton Matheson, Victoria Perry, & Chandara Veung,
Territorial vs. Worldwide Corporate Taxation: Implications for Developing Countries 4 tbl. 1
(Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/13/205, 2013). It is worth noting that many
territorial systems do not fully exempt 100% of repatriated foreign earnings from domestic
taxation (usually exempting around 95%), and thus the distinction between territorial and
worldwide taxation systems is less one of kind than of degree of exemption. Id. at 8. Moreover, when a country's headline tax rate is relatively low (such as Ireland's at 12.5%), the distinction between worldwide and territorial treatment ceases to be important, since such systems routinely grant an offset for foreign taxes paid (at the presumably higher foreign rates).

See Rosanne Altshuler, Stephen Shay & Eric Toder, Tax Policy Ctr., Lessons the United
States Can Learn From Other Countries' Territorial Systems for Taxing Income of Multinational Corporations 15-16 (Jan. 21, 2015), available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/

publications/url.cfn?ID=2000077.
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Figure 2: U.S. Tax System compared to Foreign Territorial Tax Systems 35
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D. RepatriationReckoning
The intersection of high headline tax rates, residency rules, and the
global reach of U.S. tax law makes it clear why incorporation in the
United States can (all else constant) be disadvantageous to MNCs. Figure 2 illustrates this point conceptually, comparing two hypothetical
multinational parents. The first (depicted on the left) is incorporated in
the United States, and the second (depicted on the right) is incorporated
abroad. Assume that the applicable corporate tax rate in the United
States is 35% (applied on a worldwide basis), compared to 20% in the
foreign jurisdiction (which is applied only territorially). Each company
has two multinational subsidiaries-one doing business in the United
States and the other doing business in the foreign jurisdiction-and each
subsidiary generates $100 in pre-tax earnings." The foreignincorporated multinational will generally be required to pay the applicable jurisdictional rate for each of its subsidiaries based on their locus of
operation. Thus, it will pay $35 (35%) in tax to U.S. tax authorities and
$20 (20%) to foreign tax authorities, leaving it with a total of $145 in

3 The figure assumes-for illustration's sake-a U.S. rate of 35% and a foreign rate of
20%.
36 The numerical values are simplified for illustrative purposes. I also assume for illustration that a territorial system grants a full exemption for foreign earnings, even though (as
noted above) most territorial systems fall slightly short of that.
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post-tax income (which may then be distributed upstream to the foreign
parent tax-free under the foreign jurisdiction's tax rules). The U.S. corporation looks similar at first-it, too, owes $35 to U.S. tax authorities
and $20 to foreign tax authorities based on each subsidiary's earnings.
And, just as before, it may effectively transfer the U.S. subsidiary's
post-tax earnings ($65) to the parent on a tax-free basis as a consolidated
entity. However, should the U.S. parent receive a distribution of the foreign subsidiary's post-tax earnings ($80), the dividend will be taxable
and the U.S. parent will owe domestic authorities an additional tax to
"level up" the foreign sub's tax bill to U.S. rates of 35% (or a total of
$35). After crediting the $20 worth of foreign tax paid by the subsidiary,37 U.S. tax authorities would collect $15 in additional tax when the
dividend is paid and the earnings repatriated. The net result for the U.S.
multinational is $130 in post-tax earnings, falling far short of the $145
enjoyed by its overseas comparator. Such margins are significant, particularly in highly competitive global industries.
What (if anything) can a U.S.-incorporated parent do to avoid U.S.
tax liability on its extraterritorial earnings? Not a lot, it turns out, so long
as the parent insists on "upstreaming" the earnings of its CFCs.38 However, so long as a foreign subsidiary retains its earnings without distributing them to the parent, those earnings will (mostly) remain nontaxable
in the United States. 39 Moreover, the parent may not even have to recog" See I.R.C. §§ 901-03 (2012).
* See I.R.C. §§ 951-52 (2012). A "CFC" is defined under Subpart F of the Code as a foreign corporation with "United States shareholders" (U.S. persons each owning, directly, indirectly, or constructively, at least 10% of the voting stock of the foreign corporation) who
together own more than 50% of the voting power or value of the foreign corporation's outstanding shares. (The thresholds are reduced for certain purposes in the case of insurance
companies.) See I.R.C. §§ 951(b), 957. Thus, any 100% owned foreign subsidiary of a U.S.
parent generally qualifies.
It bears reemphasizing that for all its odd features, a worldwide tax system arguably assuages a thorny practical issue that territorial tax systems invite: strategic profit shifting.
Figure 2 has implicitly assumed that each of the U.S. and foreign subsidiaries generates $100
in pre-tax earnings. However, in many multinationals, subsidiaries may do business with one
another through various types of loans, leases, supply contracts, services contracts, and other
transfer pricing schemes. The foreign parent in Figure 2 has a strong incentive to set the
terms of such transactions so as to shift net income into the foreign sub, which is taxed at a
lower rate. Such profit shifting schemes, however, may be less lucrative to the U.S. parent,
whose subsidiaries all ultimately receive the same tax rate. (That said, U.S.-parented MNCs
still have some incentive to shift profits to the extent they do not intend to repatriate them, as
explained below.)
9 See I.R.C. §§ 951-65 (2012). An exception is when a controlled foreign corporation has
passive income, say from financial assets of other companies it owns. Here, Subpart F rules
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nize a deferred tax liability in its financials if such CFC earnings are
deemed "permanently reinvested earnings" under Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles ("GAAP"). 4 0 Consequently, virtually all U.S.
multinational parents have come to favor strategies that retain extraterritonal earnings within their overseas CFCs. Such strategies functionally
achieve the deferral of domestic tax liabilities, potentially indefinitely.
Nevertheless, the practice of warehousing liquid assets within foreign
subsidiaries is not a paragon of good capital budgeting practices for a
variety of reasons. First, the parent may have several profitable investments that could utilize the retained earnings, but which cannot be undertaken at the CFC level. While the foreign subsidiary's retained earnings could be an inexpensive source of funds, the tax cost of repatriating
such funds can be prohibitive. More subtly, unrepatriated earnings may
be susceptible to any number of risks from exchange rate volatility, interest rate fluctuations, political risk, and the like; 41 and while some of
these risks can be hedged, the cost of doing so may be unattractive. 42 Finally, the overall scale of unrepatriated earnings is appreciable. It is estimated that the aggregate amount of cash held by foreign-incorporated
subsidiaries of U.S. multinationals is somewhere in the neighborhood of
two trillion dollars.4 3 While much of this sum is not literally "stranded"

generally cause that income to be recognized as accruing to the parent. The standard rationale for this constraint is that passive income streams are highly mobile and U.S. parents
would have excessive incentives to move such income streams into the subsidiary to get deferral. Arguably for these same reasons, most international tax regimes have something akin
to worldwide reach as to passive income.
40 Codification of Accounting Standards and Procedures, Recognition of Income Taxes
No. 740, § 30-25 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2015) [hereinafter C.A.S. § 740-30-25],
which requires recognition of deferred taxes from a CFC's future distributed earnings. Although recognition is a default presumption under C.A.S. § 740-30-25-3, the presumption can
be rebutted if the U.S. parent discloses an intent and ability to reinvest the CFC's undistributed earnings indefinitely. Id. at C.A.S. §§ 740-30-25-3, 740-30-25-17.
41 See, e.g., Jason Shemntob, Interested in Amazon Stock? Don't Ignore These Overlooked
Risks, DailyFX (May 3, 2013, 2:08 AM), http://www.dailyfx.com/forex/fundamentallarticle/
special report/2013/05/03/InterestedInAmazonStockDontIgnore EamingsRepatriation_
and Currency Translation Risks.html.
4
rSee, e.g., Chana Schoenberger, Exposed! As Currency Volatility Rises, Companies
Scramble to Avoid Being Caught with Their Hedges Down, Wall St. J., Mar. 2, 2011, at
C1O.
43 See Kate Linebaugh, How Firms Tap Overseas Cash: U.S. Companies Can Borrow Millions of 'Trapped' Funds from Foreign Units if They Follow the Rules, Wall St. J. (Mar. 29,
2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323361804578388522312624686
(estimating the value at $1.7 trillion as of early 2013); accord Andrew Bird et al., Does the
U.S. System of Taxation on Multinationals Advantage Foreign Acquirers? 2-4 (Rotman Sch.
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overseas per se (indeed, many CFCs hold their cash substantially within
U.S. bank accounts 44), the tax-related restrictions on its deployment described above remain intact.
That said, U.S. multinationals have devised-over the course of many
decades-admirably conniving strategies to access their CFCs' marooned monetary morsels. A common tactic for tapping offshore earnings is through intercompany loans from the foreign subsidiary to the
parent. While U.S. tax rules often deem such loans to constitute dividends for tax purposes 45 (and therefore taxable as per Figure 2), there are
some limited (but well-trodden) exceptions under Section 956 of the Internal Revenue Code, which spells out criteria under which certain intercompany loans are deemed nontaxable.4 6 When implemented deftly,
these exceptions can unlock an enormous source of stranded liquidity.
And unlock it they have: In recent congressional testimony, for example,
Hewlett Packard executives conceded that they utilize such tax-free intercompany loans routinely, at approximately the same intensity as they
access third-party credit through the vast commercial paper market-to
the tune of $1.6 billion in balances on an average day.47
Nevertheless, CFC loan loopholes can be temperamental and cantankerous creatures, an artifact of their complicated habitat in the tax code.
Most centrally, Section 956 requires any such loans to be short-term in
nature, and they generally cannot remain outstanding beyond the end of
the subsidiary's fiscal quarter. Should a CFC loan remain open beyond
the quarterly fiscal close, it may still avoid taxation if the debt is satisfied within thirty days of the time it is incurred. However, this thirty-day
exception cannot be recycled without bound: if any CFC's upstream
loan is held open for more than sixty days during a tax year, for example, the thirty-day tolling exception is no longer applicable to that CFC,
and the loan will be held to constitute an "investment in U.S. property"

of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 2550819), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2550819;
Dhammika Dharmapala et al., Watch What I Do, not What I Say: The Unintended Consequences of the Homeland Investment Act, 66 J. Fin. 753, 753-54 (2011) (documenting pentup demand for repatriations at the time of the 2004 federal tax holiday).
4 See Rob Garver, Nearly S1 Trillion in Off Shore Profits Is in U.S. Banks, The Fiscal
Times (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2015/04/20/Nearly-1-Trillion-ShoreProfits-US-Banks.
45 See I.R.C. § 956(c)(1)(C) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.956-2(a)(1)(iii) (2013).
46 See I.R.C. § 956(a).
47
Linebaugh, supra note 43.
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(and therefore taxable).48 Consequently, unlike commercial paper, repos,
and other short-term borrowing instruments, individual CFC loans cannot "roll over" to remain effectively outstanding on a continual basis.
Even here, however, U.S. multinationals have devised some clever adaptation strategies, since Section 956 rules hinge on the identity of the specific CFC extending credit. HP, for example, has established a practice
of taking alternating short-term loans from two different controlled foreign subsidiaries, a practice almost certainly designed to avoid the appearance of a continuous long-term loan.49 While undeniably creative,
such strategies also may tempt fate by triggering anti-abuse rules, which
give the IRS some discretion to declare technically or facially compliant
intercompany loan schemes abusive, and therefore taxable.so Moreover,
such arrangements may still lock up a significant amount of cash, since
the participating CFCs are not allowed to pool their cash (or the technique falls apart). Consequently, a parent may need upwards of $2 billion in cash reserves located at the CFC level in order to make use of $1
billion in the United States (since each of the CFCs must have their own
segregated source of liquidity). Finally, because these intercompany
transactions (even the more creative ones) are constrained to be short
term, it could remain difficult to hedge various types of exchange-rate,
market, and regulatory risks that attend locking up assets in a foreign entity.
One last strategy that can dampen the tax sting from repatriating
stranded assets is to embrace a leveraged capital structure at the U.S.-

.

48 See I.R.S. Notice 88-108, 1988-2 C.B. 445 (stating the basic rule); I.R.S.
Gen. Couns.
Mem. AM 2007-0016 (Sept. 25, 2007) (affirming that, after the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, the application of § 956's "30/60" rule now applies to fiscal quarters).
49 Linebaugh, supra note 43. The HP technique takes advantage of the fact that § 956 pivots off the CFCs' fiscal quarter ends. Consequently, by setting up CFCs with different taxable years (and hence different quarter end dates), it is possible for one subsidiary to have
loans outstanding over the other subsidiary's fiscal quarter end, and thus neither subsidiary
would trigger a tax inclusion.
soTreas. Reg. § 1.956-1T(b)(4)(i) (2013). Indeed, the IRS has successfully challenged
some similar intercompany loan strategies that use a series of short-term, one-month loans
from the same CFC that effectively replicate the cash flow patterns of a continuous longterm loan. See Rev. Rul. 89-73, 1989-1 C.B. 258-59; Jacobs Eng'g Grp. Inc. v. United
States, 97-1 T.C.M. (CCH) 87,855, 87,756-58 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff'd, 99-1 T.C.M. (CCH)
87,786, 87,787 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that twelve successive month-long loans made by a
U.S. parent company's Panamanian unit to the U.S. parent amounted to a repatriation of
funds). For a detailed analysis of this case, see Lowell D. Yoder & Sandra P. McGill, Treatment of CFC Loans to U.S. Affiliates: The Sword and Sickle of Subpart F, 26 Tax Mgm't
Int'l J. 454 (1997)

1668

VirginiaLaw Review

[Vol. 101:1649

parent level. Holding aside any intercompany loans it receives from
CFCs, a U.S. parent might engage in long-term borrowing from third
parties, possibly distributing such funds to shareholders through a dividend or share repurchase-sometimes known as a dividendrecapitalization-thereby increasing the parent's overall leverage ratio. Because the
interest expense associated with the U.S. parent's third-party debt is deductible to the parent, those debt service payments can help shield CFC
cash repatriations from additional U.S. tax liability. Moreover, the value
of the assets held in CFCs (reflected through their stock held by the parent) can augur the parent's general credit-worthiness, and can even provide some limited security for third-party lenders (if utilized carefully").
Several major U.S. MNCs have utilized this leveraging strategy to great
effect, most notoriously Apple Inc., which in 2013 executed what was at
the time the largest single corporate bond offering in history (over $17
billion) at effectively triple-A rates.52 Although leverage is recognized as
having tax advantages generally, its utility for shielding repatriated foreign earnings makes debt financing arguably more attractive to U.S.based MNCs. At the same time, in the quest to seek tax relief through
leverage, a company may invite bankruptcy risks, debt overhang problems, and risky managerial decisions.53
A different dimension of tax avoidance pursued by U.S.-based MNCs
concentrates on the tax liabilities of CFCs prior to repatriation. Multinationals frequently set up special structures among their affiliated subsidiaries to reduce the foreign tax liabilities of those subsidiaries irrespective of repatriation. Many of these arrangements hinge on a flavor of
jurisdictional arbitrage, employing (for example) licenses or leases of
s Significant caution is warranted in pledging CFC stock or assets to secure third-party
loans to the parent. Under § 956's rules, third party loans may be deemed distributions from
the CFC if the CFC acts as a guarantor, or if its assets "indirectly" serve as security for the
loan. See Treas. Reg. § 1.956-2(c)(2). A safe harbor defense to this rule is triggered when the
domestic parent pledges no more than 67% of the voting stock in the foreign subsidiary. Id.
52
Katy Burne & Mike Chemey, Apple's Record Plunge into Debt Pool: Offering Sets Record; Demand Was More Than $50 Billion, Wall St. J. (April 30, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SBl0001424127887324482504578454691936382274. Five months later, this bond
offering was eclipsed by a $49 billion offering by Verizon, itself a large U.S.-parented MNC
with significant foreign subsidiaries. See Matthew Robinson, Verizon Raises $49 Billion in
Largest Corporate-Bond Sale, Bloomberg Bus. (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2013-09-1 1/verizon-plans-49-billion-bonds-in-largest-company-offering-ever.
5 See, e.g., Hayne E. Leland & David H. Pyle, Informational Asymmetries, Financial
Structure, and Financial Intermediation, 32 J. Fin. 371 (1977) (analyzing the problems posed
by a leveraged capital structure in project choice).
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intangible property to exploit anomalies or inconsistencies among foreign tax jurisdictions. The effect is to reduce (and sometimes eliminate)
foreign tax liability. A common variant of this scheme is popularly
known as the "Double Irish" structure, pictured in Figure 3. Under this
approach, a U.S. parent sets up two subsidiaries (sub 1 and sub 2), both
of which are incorporated in Ireland. sub l's headquarters, however, are
in a tax haven (such as Bermuda), while sub 2's are in Ireland. Irish tax
law broadly permits (until recently 54) the location of corporate "headquarters" to determine tax residence, and thus sub 1 would be considered
a Bermudan tax entity (where there is no corporate tax). 5 sub 1 is endowed with rights to various of the parent's hard-to-value intangible assets (for example, patents, trademarks, copyrights, etc.) which it then licenses to sub 2 at relatively high (but hard to value) royalty rates.56 Sub 2
then acts as manufacturer/distributor of all the parent's foreign sales,
pursuant to a manufacturing cost sharing arrangement with the U.S. parent. Its royalty payments to sub 1 are fully deductible under Irish law,
and thus sub 2 shows little or no net earnings, which are capitalized into
the royalty amount. sub I of course shows significant earnings, but it is
taxed at the Bermuda rate of zero percent.

54 See infra note 59 (documenting a phased-in change in Irish tax residency rules).
5s See
56 The

Corporate Tax Rates Table, supra note 27.
two foreign subs can elect under U.S. law to be treated on a consolidated basis, and
therefore, any royalty or other transfer payments between them are disregarded for U.S. tax
pu5oses. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (2014).
The cost sharing arrangement is usually required under U.S. law to keep sub 2 from being deemed a domestic subsidiary under U.S. law. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7A.
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Figure 3: "Double-Irish" Structure for Foreign Tax Avoidance
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The Double Irish structure-along with its variants 58 -effectively
shifts the MNC 's tax base among foreiganjurisdictions in order to concentrate them in the jurisdiction with the most favorable tax treatment.
As noted above, profit shifting is a dilemma endemic to territorial tax
systems, though it is (arguably) less of a problem in systems that tax
worldwide income. (Notably, Ireland recently imposed more significant
constraints on the prospective use of the Double-Irish structure, substantially removing prospectively the option to peg an Irish corporation's tax
residency on the location of its corporate headquarters' 9). Nevertheless,
Figure 3 does not consider that Ireland imposes a withholding tax on all royalties paid to
non-E.U. tax entities (which includes sub 1, a Bermuda tax entity). However, if such royalties are paid to tax entities in other E.U. countries (such as the Netherlands or Malta), no
such tax is imposed. Thus, a somewhat more common variant on the Double-Irish structure
interposes a Dutch subsidiary between sub I and sub 2 to act as a pass-through entity for the
royalty, thereby sidestepping any withholding tax. This variant is sometimes called the
"Double Irish Dutch Sandwich" structure. See Jeffrey L. Rubinger & Summer Ayers LePree,
Death of the "Double Irish Dutch Sandwich"? Not So Fast, Taxes Without Borders (Oct. 23,
2014), http://www.taxeswithoutbordersblog.com/2014/10/death-of-the-double-irish-dutchsandwich-not-so-fast.
59 See Finance Act of 2014 (Act No. 37/2014) § 43 (Ir.), available at http://www.oireachtas.ie/
documents/bills28/acts/2014/a3714.pdf. Specifically, all corporations incorporated in Ireland
after January 1, 2015 will be deemed to be Irish corporations, regardless of the location of
their headquarters. Companies incorporated in Ireland before 2015 will be grandfathered in
on January 1, 2021. Id. The reforms, however, specifically exempt bilateral treaties between
Ireland and other jurisdictions that codify the management test. Id. at § 43(1)(a)(2). Notably,
58
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note that even if a structure such as the above succeeds in reducing the
U.S. parent's foreign tax liabilities to zero (or near zero), it does not
solve the problem of stranded offshore cash. If anything, successful base
shifting between CFCs exacerbates matters: By causing the multinational to avoid most or all foreign taxes, base shifting results in a U.S. issuer's CFCs collectively holding an even largerstock of untaxed assets. If
or when that cash is ever repatriated, the parent will not face a modest
"leveling up" tax equal to the difference between foreign and U.S. nominal rates; rather, the tax bill associated with repatriation will be a far
more discontinuous jump to the full 35-40% marginal rate of combined
state and federal tax that most multinationals face in the United States.
All told, the very foreign tax reduction strategies ingeniously pioneered
and adopted by U.S. multinationals have significantly amplified the
costs of repatriating those assets.
Finally, in addition to these well-known tactics, U.S. MNCs have pursued even more aggressive strategies to reduce and even eliminate their
CFCs' tax liabilities through the political process. Several European jurisdictions, for example, specifically grant favorable tax treatment to income earned through intellectual property licenses as opposed to other
corporate income (so-called "innovation boxes").6 0 Such treatment,
when combined with territorial tax treatment and the notorious difficulty
in valuing IP rights, can facilitate base shifting among international affiliates. 6 1 And bolder approaches also appear to have been pursued, usually

both Malta and United Arab Emirates have such treaties with Ireland, suggesting that a modest adaptation of the strategy may remain viable. See Rubinger & LePree, supra note 58.
60 These include Belgium, France, Ireland, Hungary, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Spain, the Swiss Canton of Nidwalden, the United Kingdom, Malta, and Cyprus. In general, these special rates are less than half the applicable corporate income tax
rate, and in some cases (such as Malta) as low as zero. See Lisa Evers at al., Intellectual
Property Box Regimes: Effective Tax Rates and Tax Policy Considerations 1 (Nov. 2013)
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dpl3070.pdf). Recent legislation in the United States has similarly proposed reduced tax rates of around 10%
on "qualifying income from patents and other intellectual property assets." See, e.g., John D.
McKinnon, Lawmakers Unveil Tax Plan on Intellectual Property, Wall St. J. (July 29, 2015,
2:52 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/lawmakers-unveil-new-tax-plan-on-intellectualproperty-1438195972.
Interestingly, just as the Irish Finance Act constrains the "Double Irish" structure, see
supra note 59, the Irish Department of Finance is contemplating further relaxation of its conditions on IP Box treatment, so that "monoline" Irish IP licensors could potentially achieve
an effective tax rate as low as zero percent. See Irish Tax Alert: Finance Bill 2014: Impact
on Multinational Corporations, Deloitte (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www2.deloitte.com/content/
dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-alert-ireland-231014.pdf.
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by more prominent and larger MNCs. Regulators in Brussels, for example, recently brought charges against Apple Inc. relating to alleged illegal agreements it entered with Irish authorities as early as 1991 to receive special tax-favored status (along with unusually low rates). 62 These
charges add to the stock of other creative strategies that-it has
emerged-Apple employed to great effect, such as the creation of CFCs
with no declared tax residence whatsoever and thus, they contended, no
required tax liability. 63 Although these investigations are still underway,
Apple has since been joined by several other MNCs that have come under similar scrutiny.64 And the fact that such activities have raised the ire
of international tax regulators (regardless of whether any U.S. MNCs
will ultimately be forced to answer monetarily) suggests an additional
vulnerability of the status quo.
Nevertheless, because this last set of strategies principally implicates
foreign tax liabilities, they once again do little to address the problem of
stranded overseas assets (and-as noted above-they may even exacerbate such problems by increasing the marginal costs of repatriation).
Consequently, U.S. MNCs have continued to accrue significant sums of
overseas cash that is expensive to repatriate, cumbersome to access, and
increasingly risky and costly to hold. It is perhaps unsurprising, then,
that issuers began to look for an alternative strategy-a strategy they
found in the tax inversion.
II. CORPORATE INVERSIONS: THE NEW, NEW (OLD) MATH

Given the attendant costs and risks associated with "stranding" capital
in CFCs (which can themselves be magnified by aggressive tax avoidance strategies), the resurgence of tax inversion transactions among U.S.

62 Tim Bradshaw et al., Apple Hit by Brussels Finding over Illegal Irish Tax Deals, Fin.
Times (Sept. 28, 2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ae979adO-4708- 1e4-8c50-00144fea
b7de.html#axzz3a8ZbchXp.
63 Id. See generally Edward D. Kleinbard, The Lessons of Stateless Income, 65 Tax L.
Rev. 99 (2011) (evaluating proposals to address stateless income planning); Chris William
Sanchirico, As American as Apple Inc.: International Tax and Ownership Neutrality 2-4

(Feb. 26, 2014) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-2394227) (analyzing the meaning and significance of "ownership nationality" to the taxation of multina-

tionals).
6 Analogous investigations have been launched, for example, against Starbucks, Fiat, and
Amazon. See Tom Fairless, Huge Profit Stokes Concerns over Starbucks's Tax Practices in
Europe, Wall St. J. (Apr. 6, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/starbuckss-tax-practices-

draw-european-scrutiny- 1428363189.
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MNCs was perhaps unsurprising. This Part provides an overview of
such transactions, their history, and the evolving set of regulatory constraints that the United States has promulgated in response. I then turn to
a pragmatic analysis of which types of firms-in the light of these and
other impediments-are likely the best (and worst) candidates to invert.
The Part closes by analyzing in greater depth one such evident impediment: the requirement that inversion targets abandon U.S. (and most
commonly Delaware) corporate law. Here, I argue that while this impediment is clearly a real one historically, its significance has faded for publicly traded companies over the last fifteen years, as federal mandates
have progressively overshadowed and preempted state corporate governance laws, effectively unbundling tax and governance.
A. Overview and Regulatory Evolution
The intent behind an inversion transaction is to relocate the tax residence of a U.S. MNC parent outside of U.S. jurisdiction, transplanting it
into a jurisdiction offering a more favorable tax environment. As noted
in the previous Part, there are a host of foreign jurisdictions that offer
lower tax rates, territorial (rather than global) tax treatment, more flexible tax residency rules, and more liberal recognition rules than does the
United States. The most creative forms of inversion transactions, therefore, attempt to capitalize on these differences in a way that is maximally beneficial-all things considered-for the inverting corporation.
Given the upsurge in inversion activity of late, it is important to keep
in mind that tax-avoidance-motivated merger transactions are hardly
new. Indeed, an early border skirmish in the public battle over inversions took place over two decades ago, when in 1994, Helen of Troy, a
publicly traded Delaware corporation in the personal care and cosmetics
industry, formed a shell subsidiary in Bermuda (which at the time, as
now, had no corporate income tax), causing the subsidiary to acquire the
parent in a stock-for-stock transaction. 6 6 Under the then-prevailing tax
An inversion need not exploit all of these tax differences to be attractive. Ireland, for
example, has been a popular recent inversion destination notwithstanding its worldwide tax
regime, as its low headline rates and permissive tax avoidance rules tend to swamp other factors. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
66 A stock-for-stock acquisition of a parent by a wholly-owned subsidiary is a standard and
unremarkable move in M&A (even if it has no logical parallel in, say, family law). Notably,
another U.S. issuer, McDermott Inc., had done something similar to Helen of Troy in 1983,
when it arguably pioneered this strategy to move its jurisdiction of incorporation to Panama.
65
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rules, this transaction-like any other stock deal-was deemed nontaxable to U.S. shareholders. Once the transaction closed, moreover, the
surviving parent continued to be traded in the U.S. public markets under
Helen of Troy's name, but with incorporation and tax residency in Bermuda.
The Bermudan tax abduction of Helen of Troy raised considerable
alarm at the time about the use of captive subsidiaries to escape U.S. tax
treatment-sometimes known as a "naked" or "shell" inversion. The
U.S. Department of the Treasury soon thereafter dispatched a response,
in the form of a set of anti-inversion regulations promulgated in 1996.
The ultimate reforms made a naked inversion decidedly more expensive
by deeming it a taxable event to U.S. shareholders of the inverted company unless the U.S. target's equity was diluted by new foreign ownership by no less than 50%.68
Although this first generation of reforms possibly deterred a fair
number of inversion transactions, it proved little more than a nuisance to
others. 69 For example, the taxable nature of the transaction to shareholders mattered little if most shareholders of the inverting U.S. MNC were
tax-exempt entities, or already had a high tax basis in their holdings, or
were non-U.S. taxpayers. In addition, some acquisitions are designed to
be taxable in any event (and many buyers in fact prefer taxable deals beSee, e.g., Zachary Mider, The Greatest Tax Story Ever Told: How U.S. Companies Learned
to Relocate their Official Addresses Overseas and Avoid Taxes-in One Operetta, Bloomberg Bus. (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2014-12-18/i-hearamerica-singing-never-pay-taxes-the-inversion-operetta (describing the transaction).
" See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B) (1994).
68 See I.R.C. § 367 (2000) (allowing U.S. shareholders to recognize taxable gain (but not
loss) in inversion transactions). Although such gain can be avoided in some circumstances,
the § 367 implementing regulations make it effectively impossible to avoid them short of a
significant shareholder dilution. Specifically, those conjunctive conditions are as follows:
(a) The U.S. Target in the aggregate receives 50% or less (by vote and value) of the
Non-U.S. Acquirer
(b) The U.S. Target's directors, officers, and 5% shareholders that are U.S. persons
own 50% or less (by vote and market value) of the Non-U.S. Acquiror
(c) The Non-U.S. Acquiror is engaged in an "active trade or business" outside the
United States and the value of the Non-U.S. Acquiror is at least equal to the value of the U.S. Target, and
(d) The U.S. shareholder either (i) owns less than 5% (by vote and value) of the
Non-U.S. Acquiror or (ii) enters into a five-year "gain recognition agreement."
See Treas. Reg. § 1.367(a)-3, (as amended by T.D. 8702, 1997-8 I.R.B. 4).
69 Indeed, it is possible that by clarifying the ground rules for consummating legitimate
inversions, the reforms may have catalyzed other such transactions. See infra Figure 4 and
accompanying text.
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cause they involve an attractive basis adjustment to the target's assets
and goodwill). Finally, even if some subset of shareholders were required to recognize some tax liability at the individual level, those costs
were arguably dwarfed in many cases by the prospect for greater tax
savings at the corporate level. Consequently, even after the 1996 reforms, several public U.S. MNCs continued to pursue the strategy (either by meeting the 50% threshold or by entering a taxable transaction).70 Much of this calculus remains relevant today.
Eight years later, through the 2004 American Jobs Creation Act,7 1
Congress added a second round of double-barreled reforms that have become the centerpiece for structuring most of today's inversions. First,
Section 4985 imposes a 15% "excise tax" on stock remuneration of officers, directors, and large block shareholders of the inverting company-a measure clearly intended to visit direct financial consequences on
corporate decision makers. 7 2 The levy is triggered if the transaction results in the U.S. target's shareholders retaining at least 60% ownership
of the surviving entity (by vote or value). It is difficult to sidestep the
excise tax in practice, although in some cases U.S. targets can accelerate
the vesting schedules of stock options compensation packages to blunt
its force. Many inversions also manipulate the incidence of the excise
tax, "grossing up" the compensation of any directors, officers, or block
shareholders for any additional tax liability owed. Though commonplace, such strategies can prove expensive, since gross-up payments are
themselves subject to both the excise tax and personal income tax rates.
The terms of the recent Medtronic-Covidien transaction, for example,
required Medtronic to underwrite a $63 million dollar gross-up fund for

70 Between the 1996 reforms and the subsequent 2004 reforms, nineteen public U.S.
companies executed inversion transactions, including Tyco (1997), Fruit of the Loom (1998),
Ingersoll-Rand (2001), and Herbalife (2002). Appendix B contains a compilation public outbound inversion transactions since 1994. See Shayndi Raice, How Tax Inversions Became
the Hottest Trend in M&A: Tax Inversions a Major Driver in Cross-Border Deals, Wall St. J.
(Aug. 5, 2014, 3:34 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-tax-inversions-became-thehottest-trend-in-m-a- 1407240175.
71 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (2004) (codified as amended in scattered sections of I.R.C.)
72 I.R.C. § 4985 (2012).
7 See id. The tax applies to the equity compensation of officers, directors, and block
shareholders of any affiliated group member who qualify as reporting persons under § 16(a)
of the Exchange Act, as well as any fiduciary who held that position during the previous six
months. Id.
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its officers and directors, in order to offset (on an after-tax basis) an initial excise tax liability of no more than $23.25 million.74
The second prong of the 2004 reforms was much more direct. Section
7874 sets out criteria by which the IRS would simply ignore the expatriation aim of the transaction, treating the surviving parent as a "surrogate" U.S. company-and taxing it as such-no matter where it was incorporated. Specifically, the section (and surrogate status) applies to
transactions in which three conjunctive criteria are met: (1) the foreign
buyer acquires (directly or indirectly) substantially all of the properties
held by a U.S. corporation; (2) the former shareholders of the U.S. target
end up owning at least a specified floor (either 60% or 80%) of the surviving entity's stock; and (3) the expanded affiliated group that includes
the foreign acquiring corporation does not have "substantial business activities" in the foreign acquiring corporation's country of incorporation
when compared to its overall business activities of the expanded affiliated group.76 Under the terms of Section 7874, an inversion transaction
can still procure favorable tax treatment (and avoid U.S. taxation of the
surviving entity) if the inverter can demonstrate that the transaction
flunks at least one of the above three conditions.
In many inversions, however-particularly those that are predominantly tax avoidance plays-conditions (1) and (3) are satisfied. The acquiring foreign parent in a typical inversion traditionally does, in fact,
acquire all or substantially all of the properties of the U.S. targetindeed, the principal aim of such transactions is to remove those properties (to the extent possible) from U.S. tax treatment, which requires a
substantial acquisition. (Moreover, standard successorship clauses in the
target's contractual instruments tend to require any sale to be a substantial transfer.7 7 ) In addition, it is unlikely that a significant fraction of a
U.S. inverter's ventures will be located in the destination jurisdiction for
the transaction (particularly if that jurisdiction is chosen predominantly

74 Ajay Gupta, Grossing Up an Inversion Tax, 75 Tax Notes Int'l 806, 806 (Sept. 8, 2014).

I.R.C. § 7874 (2012).
Id.
n See Am. Bar Ass'n, Revised Model Simplified Indenture, 55 Bus. Law. 1115, §§ 5.015.02, at 1134-35 (2000) (permitting substitution of acquiring company only upon consolidation, merger, or transfer of all or substantially all assets). But see infra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing "spinversions").
7716

2015]

CorporateInversions

1677

for attractive tax rules), and thus the "no substantial business activities"
criterion would be flunked only through fortunate coincidence.
Therefore, the surest course in most cases for an inversion to obtain
favorable tax treatment is to focus on the ownership continuity thresholds from condition (2) above. Section 7874 articulates two distinct cutoff points for the maximum ownership stake the U.S. target's shareholders are allowed to retain in the post-transaction entity. The resulting tax
treatment of the surviving entity depends on which (if either) dilution
threshold it obtains. The first (and most favorable) threshold kicks in
when shareholders of the U.S. target retain less than 60% of the surviving foreign parent corporation (measured either by voting power or economic value), by reason of their ownership of U.S. target corporation
stock. When the former U.S. target shareholders are below this threshold
(and thus their ownership is diluted by more than 40%), then the transaction and the surviving entity receive extensive benefits, including full
prospective recognition of the surviving parent by U.S. tax authorities as
a foreign corporation.
The benefits are still appreciable-though not quite as extensivewhen the magnitude of dilution is smaller (that is, when U.S. target
shareholders end up owning more than 60% but less than 80% of the
surviving parent entity). Here, the surviving entity still receives foreign
residency tax status going forward, but there are some significant strings
attached. In particular, certain gains recognized by the U.S. target in the
inversion establish what amounts to a lower bound on the U.S. company's taxable income for the following ten years.79 Such amounts are taxable in full at the maximum corporate tax rate, with no standard offsets
(such as net operating losses) to shield the liability."

7 Under new interpretive guidelines promulgated by the IRS in 2012, "substantial business
activities" are present in any jurisdiction where the worldwide corporate group (post inversion)

has at least 25% of its: (1) employees (including employee compensation); (2) assets; and (3)
income. See T.D. 9592, 2012-28 I.R.B. 41, available at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irbl2-28.pdf
(explaining the temporary guidelines under Treas. Reg. § 1.7874-3T). Before 2012, that safe
harbor had been 10%, a threshold that was decidedly easier to meet. Id. It is worth observing
that a minority of recent inversions have nonetheless taken the position that the surviving
company met the "substantial business activities" test in the incorporation site of the surviving entity. These include Aon Corp., Rowan Companies, Tim Hortons, and Western Gold-

fields.
7 The U.S. company's taxable income (now as a subsidiary) over this ten-year period cannot be less than the "inversion gain," meaning the gain recognized on its transfer of stock or

assets plus certain royalty income from foreign affiliates. I.R.C. § 7874 (2012).
0
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Finally, if U.S. target shareholders retain 80% or more of the surviving parent (again measured either by voting power or value), then the
foreign acquiring corporation is treated as a surrogate U.S. corporation
for all U.S. tax purposes, and any of the foreign acquirer's pretransaction subsidiaries become CFCs of the surrogate entity. At this
threshold and above, the inversion not only fails as a tax avoidance
mechanism, but it may actually invite greater tax liabilities to the extent
that the foreign acquirer's affiliates are now under U.S. tax jurisdiction.
Figure 4: Organizational Structure of Standard Inversion (Reverse
Subsidiary Merger)
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Figure 4 provides a depiction of a typical inversion that is designed to
satisfy the 60% or 80% continuity thresholds. In the figure, a foreign acquirer creates a captive subsidiary ("Merger Sub") that merges with the
U.S. target, paying stock in the foreign acquirer as currency in the transaction." As a result of the merger, the foreign acquirer becomes the par-

While not pictured in Figure 4, keep in mind that the excise tax on compensation continues to apply when U.S. shareholders are diluted by less than 40%, and the transaction remains taxable to the inverter's shareholders when dilution falls short of 50%). The foreign
subsidiary may formally be deemed the acquirer under the applicable merger statute (as illustrated), or it may be acquired by the U.S. company in a "reverse subsidiary merger." Alt81
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ent of the U.S. target (and all its subsidiaries). Former shareholders of
the U.S. target emerge with stock of the foreign acquirer, and sit alongside shareholders of the acquiring corporation with an ownership claim
that is designed to meet the relevant threshold (either 60% or 80%, depending on what tax benefits the parties are hoping to receive).
In some transactions, it can be difficult to meet the relevant dilution
thresholds, because the U.S. "target" is simply too large relative to the
foreign "acquirer" to produce the desired extent of dilution at a fair exchange rate for the stock transaction. Consequently, many such deals
have attempted to embellish the relative valuations of the parties-and
thereby satisfy the threshold-through a series of transactions meant to
put the U.S. corporation on a starvation diet and/or its foreign counterpart on a fiscal bender. A common strategy for the former was to cause
the U.S. target to pay a "skinny-down dividend," such as by borrowing
cash and paying it out as a dividend to shareholders, so as to reduce its
net assets and equity value and make it more comparably sized to the
target.8 2 Although longstanding IRS guidance dictated that such dividends were to be ignored if their "principal purpose" was to avoid antiinversion regulations," there are often ways to mask the rationale behind
the payment (including the use of cash as part of the consideration for
the acquisition of the U.S. target in the merger itself). Another common
strategy has been to "puff up" the evident value of the foreign acquirer
through aggregating passive assets (such as cash or stock of other companies) in retained earnings before executing the inversion.8 4 Other
structuring tactics include having the U.S. target, prior to the transaction,
spin off various divisions-or alternatively have the foreign buyer ac-

hough there are some tax implications of this latter structure, they are not as pertinent for the
pu oses of current discussion.
Several inversion transactions, such as Argonaut/PXRE (2007) and Valeant/Biovail
(2010), used such strategies. See, e.g., Valent Pharm. Int'l, Agreement and Plan of Merger
(Form 8-k, Ex. 2.1), 87-88 (June 23, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/930184/000095012310060187/y85150exv2wl.htm.
83 See I.R.C.§ 7874(c)(4) ("The transfer of properties or liabilities (including by contribution or distribution) shall be disregarded if such transfers are part of a plan a principal purpose of which is to avoid the purposes of this section.").
84 See, e.g., William R. Pauls, Inversion Notice Boxes Out Foreign Insurers and Reinsurers, 145 Tax Notes 1259, 1259-61 (Dec. 15, 2014) (noting that many foreign insurance and
reinsurance companies that have been active in the inversions market have significant passive assets).
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quire other foreign entities-to skew the balance. Similarly, some
deals involved a spinoff of a portion of a U.S. target to a newly formed
foreign corporation, distributing the stock of the new corporation to the
target's stockholders (also known as a "spinversion").86 Such structures
effectively reduce the size of the acquired entity relative to the acquiring
foreign corporation, so as to satisfy the applicable dilution threshold under Section 7874. If all else failed, one final approach would be to have
some of the consideration come in cash, or simply to grant the foreign
acquirer exceptionally attractive terms of exchange in the deal, so as to
justify a valuation that appears to hit the targeted dilution threshold. 7
In addition to complying with the requisite conditions prescribed by
the U.S. tax code, of course, the inversion transaction must also satisfy
applicable conditions in the foreign jurisdiction where tax residency of
the surviving entity is sought. Thus, for example, if the transaction seeks
tax residency in a jurisdiction that utilizes a "corporate headquarters"
test, the headquarters of the resulting entity could not remain in the
United States, but would have to be moved to the foreign location. Many
recent inversions with surviving Irish parent corporations (such as Medtronic-Covidien) opted to make this move.

8 See, e.g., Ajay Gupta, News Analysis: Will PayPal's Spinoff End in an Inversion-or
Two?, 76 Tax Notes Int'l 188, 193-94 (Oct. 20, 2014) (analyzing the use of pre-transaction
spinoffs for satisfying § 7874).
86 One notable example is Mylan's acquisition of Abbott Laboratories' foreign generic
drug assets. See Michelle Fay Cortez, Mylan to Add Abbott's Generic-Drug Unit, Cut Tax
Rate, Bloomberg Bus. (July 14, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-14/abbottto-sell-generic-drug-unit-to-mylan-for-5-3-billion.html. It should be noted that both spinoffs
and "spinversions" may create problems in allocating the U.S. corporation's debt, and some
debt covenants specifically prohibit such piecemeal sales. See Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz,
Spin-Off Guide 1, 14 (2014), available at http://www.wlrk.com/files/2014/SpinOffGuide.pdf.
8 Whether this last strategy might be a violation of fiduciary duties is a matter addressed
below. See infra notes 108-07 and accompanying text.
88 Joseph Walker, Medtronic's Tax Inversion: Not as Easy as It Seems, Wall St. J. (June 19,
2014, 7:24 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/medtronics-irish-jig-not-as-easy-as-it-seems-14
03220286.
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Figure 5: Percentage Share of Surviving Inversion Entity Owned by
Public Shareholders of the U.S. Target, by Relevant Ownership
Threshold Cutoff Bands (Source: Appendix B)
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Although the tax reforms of the 2000s clearly added teeth to the U.S.
anti-inversion rules, the track record since suggests the changes were either ineffectual or were overpowered by other factors. Indeed, in the
decade between the Helen of Troy inversion and 2004, a total of twentytwo inversions were announced in which a U.S. public company proposed to move its tax home abroad. In the ensuing decade between the
2004 reforms and 2014, in contrast, there have been more than twice that
number (forty-nine), and twenty such transactions have been announced
since 2012 alone. 89 That is not to say that inversion transactions have
been impervious to the evolving regulatory landscape: To the contrary,
the nature and composition of deals have changed significantly in response to the rule changes that have occurred over the last decade and a
half. Figure 5 above illustrates one such change, summarizing the own-

89

See infra Appendix B; Raice, supra note 70.
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ership fraction retained by public U.S. target shareholders of the surviving entity for announced inversions between 1994 and the end of 2014.
As the figure demonstrates, deal structure has responded discernibly to
the changing regulatory landscape. Before the 2004 reforms took effect,
the vast majority (86%) of inversions skewed heavily towards "naked"
self-inversions. That number declined significantly after the 2004 reforms (to 45%), as a greater fraction of deals were structured to comply
with the relevant dilution threshold tests under Section 7874. Selfinversions virtually disappeared from the scene after 2012, when additional IRS guidance tightened the "substantial business activities" test as
an alternative to the dilution thresholds.9 0 Nevertheless, the tax advantages of inversions evidently remained too lucrative for many U.S.
issuers to pass up. During the 2013-14 years, fully nine-tenths of announced deals fell within one of the two size dilution buckets prescribed
under Section 7874 (60% and 80%). During the summer of 2014, just as
President Obama was making the pronouncement reproduced at the beginning of this Article, most analysts eagerly awaited what response (if
any) would come from Congress, Treasury, or others.
That response came in September 2014, when the U.S. Treasury issued new Guidance intended to place more significant constraints on the
attractiveness of tax inversions. 9' The new Guidance did not (and indeed
could not) alter the 60% or 80% statutory thresholds established under
Section 7874. However, the new rules do make it harder for parties to
engage in familiar parlor tricks designed to make a transaction compliant
with targeted dilution thresholds. For example, the new restrictions
heavily constrain skinny-down dividends, disregarding "extraordinary"
dividends made during the three-year period that precedes the transaction. 92 Additionally, the value of the foreign acquirer must be computed
independent of passive asset holdings (such as cash or passive invest-

90 See supra note 78.

91 I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, 2014-42 I.R.B. 712. The Secretary of Treasury is given considerable authority under § 7874 to make adjustments to the application of the statute "as are necessary to prevent the avoidance of the purposes of this section." See I.R.C. § 7874(g) (2012).
92 The Guidance defines such a dividend or dividends to be in excess of (1) all distributions made during the taxable year by the domestic target over (2) 110 percent of the average
of all distributions during the 36-month period immediately preceding such taxable year.
I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, 2014-42 I.R.B. 714. Significantly, "distributions" is defined broadly
in the Notice, and would implicate pre-inversion spinoffs (even if done tax-free under I.R.C.
§ 355). See Gupta, supra note 85.
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ments) when at least 50% of the entity's assets are passive. The new
rules also place new hurdles in the way of "spinversion" transactions by
treating the spun-off assets (even if incorporated abroad) as a U.S. corporation for tax purposes.94 Another important area where the 2014
Guidance tightens up scrutiny is in post-inversion intercompany loans.
The guidelines specifically deem as taxable "hopscotching" loans in
which the CFCs owned by the U.S. target lend capital directly to the foreign acquirer. That is, these "hopscotching" loans are deemed for tax
purposes to have been passed through the U.S. target-for a period of
ten years after the inversion. Consequently, such payments continue to
have to satisfy the I.R.C. Section 956 constraints discussed above,95 and
are otherwise treated as taxable distributions to the U.S. target.
It is still perhaps premature to declare definitively what durable effects the 2014 Guidance will have. On the one hand, the Guidance imposes nontrivial impediments for deal structuring, ones reflected in acquisitions that were signed (but not closed) at the time of the rule
change. 9 6 In fact, the $55 billion AbbVie/Shire deal was ultimately derailed substantially by the new rules, with AbbVie opting to pay a $1.64
billion break fee rather than attempt to restructure the transaction.9 7
Moreover, the pace of inversions announced in the months following the
release of the Guidance slowed to a relative trickle. The first four

9 I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, 2014-42 I.R.B. 712, 714. Prior guidelines excluded passive assets
only if they were part of a transaction related to the merger (so-called "stuffing" transactions).
94 Specifically, the Guidance partially closes an exception in § 7874 that deals with internal group restructuring, and which had allowed U.S. parents to move assets to a foreign spinoff entity, distributing the spun-off stock to the U.S. parent's shareholders. The Guidance
calls for future regulations that will deem such foreign spin-offs to be domestic corporations
for U.S. tax purposes, thereby eviscerating the tax benefits of the restructuring transaction.
See Fact Sheet: Treasury Actions to Rein in Corporate Tax Inversions, U.S. Department of the
Treasury (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/

jl2645.aspx.
95 See supra notes 39-53 and accompanying text.
96 These include the then-pending inversions of Abbott Labs/Mylan (a "spinversion"),
Medtronic/Covidien, and AbbVie/Shire. Shares in each of these companies were off discernibly in the hours after Treasury released the Guidance. See Maureen Farrell & Steven Russolillo, The Inversion Trade: Stocks Selling Off on Treasury Guidance, Wall St. J. (Sept. 23,
2014),
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/09/23/the-inversion-trade-stocks-selling-offon-treasury-guidance. Nevertheless, only the AbbVie/Shire merger ended up being derailed
by the new rules; the other two closed after some restructuring. See infra Appendix B.
7 Shire Gets $1.64B Breakup Fee from AbbVie, CBS News (Oct. 20, 2014, 7:00 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/shire-gets- 1-64b-breakup-fee-from-abbvie.
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months of 2015, for example, saw but two announced inversionS98-far
off the pace from a year before, even as overall M&A activity remained
historically robust.99
On the other hand, there are several signs that the reform may be too
little too late for some potential targets. First, the act of clarifying the
ground rules for inversions can, paradoxically, provide a strategic playbook for architects of future transactions. (Perhaps consequently, more
than a half dozen U.S. companies announced inversions after new reforms were proposed in September 2014.)00 Second, within some industries (such as pharmaceuticals), the emigration genie appears not only to
be out of the bottle, but acting as a veritable M&A shadchan: Several of
the surviving foreign entities from previous inversions (such as Activis,
Mylan, Endo, Tim Hortons, and Valeant) are now large enough to satisfy relevant tax dilution thresholds with many U.S. targets. And accordingly, several have been lining up for seconds (if not thirds).'0 o

98 These are Arris (April 2015) and Cyberonics (February 2015). See Cecile Daurat & Amy

Thomson, Pace Soars as Arris Agrees to $2.1 Billion Inversion Deal, Bloomberg Bus. (Apr. 23,

2015, 5:09 AM), http://www.bloomberg.comI/news/articles/2015-04-22/arris-agrees-to-acquire-

u-k-based-pace-for-2-1-billion.
99 Dan Primack, M&A Mania: Deal Activity Hits 8-year High, Fortune (Mar. 31, 2015,

3:37 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/03/3 1/ma-mania-deal-activity-hits-8-year-high.
100 See All My Bags Are Packed: Corporate America's Tax-Driven Exodus Continues, The
Economist (August 15, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/business/21660986-corporateamericas-tax-driven-exodus-continues-all-my-bags-are-packed. As one commentator put it: "In
a perverse way, Treasury's most effective weapon may have been ambiguity .... [W]ith [the]
guidance, it is likely that lawyers will attempt to restructure many transactions to satisfy the
new rules." Howard Gleckman, Treasury's New Rules May Slow, But Won't Stop Corporate
Tax Inversions, Forbes (Sept. 23, 2014, 6:41 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2014/
09/23/treasurys-new-rules-may-slow-but-wont-stop-corporate-tax-inversions.
1o1 The cross-border acquisitive activity of such prior inverters has thus far been limited
however: Although the number of outbound acquisitions (inversions and others combined) in
the months since the Treasury's crackdown declined, the aggregate dollar volume of announced outbound deals increased somewhat. See David Crow et al., Tax Inversion Curb

Turns Tables on U.S., Fin. Times (Mar. 15, 2015, 10:36 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/
elba6eb0-ca5c-11e4-b8ff-00144feab7de.html#axzz3UVhNpbS5. That said, the uptick in
outright foreign acquisitions of U.S. firms (to the extent one exists) is more likely a piece of
a dramatic increase in overall global M&A activity during this time. See Amanda Athanasiou, Did Treasury Cause an Increase in Foreign Takeovers?, 78 Tax Notes Int'l 514, 514

(May 11, 2015).
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B. You Get an Inversion; YOU Get an Inversion; EVERYBODY Gets an
02

Inversion?I

Given the tax inversion's prominence in contemporary policy debates,
one might conclude that it is now a dominant strategy for most/all domestic MNCs. Empirical evidence does not bear out that inference: Despite extensive media coverage, comparatively few inversion transactions have been executed during the last two decades.10 The overall
modesty of these numbers plausibly reflects the complicated and idiosyncratic regulatory landscape surrounding inversions. Some U.S. companies are likely---even after the most recent Treasury Guidance-to
want to pursue them still; but for others, the costs and difficulties of inversions are likely to be prohibitive relative to other available options.
Put simply, inverting is not the most profitable strategy for all firms,
suggesting that the current wave may well abate without additional regulatory reforms.
Although cataloguing each consideration relevant to inversion calculus is beyond the scope of this Article, it is worthwhile noting some of
the most significant ones briefly:
Domestic Orientation:As noted above, the principal benefit of inverting comes from the favorable tax treatment accorded to taxable income earned abroad. If a U.S. corporation's income is derived largely
from domestic operations, most of its earnings will remain taxed at
U.S. rates, regardless of the jurisdiction of incorporation. Similarly,
the subsidiaries of the U.S. target often still fall under American tax
rules after the inversion. 10 4
Alternative Strategies: Even for MNCs with substantial international
operations, it is important to keep in mind that inversions are but one
of several tax management tactics in play. The various noninversion
strategies for reducing or deferring domestic tax liabilities (detailed at
length above'os) continue to be available alternatives to an inversion.
Consequently, while the 2014 Guidance appears to have fallen short of
102 See Look Back at Oprah's Free-Car Giveaway,
The Oprah Winfrey Show (Sept. 13,
2004), http://www.oprah.com/oprahshow/Oprahs-Entire-Audience-Are-Surprised-with-NewCars-Video.
103 By my count, there were approximately seventy inversion transactions announced between 1994 and 2014, or between three and four per year. See infra Appendix B.
104 Walker, supra note 88.
05 See supra notes 25-64 and accompanying
text.
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quashing the profitability of all inversions, it may still have deterred a
significant fraction of firms from pursuing that path, simply by making other conventional tax avoidance strategies marginally more attractive by comparison.
Stockpiled Foreign Tax Credits: The CFCs of several large U.S. multinationals-particularly in natural resource extraction industries-pay
significant concession fees to foreign governments that are routinely
(if controversially) characterized in part as taxes, even when the foreign country has otherwise miniscule corporate income tax rates."o'
Over time, such MNCs have amassed large arsenals of foreign tax
credits that can help shield future repatriated distributions. Inverting
would likely cause such companies to squander these considerable tax
assets.
Shareholder Opposition: Some U.S. shareholders may find inversion
transactions objectionable for a variety of reasons. First, as noted
above, the applicable tax rules require these transactions to dilute U.S.
shareholders, thereby giving them less influence over the surviving
company. Second, most such transactions-unless significantly dilutive-are taxable to U.S. stockholders, regardless of the consideration
paid. Should the U.S. target have significant numbers of taxable U.S.
shareholders with large capital gains, or significant holdings by
founders or other holders who want to maintain a modicum of influence, an inversion transaction might prove extremely unpopular, making approval less certain. 107
A Bleak (and Expensive) Singles Scene: In some industries, the population of acceptable foreign dancing partners is small, and potentially
expensive. Even if a willing partner emerges, it can be hard to find one
that is sufficiently large to meet the dilution thresholds described
above (particularly so after the 2014 Guidance made it difficult to manipulate these boundaries). This scarcity is perhaps reflected in the
terms of some recent deals, where the implied valuations have been
eye-popping. AbbVie, for example, agreed to terms that valued its
U.K. counterpart, Shire, at twenty-four times Shire's EBITDA and
106 See Exxon Corp. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 338, 359-60 (1999); Phillips Petroleum
v.
Comm'r, 104 T.C. 256, 257-62, 316 (1995).
107 Laura Saunders, An 'Inversion' Deal Could Raise Your Taxes: Shareholders
Are Likely to Owe Capital-Gains Tax, Wall St. J. (Aug. 1, 2014, 12:34 PM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/how-a-corporate-inversion-could-raise-your-taxes- 1406910874.
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Medtronic agreed to a 14.3 multiple for Covidien, discernibly above
recent norms.108 Moreover, deals that run very close to these dilution
margins can be risky and challenging to structure. For example, it may
be prohibitively hard to negotiate a "floating" exchange rate in a merger (which could turn on the U.S. target's stock price), since a sudden
upturn in the target's value could cause the terms of the deal to trip a
dilution threshold (with adverse tax consequences).
Legal Challenges: Almost all acquisitions of public companies give
rise to some sort of legal challenge. Inversion transactionsnotwithstanding their tax benefits-are no exception. The terms of the
acquisition may be subject to a host of potential challenges, ranging
from complaints about the imposition of tax liability, to self-dealing,
to Blasius-based challenges of improper manipulation of the shareholder governance franchise, to Revlon-based challenges asserting that
the foreign acquirer received excessively generous terms of trade
(possibly to make the transaction meet the relevant dilution threshold). 109

Technical Challenges: Because inversion transactions are virtually all
strategic (rather than financial) mergers, there can be challenges in in-

108 See Soyoung Kim, Amid Tax Inversion Craze, Some U.S. Companies Get Cold Feet,
Reuters (Aug. 25, 2014, 6:19 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/25/usa-taxinversions-bubble-idUSL2NOQR12W20140825. EBITDA stands for "earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization," and such multiples are a standard benchmark for
valuations. In recent years, mean deal multiples have tended on average to be comfortably
below lOx. See, e.g., Am. Appraisal, Global M&A Valuation Outlook 2014, at 6, available
at http://global.american-appraisal.com/AA-Files/Library/PDF/MAGlobalOutlook_2014.pdf.
109 See, e.g., C & J Energy Servs. v. City of Miami Gen. Emp. and Sanitation Emp. Ret.
Trust, 107 A.3d 1049, 1052-53 (Del. 2014); City of Miami Gen. Emp. and Sanitation Emp.
Ret. Trust v. C & J Energy Services, No. 9980-VCN, 2014 WL 6696435 (Del. Ch. 2014)
(applying Revlon scrutiny to an inversion transaction structured to transfer more than fifty
percent of control of the U.S. Target to a controlled foreign acquirer, in order to satisfy dilution thresholds under I.R.C. §§ 7874 and 367). In December 2014, the Delaware Supreme
Court reversed, holding Vice Chancellor Noble had misconstrued what Delaware law requires of a target board in a Revlon transaction. The Supreme Court assumed for discussion,
however, that Revlon was applicable, refraining from making a determination on whether
reserving significant post-acquisition minority rights could render the Revlon test inapplicable. See C & JEnergy Serv., 107 A.3d at 1052-53 (Del. 2014). Shareholders have also challenged "grossing up" provisions in deals meant to make executives and directors whole for
the inversion excise tax. Such a suit is currently in progress regarding the Medtronic deal.
Marino Eccher, Medtronic Shareholder Sues over Merger Tax Compensation Plan, Pioneer
Press (Oct. 6, 2014, 7:02 PM), http://www.twincities.comibusiness/ci 26674591/medtronicshareholder-sues-over-merger-tax-compensation-plan.
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tegrating the operations of the two participants. Corporate cultures and
legal traditions can differ significantly. Moreover, inversions can require shifting to different accounting protocols (for example, GAAP to
IFRS), which can prove cumbersome.
Regulatory Challenges: Particularly large transactions may face significant regulatory risk from competition authorities, foreign-directinvestment boards and even takeover panels. Particularly in industries
where deal momentum has been considerable, industry concentration
may soon grow substantial enough to invite serious antitrust scrutiny
to new acquisitions (a factor that ultimately stymied the inversion
transaction between Applied Materials and Tokyo Electron 1o). To the
extent that such scrutiny entails some discretion by government actors,
the current maelstrom surrounding inversions in the United States may
heighten that risk further. Moreover, a significant form of regulatory
risk can come from U.S. and foreign tax authorities themselves, who
can (and do) retroactively alter the rules on tax treatment when a deal
is part way between signing and closing (as occurred with the nowabandoned Abbvie-Shire transaction").
JurisdictionalRoulette: A final possible downside to inverting-and
one that animates much of the rest of this Article-is jurisdictional:
Under U.S. tax rules, an inversion requires moving the firm's incorporation home away from the familiar jurisprudential stomping grounds
for U.S. public companies-typically Delaware law 12-and into the
domain of a foreign jurisdiction (such as Ireland, the U.K., Canada,
etc.). Not only might that new jurisdiction be relatively unfamiliar, but
surrendering U.S. law could prove particularly costly for those firms
and investors that benefit by "bonding" to the contours of Delaware
law. Moreover, the Delaware safety net likely earns its keep at pivotal
crisis moments in a corporation's lifetime, where both the Chancery
Court and the Delaware Supreme Court have developed reputations
for swift, sophisticated, principled, and relatively predictable adjudica110 See Takashi Mochizuki et al., Applied Materials, Tokyo Electron Cancel Merger Plan;
Deal Collapses After Firms Give up on Winning Antitrust Approval, Wall St. J. (Apr. 27, 2015,
10:42 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/applied-materials-tokyo-electron-scrap-merger-plan1430117758.
1" See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
112 As detailed below, approximately 64% of U.S. inversion targets since 1994 (forty-six
of seventy-two) expatriated from Delaware-a proportion that reflects Delaware's overall
dominance in public company incorporations. See infra Appendix B.
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tion.113 How a foreign jurisdiction handles similar crisis moments is
still unclear.1 14 Inverting can thus carry a material collateral cost as to
corporate internal affairs-the company must trade in a strong and
familiar hand for a brand new deck with a brand new dealer.' 15
Although it is unlikely that each of the aforementioned factors carries
identical weight for all aspiring inverters, their aggregation can be sufficient to render the tax inversion game unworthy of the candle-at least
for some companies. Perhaps consequently, some commentators have
pointed to signs (corroborated by early data) that the inversion frenzy
will begin to slow on its own accord, even without an extra push from
tax policy.

116

C. InternalAffairs, CorporateGovernance, and the Loss of Delaware
Jurisprudence
This Part closes by offering a more in-depth analysis of the final of
the aforementioned costs of inverting: the loss of U.S. (and often Delaware) jurisprudence to expatriating corporations. How large a cost is associated with swapping Wilmington for London or Belfast? Reasonable
minds can (and do) differ, and the issue is challenging to measure empirically. Nonetheless, Delaware's traditional dominance in attracting incorporations-and its record of maintaining that dominance-has been
the topic of untold reams of academic writing. The prevailing views fall
into one of three general camps, summarized below.
According to one line of argument, Delaware's focal popularity is an
artifact of a regulatory "race to the bottom," in which corporate managers prefer Delaware because it offers a manager-friendly structure that
(in their minds) takes precedence over broader considerations of share-

113 See, e.g., Donald F. Parsons Jr. & Joseph R. Slights IlI, The
History of Delaware's
Business Courts: Their Rise to Preeminence, 17 Bus. L. Today, March/April 2008, at 21, 2223, available at https://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/2008-03-04/slights.shtml.
114 As one senior partner put it in a recent interview: "It sounds easy enough when
you are
just scheduling quarterly board meetings in some exotic locations. . . . But then if you're in
the middle of an M&A deal or activist situation and the board has to meet frequently, we've
seen this can become an administrative burden." Kim, supra note 108 (quoting Mario Ponce
of Simpson Thatcher & Bartlett).
115 As I will argue below, however, this last collateral cost may not be as large as it once
was, due to the progressive federalization of corporate governance. See infra Section II.C.
116 See Kim, supra note 108.
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holder (or company) welfare."' According to this account, corporate
boards and CEOs-who control incorporation and reincorporation decisions-are naturally drawn to jurisdictions that provide them with a
buffer against liability and shareholder monitoring. Consequently, regulatory competition tends to reward jurisprudential pandering to managerial self-interest and private benefits of control.
A second camp argues that Delaware's persistent position as a jurisprudential juggernaut is due to path dependent network externalities,
whatever the reasons for the state's initial dominance."' According to
this account, most practicing lawyers have been traditionally schooled in
Delaware corporate law, and they therefore have a natural inclination to
preserving its contours. Therefore, regulatory competition is likely to
have muted effects, since incumbent legal professionals have a stake in
(and comfort with) the current dominant regime.11 9
A third camp-and likely a measured majority of corporate law
scholars and practitioners-tends to believe that corporate governance
"matters," and that Delaware's legal framework and accompanying institutions add-all told-net economic value to public companies by encouraging governance practices that tend to serve shareholders' interests. 12 0 Even assuming managers would otherwise covet a management
friendly (and investor unfriendly) regime, the argument goes, embracing
such a regime would substantially impair the firm's access to low-cost
debt and equity capital. Other U.S. jurisdictions more unabashed in their
117 E.g., Lucian Bebchuk et al, Does the Evidence Favor State Competition
in Corporate
Law?, 90 Calif. L. Rev. 1775, 1783 (2002); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate
Law:
11 8 Reflections upon Delaware, 83 Yale L.J. 663, 663 (1974).
E.g., Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law,

55 Stan. L. Rev. 679, 738-39 (2002).
119 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk:
Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 Yale L.J. 553, 557 (2002) (arguing Delaware's powerful incumbency deters active state competition).
120 Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law 148 (1993); Robert Daines,
Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value? 62 J. Fin. Econ. 525, 533 (2001) (arguing Delaware law enhances shareholder value by as much as five percent); Daniel R. Fischel, The
"Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. Rev. 913, 919-20 (1982); William Savitt, The Genius of the Modem Chancery System, 2012 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 570, 571; Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law,
Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. Legal Stud. 251, 275-76
(1977); Albert B. Crenshaw, Delaware Inc., Wash. Post (May 7, 2000) http://www.washington
post.com/archive/business/2000/05/07/delaware-inc/fddd53ab-ebde-4176-9ce5-6817f2af609f;
Steven Lipin, Firms Incorporated in Delaware Are Valued More by Investors, Wall St. J. (Feb.
28, 2000, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB951694281741477590.
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solicitude for managerial interests, by contrast, have attracted less stable
firms that tend to manifest more problems for investors.121 (The state of
the literature regarding foreign jurisdictions-including popular inversion destinations-remains sparse. 122)
Empirically, the proposition that Delaware law creates value (at least
historically) enjoys some support. Through the end of the 1990s, in fact,
Delaware incorporation tended to predict significantly greater profitability and enterprise value than did non-Delaware incorporation.1 23 Later
research, however, has begun to demonstrate that the "Delaware effect"
has been inconsistent in the years since, with a tendency towards substantial atrophy over that time.1 2 4 Recent work by Martijn Cremers and
Simone Sepe, for example, finds that the traditional valuation premium
on Delaware incorporation abated substantially over the course of the
decade from 2002 through 2012,125 an effect corroborated in other
measures of jurisdictional quality as well.1 26 There are likely many reasons for this atrophying trend. However, one roughly contemporaneous
phenomenon-documented at some length by Mark Roe'2 7 and othersconcerned the interplay between state and federal securities law (as discussed in greater detail below).
In some contrast, substantial empirical evidence suggests that listing
in U.S. securities markets is associated with positive and persistent economic value creation. A large literature on cross-listed issuers, for example, demonstrates that listing on U.S. securities markets is associated
Michal Barzuza & David C. Smith, What Happens in Nevada? Self-Selecting into Lax
Law, 27 Rev. Fin. Stud. 3593, 3594-96 (2014) (finding that Nevada incorporations are significantly more likely to restate earnings than non-Nevada incorporators).
122 See Manuel Ammann et al., Product Market Competition, Corporate Governance,
and
Firm Value: Evidence from the EU-Area 1-7 (Apr. 14, 2011) (unpublished manuscript,
available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1771622) (reviewing literature).
123 See Daines, supra note 120, at
527-28.
124 Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. Econ.
& Org. 32, 33
(2004).
12 5
K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, Whither Delaware? Limited Commitment
and the Financial Value of Corporate Law 2, 19-20 (Nov. 4, 2014) (unpublished manuscript,
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=2519238).
126 See Brian R. Cheffins, et al., The Race to the Bottom Recalculated: Scoring Corporate
Law Over Time 82 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 261/2014,
2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-2475242 ("Our deployment of leximetric analysis indicates, for instance, there has been erosion of shareholder protections offered by state
law over the past century. This erosion was generally modest, however, suggesting that if
there was a meaningful race to the bottom, it did not occur during the twentieth century.").
127 Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 588,
592-93 (2003).
121
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with positive price reactions.1 28 Some of this literature suggests that a
key driver of this market premium comes through "bonding" of foreign
firms to the more demanding standards (including those related to corporate governance) in the United States.' 29 Although others have disputed
the channels through which this premium occurs,130 the bonding hypothesis continues to have significant support in the academic community.131
Perhaps a more telling understanding of the value of U.S. incorporation versus U.S. listing lies in understanding the joint relationship between them. Well into the late twentieth century, the two were conceived as legally orthogonal: Corporate law and governance matters
were considered the unique province of state law; U.S. securities regulation focused, in contrast, on maintaining a well-functioning trading market. This division of jurisdictional labor was famously acknowledged by
the U.S. Supreme Court nearly four decades ago:
[W]e are reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of
corporations that deals with transactions in securities, particularly
where established state policies of corporate regulation would be overridden. . . . "Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors
commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that,
except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of

128 See, e.g., John Ammer et al., Why Do U.S. Cross-Listings Matter?
1-4 (May 2008)
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1146605) (reviewing the literature and independently exploring the impact of cross-listing on stock value).
129 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 641, 691-92, 70607 (1999) (analyzing the role of bonding in foreign issuers' decisions to list in the U.S. markets); Craig Doidge et al., Why Are Foreign Firms Listed in the U.S. Worth More?, 71 J.
Fin. Econ. 205, 209-10 (2004) (arguing that cross-listing in the United States reins in expropriation by dominant and controlling shareholders, as well as other agency costs); Rend M.
Stulz, Globalization, Corporate Finance, and the Cost of Capital, 12 J. Applied Corp. Fin. 8,
9 (1999) (arguing that effective corporate governance lowers the cost of capital by reducing
information and agency costs).
130 Amir N. Licht et al., What Makes the Bonding Stick? A Natural Experiment Involving
the U.S. Supreme Court and Cross-Listed Firms 29-32 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper
No. 11-072, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1744905; Sergei Sarkissian & Michael J. Schill, The Nature of the Foreign Listing Premium: A Cross-Country Examination
4-5 (Darden Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 1639848, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract- 1639848.
131 Moreover, even if the U.S. listing premium is due to forces other than U.S. legal structure (for example, reputational bonding, or simply the liquidity of U.S. markets), the fact that
this benefit is not easily replicated makes it a plausible target for tax levies, as discussed further below.
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directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation."l 32

Times have indeed changed. Although the separation of corporate and
securities law was never entirely air-tight, the acoustic separation between them began disintegrating substantially after the bursting of the
dot-com bubble, as securities law began increasingly and progressively
to colonize corporate governance, preempting and displacing the mandates of state corporate law. While this federal incursion into governance has occurred along multiple fronts, at its vanguard have been two
landmark pieces of legislation (and their implementing regulations): the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("SOX")'33 and the Dodd-Frank Act of
2010 ("Dodd-Frank"). 134
The substantial federalization of corporate governance is multidimensional and widely acknowledged, drawing the attention of academic commentators, judges, and regulators over recent years, 135 along
with a lively-if characteristically raucous-debate about its normative
desirability.13 6 This federalization trend also appears manifest empirical132 Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (quoting
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S.
66, 84 (1975) (emphasis added)).
133 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of
U.S.C.).
134 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of U.S.C.).
135 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance
Round 11, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 1779, 1780-89, 1794-96 (2011); William W. Bratton and Joseph
A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of Corporate Federalism, 41 Wake Forest L. Rev.
619, 622-23 (2006); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Race for the Bottom in Corporate Governance, 95 Va. L. Rev. 685, 694-95 (2009); Jill E. Fisch, The New Federal Regulation of Corporate Governance, 28 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 39, 39-41 (2004); Mark J. Roe, A Spatial
Representation of Delaware-Washington Interaction in Corporate Lawmaking, 2012 Colum.
Bus. L. Rev. 553, 554-56; Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of
Quack Corporate Governance, 114 Yale L.J. 1521, 1523-29 (2005); Joel Seligman, A Modest Revolution in Corporate Governance, 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1159, 1159 (2005); Leo E.
Strine, Jr., Breaking the Corporate Governance Logjam in Washington: Some Constructive
Thoughts on a Responsible Path Forward, 63 Bus. Law. 1079, 1081-82 (2008); Daniel M.
Gallagher, Comm'r, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at the 26th Annual Corporate Law Institute, Tulane University Law School: Federal Preemption of State Corporate Governance
(Mar. 27, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/13705413159
52#.Uzr4pRb31US.
136
Compare Kate Litvak, The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Non-U.S. Companies
Cross-Listed in the U.S., 13 J. Corp. Fin. 195, 226 (2007) (showing negative effects of SOX
on foreign companies cross-listed in the U.S. exchanges), with Marcelo Bianconi et al., Firm
Value, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Cross-Listing in the U.S., Germany, and Hong Kong
Destinations, 24 N. Am. J. Econ. & Fin. 25, 42-43 (2013) (finding that SOX appears to have
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ly, as federal law has increasingly begun to overshadow state law in
providing the investor protections that are commonly included in standard corporate governance indexes.1 37 In some instances, the SOX-Dodd
Frank-era reforms extended or sharpened preexisting state law mandates; more often, however, the new rules entered arenas where state law
was silent-implicitly permitting issuer flexibility. Consider a sampling
of the corporate governance mandates that have become enshrined in
federal securities law during the last fifteen years alone:
Internal Controls: Perhaps the most notorious mandate introduced by
SOX is a requirement to include in the firm's annual report assessments by the chief executive officer, chief financial officer, and an
outside auditor of the effectiveness of the firm's internal controls over
the accuracy of financial statements.138
Certification of Financial Statements: Chief executive officers and
chief financial officers of U.S. issuers are required to certify the accuracy of the firm's periodic reports, and are subject to criminal penal9
ties for false certifications. 13
Executive CompensationRestrictions: Senior officers and directors are
now precluded from receiving many types of loans from their corporations. 14 0 Moreover, such fiduciaries are now required to make a significantly more complete disclosure of the elements of their executive
pay, 14 1 as well as a clear exposition of the relationship between execu-

discouraged U.S.-destination cross-listings, but that firms already cross-listed in the U.S.
"commanded a premium, due to the market perception of higher standards").
137 See, e.g., Cheffins et al., supra note 126 (conducting a historical "leximetric" analysis
of shareholder protections in Delaware, Illinois, and the collection of Model Business Corporation Act states, and finding that federal mandates have become the dominant driver of
shareholder protections in the modem era).
138 17 C.F.R. §§ 299, 308 (2011); see Management's Report on Internal Control over Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, 68 Fed.
Reg. 36,636, 36,636 (June 18, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 210, 228, 229, 240, 249,
270, and 274).
139 See Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, 67 Fed.
Reg. 57,276, 57,280 (Sept. 9, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 228, 229, 232, 240, 249,
270, and 274).
140 SOX, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 403, 116 Stat. 745, 787 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(k) (2012)).
141 See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158,
53,168-70, 53,208-09 (Sept. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 228, 229, 232, 239,
240, 245, 249, and 274).
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tive compensation and the issuer's financial performance.1 4 2 Under a
recent SEC rule change pursuant to Dodd-Frank, moreover, issuers
will be required to disclose the ratio of their CEO's pay to that of the
median employee. 43 In addition, in the event of an accounting restatement, the CEO and CFO must return to the issuer bonuses, incentives, or equity-based compensation they received prior to the issuance
of the restated financials, along with any profits they realized from the
sale of corporate stock during that period.144 Further regulations regarding "pay for performance" of CEOs also appear to be in the works
as of this writing.145
Board & Committee Structure: All publicly traded U.S. firms were required under SOX to have audit committees composed exclusively of
independent directors. 14 6 Later reforms from the exchanges required
majority independence of public companies' boards,14 7 as well as independence of all members of an issuer's compensation committee
(and its advisers), the latter reform required by Dodd-Frank.148
Broker Voting of Shares: Under a series of NYSE rule changes, broker-dealers are no longer permitted to vote "uninstructed" shares of
beneficial owners who have not submitted proxy instructions related
to directorial elections"4 9 and executive compensation matters. 50
Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 953, 124 Stat. 1376, 1903 (2010) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78n (2012)).
143 Pay Ratio Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 9877, Exchange Act Release No.
75610, 80 Fed. Reg. 50,104, 50,104 (Aug. 18, 2018).
'" Id. § 954, 124 Stat. at 1904 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-4(b) (2012)); SOX § 304, 116
Stat. at 778 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2012)).
145 See, e.g., Sunshine Act Meeting Notice, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Apr. 22, 2015), http://
www.sec.gov/news/openmeetings/2015/ssamtg042915.htm (announcing plans to consider a
regulation "requiring registrants to disclose in a clear manner the relationship between executive compensation actually paid and the financial performance of the registrant").
146 SOX § 301, 116 Stat. at 775-76 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m) (2012)).
147 See Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes and Amendments Relating to Corporate
Governance, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154, 64,154-55, 64,175-76 (Nov. 12, 2003).
148 17 C.F.R. § 240.10C-1(b) (2014); see Listing Standards for Compensation Committees,
77 Fed. Reg. 38,422, 38,428 (June 27, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 229 and 240).
149 Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by Amendment No. 4, to Amend
NYSE Rule 452 and Corresponding Listed Company Manual Section 402.08 to Eliminate
Broker Discretionary Voting for the Election of Directors, 74 Fed. Reg. 33,293, 33,293 (July
1,2009).
15 Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval to Eliminate Broker Discretionary Voting on Executive Compensation Matters, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,152, 56,152-54 (Sept.
15, 2010).
142
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Say on Pay: Under Dodd-Frank, issuers are required to conduct a nonbinding vote of shareholders no less frequently than once every three
years to approve the compensation of a public company's named executive officers.1 51

Proxy Access: The SEC was given authority under Dodd-Frank to alter
the rules relating to shareholder proxy voting of issuers.1 52 Shortly after its passage, the SEC promulgated several proxy access rules related
to shareholder proposals and director nominations, although the most
potent among them, Rule 14a- 11, was subsequently challenged and
(controversially) invalidated in the D.C. Circuit.1 5 3 Left intact, however, was a provision explicitly permitting shareholders to propose bylaw amendments that would require granting nomination power to
qualifying shareholders.1 54
CEO/Chair Identities: Public companies are required to disclose
whether the same person or different persons hold the positions of
CEO and Chairman of the Board. 55
Fiduciary Duties: The common law fiduciary obligations imposed on
officers, directors, and dominant shareholders are a defining characteristic of state corporate law. Even here, however, several post-Dodd-Frank
judicial decisions involving information management and insider trading have begun to embrace explicitly a federal standard for fiduciary duties, purportedly drawn from "federal common law."'5 6
151 Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899-1900 (2010) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2012)).
152 § 971, 124 Stat. at 1915 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n
(2012)).
153 For an analysis of the challenge to Rule 14a- 11, see Matthew Spitzer & Eric Talley, On
Experimentation and Real Options in Financial Regulation, 43 J. Legal Stud. S121 (2014).
154 After initially siding with issuers' attempts to exclude such proposals under the provisions of Rule 14a-8(i)(9) (dealing with proposals that conflict directly with management
proposals), the SEC has since retrenched to study the proper scope and application of the
section. See Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement from Chair White Directing Staff to Review Commission Rule for Excluding Conflicting Proxy Proposals (Jan.
16, 2015) (available at http://www.sec.gov/news/statement/statement-on-conflicting-proxyproposals. html).
'ss Dodd-Frank § 972, 124 Stat. at 1915 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-2 (2012)).
156 See, e.g., United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 369-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2012);
Steginsky v. Xcelera Inc., 741 F.3d 365, 367, 371 (2d Cir. 2014); cf. Starr Int'l Co. v. Fed.
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Related Party Transactions:Public companies are required to conduct
appropriate oversight and disclosure of all related party transactions
for potential conflicts of interest. 1 5
Shareholder Dilution: Public companies are required to obtain a
shareholder vote before any transaction or issuance of securities that
would result in a dilution of shareholders by twenty percent or
more.
Whistleblower Protections: The SEC is required to pay bounties (of
between ten and thirty percent of the amount collected) to individuals
who voluntarily provide original information leading to the successful
SEC enforcement of a violation of federal securities laws resulting in
monetary sanctions exceeding $1 million.15 9
It is important to acknowledge that the progressive federalization of
corporate governance-while substantial-has not been absolute, and
certain core tenets of state law have remained important factors in firm
governance. One domain where state law arguably retains appreciable
mojo is in antitakeover jurisprudence, where the Delaware Chancery
Court is an acknowledged bellwether, and where securities law has thus
far remained largely peripheral. An expatriated U.S. company could eas-

ily find itself the target of a hostile suitor, and beholden to the mandates
of an adopted jurisdiction that is both unfamiliar and relatively unfriendly towards antitakeover devices (such as poison pills, staggered boards,
and other "embedded" defensesl 60 ). The vast majority of recent inver-

Reserve Bank of N.Y., 742 F.3d 37, 38, 40-41 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding federal common law
fiduciary duty principles trump Delaware state law when a "federal instrumentality" is the
purported defendant). This trend was arguably invited by the SEC's promulgation of Rule
10b5-2 in 2000, setting out federal standards for duties of "trust and confidence" in insider
trading contexts. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2014).
157 Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158, 53,25254 (Sept. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.404). Although disclosure of a related
party had been mandatory in some form since the early 1980s, the 2006 reform was substantial and defended by the SEC as justified because of the "many developments since then, including the increasing focus on corporate governance and director independence." Id. at
53,161.
. NYSE Listed Co. Manual R. 312.03 (2015); see also NASDAQ Listing R. 5635 (2009).
While these rules predated Sarbanes-Oxley, both were amended in the years since.
159 Dodd-Frank § 922, 124 Stat. at 1841-42 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012)).
160 See generally Jennifer Arlen & Eric Talley, Unregulable Defenses and the Perils of
Shareholder Choice, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 577 (2003) (describing various forms of explicit and
embedded takeover defenses).
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sions, for example, have incorporated in European Union states, and are
potentially subject both to the E.U. Takeover Directive, as well as the
jurisdiction of country-specific takeover panels, both of which take a
dim (if not prohibitory) view of measures that "frustrate" hostile suitors.161 For U.S. MNCs contemplating inversions, then, the loss of antitakeover protections may impose a price that is excessively steep.
That said, the cost of forsaking American antitakeover law may be
tolerable--even trivial-for many U.S. targets for several reasons. First,
controlled U.S. targets that remain controlled after an inversion transaction have little to fear from takeover battles to begin with. Second, in
some prominent inversion destinations, the company may be able to
elude local takeover regulations with an assortment of tactics. In the
U.K., for example, it is possible to avoid falling under the jurisdiction of
the Takeover Panel and E.U. Directive by remaining listed outside of
Europe.1 6 2 Alternatively, inverters to the Netherlands have made use of a
longstanding legal structure known as a stichting, which can be employed as a functional equivalent of a poison pill that can temporarily
block hostile suitors.1 63 Third, significant hostile acquisition activity in
the United States has shifted over the last decade to proxy contests, an
area that has long been governed disproportionately by federal securities
law. And finally, recent legal scholarship has raised new questions about
whether federal law could be interpreted to preempt many of Delaware's
See, e.g., Gleiss Lutz, European Directive Takeover Guide 1, 9-11 (2014), available at
http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=D999E949-ED7C-44AE86B1-2F2E8A36C069; Bonelli Erede Pappalardo et al., Guide to Public Takeovers in Europe 21, 23 (2013), available at http://www.debrauw.com/wp-content/uploads/NEWS%20%20PUBLICATIONS/Guide-to-Public-Takeovers-in-Europe-2013.pdf.
162 See, e.g., The Panel on Takeovers & Mergers, The Takeover Code, at A3-A5 (11th ed.
2013), available at http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/ll/code.pdf.
But see Irish Takeover Panel, Irish Takeover Act 1997, Takeover Rules And Substantial Acquisition Rules, at T5 (2013), available at http://irishtakeoverpanel.ie/wp-content/uploads/
2014/01/ITP-Takeover-Rules.pdf (directing that even solely U.S.-exchange-traded Irish
companies are subject to the panel's jurisdiction).
16 The stichting is an independently governed "foundation" established by the board, which
receives an ongoing option to purchase a significant block of voting preferred shares, effectively allowing it to veto any hostile bid (at least temporarily). See 2 B.W. §§ 285, 291 (2015),
available at http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBROO03045/Boek2/Titel6/Artikel285/geldigheids
datum_12-05-2015 and http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0003045/Boek2/Titel6/Artikel291/
geldigheidsdatum 12-05-2015. Mylan NV, a recent U.S. inverter to the Netherlands, activated
a stichting when it received hostile interest from Teva Pharmaceuticals (itself a previous inverter to Israel). See Shayndi Raice & Margot Patrick, The Rise of the 'Stichting,' an Obscure
Takeover Defense, Wall St. J. (Apr. 22, 2015, 12:15 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-riseof-the-stichting-an-obscure-takeover-defense-1429716204.
161
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most historically important takeover rules, suggesting that federalization
may already be on the verge of expanding to that domain as well."
Although there is room for debate about the precise extent of the federalization of corporate law, few would quibble with the proposition that
the new federal mandates described above have decidedly displaced
and/or preempted a large and important swath of state law related to
corporategovernance. At the very least, the steady federal involvement
in corporate governance has upended the conceptual distinction that
business law has traditionally drawn between securities law and corporate law.
The steady march of federal law into the realm of corporate governance-for good or for ill-is highly relevant to tax inversion calculus in
at least two respects. Primarily, it suggests that the loss of Delaware law
simply does not represent the same kind of cost today for aspiring inverters that it might have two decades ago, when securities law carried
far less weight in dictating the contours of corporate governance. To the
extent that federal law has appropriated from Delaware (and other states)
large sectors of corporate governance jurisprudence, most of the benefits
from domestic incorporation can be retained simply by remaining listed
in U.S. securities markets (governed by federal securities laws), which
inverting companies have overwhelmingly opted to do.
Secondly, the availability of U.S.-style corporate governance structures through securities laws (independent of corporate law) substantially undermines the incorporation-centered approach in the United States
for determining tax residency. In other words, tax status is now no longer mandatorily "bundled" with a company's corporate governance regime. A public company is free to choose its tax jurisdiction largely independent of concerns about governance; it need not accept them (at
least from the United States) as a fully conjoined package. And, since
the vast majority of U.S. inversions are structured to retain substantial
voting control, management, and assets within the United States, the
surviving entity from an inversion typically remains subject to the same
set of federal securities mandates as was its U.S.-incorporated fore-

14See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Toward a Constitutional Review
of the Poison Pill, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 1549, 1551-52 (2014); Guhan Subramanian, Steven
Herscovici & Brian Barbetta, Is Delaware's Antitakeover Statute Unconstitutional? Evidence
from 1988-2008, 65 Bus. Law. 685, 686-88 (2010).
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bear.' 6 ' As I demonstrate in the next Part, the federal unbundling of tax
from corporate governance can have significant implications for regulatory competition-implications that bear centrally on the inversion invasion, and how best to address it.
III. INVERSIONS THROUGH THE LENS OF REGULATORY-COMPETITION
THEORY

This Part abstracts from the practical details of tax inversions, and into a conceptual and analytic assessment of the role that inversions play
on a larger policy stage: regulatory competition. Specifically, I develop
and analyze a framework that builds on (and in some ways extends) the
regulatory competition literature 16 to Study competitive dynamics when
jurisdictions install and offer multi-attribute regulatory products. My attention-unsurprisingly---will highlight two such attributes: tax policy
165 Foreign-incorporated companies listed in the United States may, under some circumstances, be exempt from certain federal governance and disclosure mandates if deemed to be
"Foreign Private Issuers" ("FPIs") for purposes of securities law. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.405
(2013) (defining FPIs). The exemptions include more liberal disclosure mandates, exemptions from most proxy rules, and greater flexibility in choice of accounting regime. For most
U.S. inverters, however, FPI status is not a realistic option for the surviving entity, since it
requires, inter alia, a majority of voting shareholders to be non-U.S. residents, a majority of
directors (as well as a majority of executive officers) to be non-U.S. citizens and non-U.S.
residents, a majority of assets to be located outside the United States, and the company's locus of business administration to be outside the United States. Moreover, the predicate conditions for FPI status must be reestablished on an annual basis. Id. For an overview of the
FPI rules, see Div. of Corp. Fin., Accessing the U.S. Capital Markets-A Brief Overview for
Foreign Private Issuers, Sec & Exch. Comm'n (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/
corfin/intematl/foreign-private-issuers-overview.shtml.
6 The analysis below tracks the general approach in the framework for regulatory competition developed in Gillian Hadfield & Eric Talley, On Public Versus Private Provision of
Corporate Law, 22 J.L. Econ. & Org. 414, 419-20 (2006) (reviewing the corporate law regulatory competition literature); Joel Slemrod & John D. Wilson, Tax Competition with Parasitic Tax Havens 4-6 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12225, 2006),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl2225 (reviewing the tax competition literature);
see also Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-tothe-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1210
(1992) (situating regulatory competition in environmental contexts). However, here I situate
the analysis differently, drawing inspiration from more general theories of oligopolistic
competition in multidimensional product space. See, e.g., Andrew Caplin & Barry Nalebuff,
Aggregation and Imperfect Competition: On the Existence of Equilibrium, 59 Econometrica
25, 28-34 (1991); Andrew S. Caplin & Barry J. Nalebuff, Multi-Dimensional Product Differentiation and Price Competition, 38 Oxford Econ. Papers 129, 132-34 (1986); Avner
Shaked & John Sutton, Relaxing Price Competition Through Product Differentiation, 49
Rev. Econ. Stud. 3 (1982).
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and corporate governance regulations. Specifically, I will consider conditions under which jurisdictions offering packages of tax and governance regulations may differentiate themselves from one another, and
what implications follow for such differentiation when firms enjoy jurisdictional mobility. Although the analysis below explores a specific,
numerical example with a variety of simplifying assumptions, the example is surprisingly adaptable to far more generalized (and technically
complicated) settings, yielding qualitatively similar conclusions. 6 1
Several central intuitions emerge from this analysis. First, I demonstrate that bundling ultimately enrichesfirm choice: That is, when jurisdictions can bundle governance and tax regulations, they will tend to differentiate themselves in their offerings, with some jurisdictions serving
as market "leaders" in governance while others serve as market "laggards." Second, jurisdictions that enjoy a position as market leaders will
rationally attempt to capture the value they have created through their
tax policies, appearing less generous in their tax treatment of domestic
firms. Third, by dint of their attractive governance regimes, leaders can
afford to moderate their responses to tax competition from other jurisdictions, and thus a market leader need not be drawn into ruinous competition with tax "havens" or other low-tax jurisdictions. Rather, a leader's optimal response to another jurisdiction's aggressive tax policies
may be muted, possibly substantially. Finally (and significantly), the advantageous strategic position that a governance leader enjoys persists
only insofar as the tax and governance attributes offered by the leader
remain "bundled"-that is, firms must be forced to accept the leader's
tax policy as they embrace its governance rules, and they cannot selectively assemble a collage of the best pieces of different jurisdictions'
regulatory frameworks. Unbundling tax from governance (as I argue has
substantially happened through U.S. securities law reforms) not only negates the leader's market power, but it likely induces long-term reduction in regulatory differentiation-a clear negative when firms have heterogeneous needs and capabilities.

16 The model introduced in the text below is deliberately kept simple for the sake of exposition. Extensions to it are discussed in succeeding subsections, and Appendix A to this Article offers a more generalized analysis for curious (and masochistic) readers.
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A. Framework andPreliminaries
Consider a population of for-profit corporate entities ("firms") making strategic decisions about their regulatory home. To ease exposition, I
normalize the total size of the population of entities at 1 (although any
other normalization would work too).' 68 For purposes of current discussion, suppose each firm chooses among "bundled" regulatory goods, and
that its chosen jurisdiction commits it both to that jurisdiction's corporate governance rules and to its tax regime. 6' 9 Each firm in the population is assumed to generate baseline "gross" profit of zr > 0, which is
constant across all firms. That said, a firm's net payoff is subject to both
upward and downward revisions away from this baseline as a byproduct
of the regulatory environment it selects. Accordingly, I assume that
firms in the population choose their regulatory environment in order to
maximize firm value net of such revisions to their baseline. 70
To focus on the most basic ingredients of regulatory competition, I
suppose in this example that there are two jurisdictions-Jurisdiction 1
("Ji") and Jurisdiction 2 ("J2"), which compete with each other for incorporations and resulting tax revenue.' 7 ' The jurisdictions are interested
in maximizing their tax revenues less the administrative cost of building
and maintaining their regulatory structure.
As noted above, regulatory competition plays out through a bundle of
regulatory attributes offered by each jurisdiction to firms that are incorporated there, which I denote as (xi, r,) and (X2, z 2), for the respective

168 For example, if there were 38,000 firms in the population, then one need only multiply
all of the total revenue numbers below by 38,000. Normalizing the market size to 1 economizes on notation with no loss in generality.
169 In this baseline model, I assume these two choices are necessarily bundled, and moreover I assume that all the taxes an entity pays are determined by its state of incorporation.
Both assumptions are easy to relax without changing any of the important insights. Later,
Subsection III.C.v will return to this caveat and demonstrate how the model can accommodate it.
170 The alert reader will note that a firm's choice of regulatory environment may itself be

subject to agency costs, so that a firm's choice of regulatory environment may not fully reflect an aim to maximize firm value. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Misreporting Corporate Performance (2002) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-354141) (describing the effect of regulatory environments on the
ability of managers to misreport corporate performance). Although this argument is not the
core focus of this Article, the framework introduced below is capable of folding in agency
costs in the choice of incorporation as well. Such concerns might be reflected, say, by firms
that have a lower willingness to pay for corporate governance (denoted as 0 below).
171 The analysis is easily generalizable to n jurisdictions. See Appendix A for details.
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are the tax elements of regulatory
competition, and they represent the per-firm tax levies imposed by each
respective jurisdiction on firms it regulates. 1 7 2 Intuitively, higher values
of ni and r2 correspond to larger per-firm tax levies in the respective jurisdiction. Tax levies are normalized to be non-negative (and thus r, 0
and

T2 >

r2

0).173

The terms x, and X2 embody the nontax elements of corporate regulation, to which I refer collectively as the "corporate governance" attributes of each jurisdiction. These variables embody canonical corporate
law/regulation commitments thought to affect firm value (such as minority shareholder protections, fiduciary duties, judicial quality, board
structure, shareholder governance rights, network externalities, and the
like). Although the framework developed below is general enough to
analyze corporate governance as a set (or vector) of traits, for simplicity
I suppose that all relevant traits can be collapsed into a single, scalar
numerical value (xi and x2). In this vein, larger values of xi and x 2 correspond to "better" packages of corporate governance rules. Like tax levies, governance regimes are normalized to be non-negative: That is, values of x, or x2 set equal to zero correspond to the minimal possible effort
by the jurisdiction to build a value-creating governance framework.
Although taxes play an obvious role in a firm's profitability, it is important to acknowledge that governance matters too. Indeed, a growing
(and already sizeable) literature in empirical corporate finance has made
a persuasive case that "good" corporate governance can and frequently
does reduce intra-firm agency costs and firms' cost of capital, thereby
enhancing shareholder value.1 74 At the same time, neither theory nor
empirical evidence suggests that "good governance" has the homogenous effects across all firms. For some firms, the ability to commit (or

172 Expressing taxes in terms of total tax levy (rather than rates) makes
the analysis somewhat straightforward without altering the core intuitions.
173 This is little more than a normalization, since subsidies received
in the jurisdictions can
be represented by adjusting the value of rupwards.
174 See supra Section IIC; see also Mihir A. Desai, The Decentering of the Global Firm, 32
World Econ. 1271, 1281 (2009) ("Legal homes can . . determine the rights for a firm's investors and workers, wherever they are located."); Paul A. Gompers et al., Corporate Governance
and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. Econ. 107 (2003) (finding that firms with stronger shareholder
rights had increased value and returns); Lucian Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate
Governance?, 22 Rev. Fin. Stud. 783 (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-593423
(finding that corporate bylaws that allowed for board entrenchment, such as poison pills, reduced firm value).
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bond) into a strong governance scheme can be highly valuable. In other
firms, governance is less prized.17 1
Accordingly, in what follows I suppose that firms value corporate
governance heterogeneously. In particular, suppose the responsiveness
of firm value to governance structure can be summarized as a point on a
scale ranging from a low of 0 (unresponsive) to a high of 1 (maximally
responsive). A firm's position on this scale (the firm's "type") is denoted
by the variable 0, which is simply a point on the unit scale between 0
and 1. To capture the interaction between the jurisdiction's corporate
governance regulation (xi) and the firm's type (0), a firm can increase
its value beyond its baseline by 0-x. I assume that firms' types are uniformly distributed in the population between extreme endpoints of 0 and
1 .176

Given that all firms value corporate governance to some degree (and
thus would be willing to pay for it), jurisdictions may naturally be interested in offering high-quality governance regulation. However, strong
regulatory regimes require resources to build and maintain. In particular,
I suppose that for both jurisdictions, installing corporate governance institutions requires expending real resources-expenditures that become
less effective (that is, have decreasing returns) as the state's corporate
governance protections grow. In particular, suppose that installing a corporate governance structure of (x;) necessitates an expenditure of 2(X ) 2
for Jurisdiction i (where i = 1, 2).
Finally, in order to capture the idea that Delaware holds a dominant
position in the arena of corporate governance, I assume that J, has an incumbency advantage over J2, and therefore enjoys a first-mover advantage in installing its governance regime (xi) before J2 chooses its
own regime (x 2). In this sense, the incumbent jurisdiction effectively establishes a beachhead in regulatory space to which the entrant jurisdiction must attempt profitably to respond. The second mover (J2) must
consequently choose whether to emulate the incumbent or to differentiate itself with a distinct governance regime. Once both jurisdictions have
175 This latter group may include firms for which governance is in principle
valueenhancing, but in which agency costs or private benefits of control swamp those benefits in
affecting incorporation decisions. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text. In fact, as
shown in Appendix A, the framework presented here extends, easily allowing some or all

firms to place a negative value on governance (that is, 9<0). See infra Appendix A.
176 Although this is in some ways a restrictive assumption, the analysis easily generalizes
to any distribution F(9) satisfying (so-called) "monotone hazard rate" properties. For details, see Appendix A.
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each committed to a governance regime, they simultaneously set the
terms of their tax regimes (r, and T2). This sequence is deliberate, and it
is meant to capture the idea that governance regimes are more complex
to build-and harder to dismantle-than a simple change in corporate
tax levies. The sequential structure of the model is illustrated in Figure
6.
Figure 6: Sequential Structure of Multi-Attribute Regulatory Competition Game

Reiterating, the analysis at this stage makes two critical assumptions:
(1) that each jurisdiction's regulatory offerings are mandatorily "bundled," and thus firms cannot assemble hybrid regulatory structures,
adopting the tax attributes of one jurisdiction and the governance attributes of another; and (2) that the competing jurisdictions endeavor to
maximize their expected tax revenues net of their costs of installing their
regulatory corporate governance structures. I will explicitly relax each of
these assumptions in a later subsection; indeed, doing so will help to illustrate some of the key points for my argument.
B. Solving the Game (Equilibrium)
With this structure in mind, I now proceed to solve the game by
standard backwards induction techniques, beginning at the final stage,
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with the firms' choices of regulatory regime. 7' At this stage, firms
choose their governance regimes from among the two providers that
have already selected their regulatory packages. For a firm of type 0, the
expected payoffs from incorporating in Jurisdictions 1 and 2 (respectively) consists of (a) the firm's baseline profits, plus (b) the value contributed by the chosen jurisdiction's corporate governance regime, less (c)
the tax levy imposed by the chosen jurisdiction. These payoffs can be
represented by the following expressions:
Firm's payoff from incorporating in Ji: H(x,, r, 1) = fr+ . xi - rj
Firm's payoff from incorporating in J 2 : HX2 T2 1)

= 2T+

9. X 2

-2

A profit-maximizing firm will simply choose the jurisdiction that offers it a package of governance and tax resulting in the larger of the
above payoffs.
Comparing the above expressions, it becomes immediately clear that
if the two jurisdictions were to offer identical governance regimes
(xi = x 2 ), then all firms (regardless of type) would flock en masse to the
jurisdiction imposing the lowest taxes. Thus, if (say) Jurisdiction 2 were
charging a tax levy of $100,000, Jurisdiction 1 could steal the entire incorporation market by imposing a levy of $99,999. Anticipating this
competition, of course, Jurisdiction 2 would reduce its levy further, and
so forth, all the way to the point where there is no profitable deviation
left, and both jurisdictions impose a tax levy of zero.' 78 This logic gives
rise to the following intuitive proposition:
Proposition 1: When jurisdictions offer identical corporate governance regulations, competition in tax rates will enter a ruinous "death
spiral, " driving firm-level tax levies as well as total tax revenues in
both jurisdictionsto zero.
177 The solution exposited below corresponds to the unique "Bayesian perfect" equilibrium
of the game. See Appendix A for details.
17 This is a version of the well-known "Bertrand paradox" from industrial
organization,
which states that when two or more firms engage in pure price competition with no capacity

constraints and bounded monopoly profits, the only equilibrium (in pure or mixed strategies)
consists of marginal-cost pricing. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., A Re-Evaluation of Perfect
Competition as the Solution to the Bertrand Price Game, 17 Mathematical Soc. Sci. 315, 315
(1989). Here, when J, and J2 offer the same corporate governance rules, all of these conditions are met. The marginal cost of providing a preexisting established regulatory regime is
zero (and therefore so is the tax levy).
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Choose J, over J2 if and only if: 99* =

-

The intuition embodied in Proposition 1 reflects what many perceive
to be the largest concern in the current inversion wave-that it has invited a type of "ruinous" tax competition, inevitably driving tax rates
across all jurisdictions to zero. It will also, by implication, drive total tax
revenues to zero in both jurisdictions, a factor that would clearly deter
jurisdictions offering copycat corporate governance regimes to begin
with (as explored below).
Now consider the situation where the competing jurisdictions differentiate their corporate governance regimes (so that x, 0 x 2 ). Suppose further (somewhat arbitrarily) that x, > x 2 and thus the incumbent jurisdiction is the corporate governance "leader" offering the strongest
governance protections (the analysis of the case where x, < x2 is entirely
symmetric). 17 9 When jurisdictions have differentiated governance regulations, choosing between them involves comparing both the corporate
governance and tax attributes of each. Once again revisiting and comparing the expressions above, a representative firm of type 9 is willing to
incorporate in J if and only if its expected payoff from J, exceeds its
expected payoff from J2, which is equivalent to the following choice
condition":
xI

-

x

In other words, the corporate governance leader (assumed provisionally to be JI) will be systematically the most attractive-all else constant-to those firms whose valuations are relatively responsive to
strong governance rules-or in terms of the model, with high values of 9
that exceed a critical cutoff value, 9e, as defined above.
There are a few noteworthy features that emerge from the above
choice condition. First, because firm types are distributed uniformly, the
jurisdictions' market shares for incorporations can be tidily summarized
by 0*, so long as 0 <9'< 1. Specifically, the corporate governance leader
(JI here) will capture a (1 - 90) share of the market, while the laggard (J2
here) will capture the remaining 9* share. Second, note from the above
"7 As will become apparent below, the incumbent firm will generally have an incentive to
select the most protective corporate governance, and thus this ordering will not, in the end,
be arbitrary.
1o The condition from the text is an algebraic rearrangement of the condition stating that
the firm's payoff in J, (that is, 7r + Ox, - r1 ) is at least as large as its payoff in J2 (that is,

)T +

OX2 -

T2 ).
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expression that whenever the jurisdictions split the market (that is, when
0 <a< 1), it must be the case that the leader imposes a higher tax than
the follower-that is (r, - r2) > 0. Finally, although it is not obvious a
priori, it turns out that in any equilibrium of this game, e will be between 0 and 1 (and thus the jurisdictions divide the market)."' Indeed,
unlike competing oligopolists in a production market (who generally
must cover their marginal costs of production), with regulatory competition the predominant costs for the jurisdiction are quasi-fixed (building
and maintaining the system), and the governance regulations can be provided to one more incorporating firm at effectively zero (or very low)
marginal cost. Consequently, should either jurisdiction find itself excluded entirely from the market by a competitor charging a positive
price, there will be a way for it to respond profitably in equilibrium
through tax cuts or better governance regimes (or both), recapturing
some market share. Therefore, in any plausible equilibrium of the tax
competition stage, it will be the case that 0 < 0 < 1. Collectively, these
observations give rise to a second proposition'82 :
Proposition2: When jurisdictions offer diferentiatedcorporate governance regulations, they will in equilibrium split the market and impose differentiated taxes as well, with the corporategovernance leader imposing a tax premium relative to the corporate governance
laggard.
Moving backwards, consider next the equilibrium of the tax game.
The governance leader and laggard each simultaneously choose a tax to
impose in a manner that maximizes its expected tax revenues weighted
by the market share captured by the jurisdiction (holding constant the
other jurisdiction's conjectured imposed tax). Equivalently, the jurisdictions' respective taxation problems are as follows:
T

*

JI's Taxation Problem: Max r, (1 - 0) = Max -r, 1

r,

r

J2'S Taxation Problem: Max r2 0* = Max
r2r0

T2

0o

- T2

x1 - x 2

I

1

ri
.X

X2

k81 This turns out no longer to hold when tax law and corporate governance are
"unbundled"-a key argument of this Article. See infra Subsection III.C.5.
182 See Appendix A for a more formal proof of this claim.
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From the above maximization problems, one can derive a (so-called)
"best response correspondence" ("BRC") for each jurisdiction. 83 The
BRC addresses a simple question: For each possible conjectured tax levy
that the "competing" jurisdiction might impose, what is the optimal, revenue-maximizing tax levy to charge in response?
Figure 7 below plots the BRCs for each jurisdiction on the same set of
axes. In the figure, JI's imposed tax is represented by the vertical axis,
and J2's by the horizontal axis. As can be seen from the figure, each of
the jurisdictions imposes a tax levy that is partially (but not completely)
responsive to its competitor's. Jurisdiction 2 (the governance laggard),
for example, always charges half the tax it predicts that J, will impose.
In contrast, J, (the leader) charges a strictly positive baseline tax (of
'2 (XI - X2)) regardless of what J2 imposes, even if it believes that J2 will
impose a tax of zero. Above that level, J increases its tax by fifty cents
for every dollar of increase by J2 . Note that each jurisdiction's profitmaximizing tax levy increases as the other jurisdiction's levy increases,
effectively reinforcing one another.1 8 4
Figure 7: Best Response Correspondences in Taxation Competition
Stage

L

Equilibrium

Y/s(xj- XZ)
18 The BRCs are derived from partially differentiating JI's and J2 's expected payoffs in
the taxation game with respect to r, and r2 , respectively, and setting each partial derivative
equal to zero. Because the expected payoff functions are strictly concave, the solutions to
those first order conditions will be maxima.
184 In game theoretic terms, the jurisdictions' taxation strategies are said be "strategic
complements"-a setting where competition can prove quite severe. See, e.g., Jeremy 1. Bulow et al., Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements, 93 J. Pol. Econ.
488, 489, 494 (1985).
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Moreover, as Figure 7 reveals, there is a unique point where the
levied taxes are the mutual best responses of one anonther-that is, the
point where the BRCs of each jurisdiction intersect. This is the unique
equilibrium of the taxation stage of the game. It corresponds to the
point where each jurisdiction is playing a best response to its opponent,
and thus there is no reason for either to change. In the above example,
the unique taxation equilibrium corresponds to a tax imposed by the
leader of % (xI - X2), whereas the laggard imposes a smaller tax levy
of /3 (xI - X2). Note from this equilibrium that the jurisdictions always
split the market, with resulting market shares of 9 = '/3 for the laggard
and (1 - 9*) = % for the leader. At these equilibrium tax levies, the
laggard and leader will realize expected tax revenues of 1/9 (XI- X2) and
4/9

(X1

- X2),

respectively.

Proposition3: When jurisdictionshave differentiatedcorporategovernance rules, the unique equilibrium in the taxation stage involves positive
levies by both jurisdictions. Moreover, the taxes imposed and total tax
revenues in both jurisdictions grow as the corporate governance
offerings become increasingly distinct. Both jurisdictions enjoy strictly
positive payoffs.
A noteworthy feature of the tax equilibrium described in Proposition
3 is that the taxes levied and total tax revenues for the jurisdictions grow
as the magnitude of differentiation (captured by (xi- x 2)) increases. This
effect is true even for the corporate governance laggard, who stands to
collect greater tax revenues the worse its governance regime becomes
relative to the leader's. The reason for this seemingly counterintuitive
effect is simple, and it is an artifact of oligopolistic market dynamics
more generally: When the extent of product differentiation grows in any
market, the providers are less likely to be competing for the same buyers. The leader tries to extract higher levies from firms that value governance highly (that is, those with high values of 9), making its product
more expensive and less attractive to low and moderate valuers. Since
the laggard is the only other choice available, it is also able to raise its
levy modestly without losing significant market share.
As noted above, although the foregoing analysis presumes that Ji is
the leader in corporate governance (and thus x 1 > x2), the analysis is
identical if J were the laggard. In either case, what is clear from the
above discussion is that both jurisdictions are decidedly better off when
they offer differentiated governance regulations as opposed to when they
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emulate one another (and ruinous price competition ensues). Accordingly, absent a coordination failure, the jurisdictions will have strong incentives to offer differentiated regulatory structures. The one remaining
question concerns which jurisdiction emerges as the leader and which
becomes the laggard.
Accordingly, let us move back one more stage in the sequence, in order to determine how the jurisdictions will select their corporate governance rules anticipating the later tax competition described above. Here,
as noted above, the model assumes a strategic advantage for J, viewing
it as somewhat akin to Delaware's incumbency status in the corporate
governance world. Although this incumbency could take on numerous
instantiations in this model (for example, J, might face a lower marginal
cost of installing governance than J2), I capture the effect here by giving
J a first-mover advantage over J2 in setting its governance structure.
Recall that for either jurisdiction, installing corporate governance xi imposes a cost of V2 x2, which drags down gross tax revenues that the jurisdiction will collect in the taxation game (more so for the leader than
the laggard).
Thus, consider the strategy of J2, after Ji has committed to a governance structure of x, 0. Jurisdiction 2 will attempt to compute its best
strategy in two contingencies: (1) it lags, installing governance rules
x 2 < 1 1 at a cost of '% x 22 , thereby generating gross tax revenues of
1/9 (X1 - X2) as per the discussion above; or (2) it leapfrogs Ji to lead, installing governance rules x 2 > x1 again at a cost of V2 X2 2 , and generating
gross tax revenues of 4/9 (X2 - X1 )Should J2 choose to lag, its optimal strategy is counterintitively
simple: It should adopt the most lax (that is, the "worst") governance
scheme possible, setting X2 = 0, which it can implement at no cost. The
reasoning here is closely related to the discussion surrounding
Proposition 3 above-so long as J2 is destined to be a laggard, its tax
revenues (as well as the leader's) increase the more it differentiates itself
from the leader's regime-even if that differentiation is in the downward
direction. Thus, reducing x2 not only increases J2'S revenues in the tax
stage, but it also reduces its total up-front costs of installing governance
to begin with. And the maximal degree to which J2 can differentiate itself as a laggard is to "go big" (as it were), setting x2 = 0, and securing a
payoff for itself equal to 1/9 (xi -0) = 1/9(x1 ). (Note once again that this
payoff increases as Ji's governance regime improves.)
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Should J 2 attempt to lead, in contrast, it will select a governance
structure x2 > X1 that maximizes its tax revenues (4/9 (X2 - Xl)), less its upfront costs of implementing that structure (2 X22 ). Here, it is easy to confirm' 85 that J 2'S optimal choice is to set x 2 = 4/9, which generates net tax
revenues equal to 4/9 (X2 - X
1 ) = (16/81 _ 4/9 x). Note here that J 2 's payoff
as a leader decreases as JI's installed level of governance improves (and
thus becomes less differentiated from and more competitive with J 2's).
Comparing this payoff to the profit maximizing from becoming a
laggard, then, it is clear that J2 will choose to become a leader only if J,
has not installed a level of governance that is "too high" to make it
unprofitable for J2 to become a governance leader. In this example
specifically, this means that J 2 will become a leader only if J, chooses a
relatively lax governance regime, so that x, < 16/45, and lagging becomes
more profitable for J2 than leading.'

6

Finally, step back to the beginning of the game to determine how the
first mover, J1 , will design its governance structure. From the analysis
above, it is clear that if J, installs any value x1 < 16 /45, it will induce J 2
to lead, and it will become the laggard. Similar to the above analysis,
the highest attainable payoff for J, if it wishes to be a laggard is to set
xI= 0, generating a net payoff for J of 1/9 (X 2 - 1 1) = 81. In contrast, if
J, selects any x1 > 16 /45, J2 will be content to lag, setting x 2 = 0. Here,
similar to the analysis for J 2 above, J, will optimally set x, = 4/9, charging a levy of % (x1 - X2) =8 /27, and generating net tax revenues of
4/9 (X1 -X 2) 4/9 (4/9 - o) = 16 /81. Because this payoff is four times that
which J; would realize as a laggard, it is clear that J, will use its firstmover advantage to become a governance leader. The foregoing discussion is summarized in the following Proposition:
Proposition4: The unique equilibrium of the game involves differentiated bundles of governance regime and tax levy, in which the incumbent/first mover becomes a governance leader, installing a relatively
high quality of governance, and the entrant/secondmover becomes a
laggard, installing the lowest quality of governance possible. The
leader and laggard divide the market, and both impose positive tax

i8 The result comes immediately from setting J2's marginal revenues from increasing x 2
(or 4/9) equal to its marginal costs (x 2).
186 To see this, note that J2 's payoff as a leader, (16/81 -4 x1 ), exceeds its payoff as a laggard, 1/9 (xj), when and only when the following condition holds: (16/81 _4/9 Xj) > 1/9 (x.

Solving this condition for x, yields the numerical figure stated in the text.
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levies on incorporatingfirms, with the leader imposing a tax premium
over the laggard.
One notable aspect of the equilibrium described above is that competition induces jurisdictions to differentiate their offerings to cater to
firms' heterogeneous preferences for governance. The leader jurisdiction
delivers greater value to firms that place the greatest value on strong
governance (extracting more tax revenue from them in the process).
Firms that place relatively low value on governance, in contrast, are
priced out of the leader's regime, and incorporate instead with the lag-

gard. Although this equilibrium is not fully efficient, it may be the best
practically attainable outcome in a regulatory competition setting."'
C. Variationsand Robustness
Although the discussion above completes the description of the model's equilibrium, the framework above has developed its core intuitions
in a relatively simplified setting, with particular assumptions about
structure, players, payoffs, sequence, and so forth. It is important to un-

derstand how critical these simplifications are for the analysis-in fact,
many of the core arguments in this Article are exposed only through relaxing several of these assumptions. I therefore turn for the remainder of
this Part to a series of extensions to the baseline model that explore the
robustness of the arguments above to alternative strategic environments.

187 My discussion thus far has concentrated on equilibrium behavior,
rather than on social
welfare concerns. Given the nature of my thesis, this focus is appropriate. Nevertheless, it
warrants observing that within this framework, governance is a pure public good with a fixed
cost of provision (and no marginal costs or congestion costs). Consequently, a benevolent
social planner would optimally eschew duplicating regulatory investments in multiple jurisdictions, and would instead concentrate governance infrastructure in a single jurisdiction,

sweeping in all firms (without rationing out relatively low valuers). It is easily confirmed
that the social planner's optimal level of governance in this example is E(9) = '/2, applied to

all firms. The above equilibrium does not fully achieve that benchmark, since (1) the leader
slightly underinvests in governance relative to the social optimum

(4/9

rather than

1/2),

and

(2) the leader prices out the lowest valuing one-third of firms. See generally Truman F. Bewley, A Critique of Tiebout's Theory of Local Public Expenditures, 49 Econometrica 713,
715-17 (1981) (defining pure public good as independent of population and noting that, in a
pure public good Tiebout model with a government concerned about public welfare, the Pareto optimum is achieved when public goods are concentrated in a single region). That said,
one can show that the equilibrium described above delivers greater social value than either a
profit-maximizing monopoly jurisdiction structure or a structure with more than two compet-

ing jurisdictions (discussed below).
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1. GreaterDimensionalityof Governance
One potential extension to the model would be to expand the dimensionality of "governance" regimes. In the baseline model above, the
competing jurisdictions' choice of governance regime was effectively a
scalar. However, governance is itself a multidimensional phenomenon,
and Jurisdiction l's governance regime might better be viewed in some
cases as a "vector" of instruments. For example, suppose each jurisdiction could separately install a level of "judicial quality" ("yi") independent of "minority shareholder protections" ("zi"). Now each of jurisdictions 1 and 2 would offer a package with three attributes-{yl, z 1, r}
and {y2, z 2, r2}, respectively. Other dimensions (or additional subdivisions of the above) are possible as well.
It turns out that greater dimensionality in governance is easily handled
in the model. As in the baseline case above, if firms have differentiated
preferences among different dimensions of governance, then much turns
on whether a firm's preference for one governance attribute (say judicial
quality) is highly correlated with its preference for others (say minority
protections). When such correlations are strong, very little changes from
the discussion above. Conversely, when these correlations are weaker
(or even reversed), it could turn out that J, and J2 differentiate themselves along different governance dimensions, say with J, leading in judicial quality and J2 leading in minority protections. Nevertheless, the
notion that the jurisdictions differentiate from one another in their bundled offerings-ultimately serving different market segments-remains
intact.
2. More CompetingJurisdictions
Another extension concerns the addition of more jurisdictions beyond
J and J2. For example, how would the inclusion of, say, a third or fourth
jurisdiction alter the equilibrium? As demonstrated in Appendix A, the
core insights from the two-jurisdiction case remain robust (with some
caveats). First, even when there are n > 2 jurisdictions in competition, no
two jurisdictions will emulate one another's corporate governance rules.
So doing would immediately invite ruinous tax competition between
those two jurisdictions, driving their gross revenues to zero (along with
all those with inferior governance regimes). Consequently, all jurisdictions will embrace differentiated governance and tax regimes, effectively dividing the market into n segments, in a manner that stratifies the
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population according to the firms' demand for good governance (the
value of 0). For example, extending the analysis above to three jurisdictions, and assuming (as above) the jurisdictions continue to choose their
governance structure sequentially (starting with J, then J2, then J3), the
unique equilibrium strategies and payoffs are as depicted in the table below 188 :
Table 1: Regulatory Competition Equilibrium with Three Jurisdictions
7,i

x;

Mkt. Shr.

Net Rev.

Ji

0.098897

0.24095

54.00%

[0.024374

J2

0.014645

0.05780

33.33%

0.003212

J3

0.007323

0.00000

12.67%

0.000928

As in the two-jurisdiction case, the early movers establish themselves
as "leaders" in a manner that matches the sequence of jurisdictional
choices. Accordingly, the last mover will serve the market as the laggard, setting x 3 = 0 just like the baseline model.
A notable change introduced by the inclusion of n > 2 jurisdictions is
the emergence of "middling" governance providers (J2 in the threejurisdiction case) who sit below the leader and above the laggard in their
offerings. For middling jurisdictions, tax strategy is slightly more complicated, since a change in tax levels now interacts on the margin with
competitors on either "side" of the middling jurisdiction. Consequently,
for such jurisdictions, tax changes will tend to play a more powerful role
in building (or losing) market share, and they will therefore respond
somewhat more vigorously to price changes among their immediate
neighbors.
Perhaps more interesting is the effect that additional competition has
on jurisdictional heterogeneity. Somewhat surprisingly, the addition of a
third jurisdiction actually reduces the range of governance options that
firms have available to them. In particular, the leader jurisdiction (Ji)
now optimally installs xi = 0.24095 (rather than 0.44444 as in the baseline case), charges a levy nl=0.098897 (rather than 0.29630), and re-

18

For the derivations underlying this table, see Appendix A.
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ceives net tax revenues of 0.0243 74 (rather than 0.19753). Although the
leader retains a robust market share (54%) in equilibrium, it is unable to
convert its market dominance into appreciable net economic rents.
Moreover, notwithstanding the presence of more jurisdictions providing
governance and the continued incentives jurisdictions have to differentiate from one another, they tend to cluster more tightly around the "low
quality" end of the governance spectrum. While possibly counterintuitive, the reason for this effect is straightforward-more jurisdictional
players means more price competition; more price competition, in turn,
means lower gross revenues; and lower gross revenues, in turn, dampen
early movers' ex ante incentives to invest in strong governance.
3. Non-Revenue-Maximizing Competitors and Tax "Havens"
A related extension concerns how predicted behavior would change if
one relaxed the assumption that jurisdictions are motivated solely by
maximizing their expected tax revenues net of regulatory installation
costs. Specifically, suppose the laggard jurisdiction (J2) had preferences
that caused it to compete on tax levies differently-and far more aggressively-than predicted in the previous section. This is an important extension, since much of the competition for U.S. incorporations is said to
come from "tax havens" whose objectives appear to have little to do
with tax earnings maximization. Such behavior may emerge, for example, if regulators are captured by interests wishing to minimize tax liabilities, or alternatively crave international fame and prominence that
comes with a high market share of incorporations. Or such jurisdictions
may simply have preferences that are the function of political constraints
and commitments on taxes. Alternatively, the initial costs of installing
anything more than "minimal" corporate governance may be prohibitive
for "late mover" jurisdictions, inducing many of them (rationally) to
cluster at x; = 0, and inducing stiff price competition that drives their tax
levies towards zero.'" 9 Understanding how regulatory competition works
when one's competitors are extremely aggressive, are captured, or pursue other goals can be helpful in disentangling the current situation.

1 In the example above, the cost of installing governance was quadratic, so that c'(0) =
0.
In a more general setting, it might be that c'(0) > 0, inducing late-moving jurisdictions to
choose (rationally) to install minimal governance, impose no taxes, and earn no positive (or
negative) net revenues. See Appendix A for details.
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Accordingly, suppose that the laggard jurisdiction J2 has an incentive
(for whatever reason) to fix r 2 far below the predicted equilibrium level
derived above, such as r2 = 0 (while still choosing location x2 = 0).190
How should the leader J, react (if at all) to such behavior? As it happens, insights into this question can be divined from the analysis already
conducted. So long as J, remains a governance leader and revenue maximizer itself, its optimal strategy is readily gleaned from the best response correspondence depicted in Figure 6. In particular, recall from
the figure that for every dollar by which J2 reduces its tax levy, J, should
respond in a muted fashion, reducing its own levy by only fifty cents.
Even in the extreme case, where J2 levies a tax of zero (to capture maximal market share), J, would still continue to impose a positive tax of
V2 (xi) > 0. While slightly less than its previous equilibrium value of
2/3 (XI -X 2), this model still allows J, to collect positive tax revenues and
secure a fifty percent market share. At the same time, however, the
additional competition by J2 will introduce enhanced price competition
on the leader, reducing ex ante returns for J, to investment in
governance. In this scenario, JI's optimal governance regime would be
to install a governance regime of xi = 0.25, charge a tax of r, = 0.125
and garner net tax revenues of 0.03125 (as compared to 0.4444, 0.29630,
and 0.19753, respectively, in the baseline case). All told, the leader
would rationally respond to a single, aggressive competitor in much the
same way that it would have to respond to multiple competitors:
reducing taxes (but not elimating them), dialing down its own
governance protections (but not completely), and realizing less net
income.
Moreover, if this extension is added onto the prior extension, a nonrevenue-maximizing laggard jurisdiction may have even less of an effect
on the leader than on others. Indeed, if, say, the market laggard reduced
its price to zero to capture market share, that decision would be
primarily visited on the laggard's immediate neighbor, who would
respond (as described above) in a somewhat muted fashion. This effect
would propagate sequentially towards the leader, but with somewhat
dampened responses at each successive juncture. By the time the shock

190 This assertion that J2 continues to fix x 2 = 0 is reasonable for many types of alternative

objectives that J2 might entertain; analyzing all such possibilities, however, is beyond the
scope of this discussion. It should also be noted that some tax "havens" that levy no corporate income taxes do assess fees and/or franchise taxes that serve a similar purpose.
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reached the market leader, the laggard's aggressive behavior may well
have been diluted through other jurisdictions' responses.
It is important to note that the arguments above are no longer valid
when the market leader (rather than a laggard) begins reducing price in a
non-revenue-maximizing way. Here, because the leader already offers a
higher quality governance regime, reducing price (say to zero) allows
the leader to capture the entire market. Nevertheless, it remains the case
that if a more aggressive laggard competitor induces some downward
pressure on the incumbent's revenue-maximizing tax, such behavior
need not cause the incumbent to slip into ruinous tax competition.191
4. MultinationalEarningsand TerritorialTaxation
A notable simplifying assumption of the baseline model analyzed
above was that it represented firms' tax levies as being paid to a single
jurisdiction, and it therefore did not need to distinguish the sources of
the firms' profits (that is, how much was earned in each jurisdiction).
This assumption clearly requires additional scrutiny. Indeed, as
demonstrated in Part II, inverting U.S. issuers are by hypothesis
multinational firms generating earnings from across jurisdictions-a fact
that clearly is in tension with the framework analyzed above. Moreover,
a central tax policy debate surrounding inversions concerns the manner
in which U.S. tax law approaches extraterritorial earnings and the global
reach of U.S. corporate tax law (as compared to the territorial reach of
other jurisdictions). In the baseline model, all income was effectively
territorial, and thus there was no distinction between territorial and
worldwide systems. Once again, practical observation is in clear tension
with the baseline model. Hence, the intuitions developed above are
likley to be pertinent only if they carry over to settings where corporate
income is earned (and is taxed) across multiple jurisdictions.
Luckily, both of these generalizations are easy to incorporate into the
model (at the cost of some additoinal notation). One way to do so is as
follows: Suppose that each firm's baseline earnings-denoted earlier as
ir-could be decomposed into the sum of two different income streams,
191 It should be acknowledged that if the entrant jurisdiction were truly insensitive to costs,

it could potentially install an arbitrarily strong governance regime (for example, a value of x 2
approaching infinity) and charge no taxes, dominating the market. This possibility seems farfetched in the tax haven context, and in any event, the problem of "tax havens with prohibi-

tively good governance rules" does not appear to be a fear that anyone has expressed in the
current debate over inversions.
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7r, and K2, which the firm receives (exogenously) from operations in
Jurisdictions 1 and 2, respectively. Further, let t, and t2 denote the taxes
that Jurisdictions I and 2 impose on that portion of profits generated
from within the jurisdiction (regardless of where the firm is
incorporated). Finally, redefine r, and r2 slightly from the earlier
analysis to denote an additional or extraordinary tax levy that each of
Jurisdictions 1 and 2 can impose only on corprations choosing to
incroporate in that juriusdiction. These additional surcharges could take
any number of institutional forms, but one obvious one is that they
proxy for tax levies imposed by the jurisdiction in question on the
extraterritorial earnings of domestically incorporated entities. Thus, one
potential factor in selecting one's place of incorporation would be to
minimize the additional tax burden placed on firms that choose to
incorporate in each jurisdiciton (a consideration that maps comfortably
into the current debate on U.S. tax law and inversion incentives).
Within this modified setup of the basic framework, each firm's payoff
from incorporating in J, and J2 now would become:

Firm's payoff from incorporating in JI:
fl(x1 , tl, t 2vr 1 1O)

=

1-

t)

+

(2 -

t 2 ) + OX

(E

t2 ) +

-T1

Firm's payoff from incorporating in J2:
Il(x 2 t1 ,t 2 ,r 2 10)

=

-

t)

+

-

X2

-2

The terms in the parentheses are simply the after-tax revenues that the
firm receives from its operations in each of Jurisdictions 1 and 2. Comparing the two expressions above, it becomes clear that a representative
firm of type 0 is willing to incorporate in J if and only if the following
choice condition holds:
0* =r

-

Choose J, over J2 if and only if: 0

x

-x2

Note that this is precisely the same expression that defined the market
shares of each jurisdiction in the basic model above. And indeed, all the
rest of the insights follow precisely the same too, including the nature of
"bundled" regulatory competition. In other words:
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Proposition 5: When firms receive earnings streams from multinational sources, and are taxed on those earnings by the jurisdiction
where they are earned, jurisdictionalcompetition remains viable, and
a corporategovernance leader can extract value by bundling its governance regime with an extraordinarytax on firms choosing to incorporate with the leader. The unique equilibrium involves differentiated
corporategovernance rules andpositive extraordinarylevies (with the
leader's levy exceeding the laggard's). Both jurisdictions enjoy
strictlypositive payoffs.
Although the "extraordinary tax" referenced in the proposition above
could take any number of institutional forms, one such form is to characterize it as a domestic tax on a company's foreign earnings. And thus a
worldwide corporate tax system-such as the one that prevails in the
United States-would be perfectly consistent with this bundled form of
competition (as well as the additional premium levied by the corporate
governance leader).
Perhaps even more intriguingly, the above extension delivers immediate insights as to whether (and how) a jurisdiction that taxes on a
worldwide basis might compete with jurisdictions that employ territorial

approaches. Suppose, for example, that Jurisdiction 2 (the laggard)
adopted a territorial system, and therefore imposed a uniform tax only
on that income earned by a firm inside J2 , regardless of the firm's tax
residence. In other words, J 2 would choose not to levy an extraordinary
tax on firms' extraterritorial earnings, and it effectively sets T2 = 0. In
terms of the baseline model, this corresponds to the case when J2 behaved in an aggressive or non-profit-maximizing fashion, exactly like
the extension analyzed in Subsection (3) above. However, just as before,

the corporate governance leader (JI) can still compete profitably by imposing a positive extraordinary levy on firms choosing to incorporate
there in the amount rl = 2(XI -X 2) > 0. It therefore becomes immediately
apparent that it would be destructive of J;'s interests to mimic J2 's territorial tax regime, which would constrain J to set r, = 0 as well.
Proposition 6: When the laggardjurisdiction is constrainedto utilize
a territorialtax regime, the optimal response of the leader to is continue to levy extraordinarytaxes on domestically incorporatedfirms
(albeit at slightly moderated levels relative to when all regimes can
impose extraordinarytax levies).
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5. UnbundledRegulatory Instruments
A fifth-and critical-assumption in the foregoing analysis was that
tax and nontax attributes of each jurisdiction's regulatory offerings were
mandatorily "bundled" into a conjoined package. That is, when opting
into their preferred regulatory environment, firms had to choose between
Ji's regulatory package on the one hand, and J2 's package on the other.
They did not have the option to combine regulatory instruments between
the jurisdictions.
How would the nature of regulatory competition change if firms were
able to debundle their regulatory packages? Depending on the
mechanism of debundling, the effect could be significant (and
undesirable). In the extreme case, unbundling would prescribe granting
firms the discretion to mix and match at will, likely by choosing JI's
desirable governance regime and J2'S lower tax rate. From JI's
perspective, this would be like competing against a jurisdiction offering
package (xi, r2), thereby imposing a lower tax levy for identical
governance dimensions. As shown above, J, and J 2 would then be
compelled to compete solely in tax levies, and the only equilibrium
would be a form of "ruinous" tax competition such that r = r2= 0.
Moreover, anticipating that unbundling will augur ruinous
competition, neither jurisdiction will have an incentive ex ante to invest
in assembling (or maintaining) a strong corporate goverance regime.
Consequently, in the first stage of the game, both the leader and the
laggard will install the minimum level of corporate governance, so that
XI = x 2 = 0. This logic can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 7: If firms were pemitted to "unbundle" tax from
governance attributes, then allfirms will opt to be taxed in the lowesttax jurisdiction and governed through the corporate governance
leader. The unique equilibrium in this setting involves alljurisdictions
installing the lowest possible level of corporate governance, levying
no taxes, and generating no tax revenue.
What might the technology of unbundling look like? Although
examples abound, two in particular stand out in the light of current
debates. The first is a territorial tax system, which effectively makes tax
levies on a firm independent of where it incorporates. As shown above, a
corporate governance leader would never have an incentive to adopt
such a system, even if all other competitors had previously done so.
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A second technology for unbundling is perhaps even more focal for
purposes of this Article: J, might simply permit it, by supplying its
corporate governance regime-mostly free of charge-to any foreignincorporated firm wishing to use it. Although this strategy seemingly
runs counter to the leader's interests, as Part III has argued, U.S.
securities law has been doing something like it (even if unwittingly)
over the last decade and a half. The next Part tentatively explores some
institutional responses to this generous governance giveaway.
6. Does Governance Really Matter?
A final consideration warranting attention concerns an empirical
assessment as to whether corporate law considerations really "matter"
relative to tax benefits in firms' inversion calculus. In other words, given
the much-heralded magnitude of stranded off-shore earnings and high
relative tax rates as core drivers of corporate expatriations, do corporate
governance considerations represent anything more than rounding error
in assessing the costs and benefits of inverting? This is an imporant
question, since much of the conceptual analysis above turns on the
heterogeneity of firms' valuations of governance causing them to "sort"
into different tax/governance regimes, and the simultaneous importance
of a tax and governance tradeoff for the "marginal" firm. If the tax
incentives were simply too overpowering to resist, then it would cast
doubt on whether there are any marginal firms to begin with: Instead, all
firms with a substantial foreign CFC footprint would stand to gain an
inframarginal benefit by inverting, irrespective of governance.
Although a detailed empirical analysis of this issue is beyond the
scope of this Article, there are several reasons to believe that governance
concerns can and do play a role in modulating the rate of corporate
inversions. First, recall from the previous Part that inversions are but one
of many alternative tax strategies that INCs can use to manage offshore earnings (including intercompany loans, debt financing, and the
like). As the magnitude of stranded CFC earnings has grown, so too has
the incentive to pursue these alternative strategies as well; thus, it is far
from clear that inversions would invariably emerge as the dominant
strategy, even when the aggregate amount of offshore earnings grows
large. What is clear, however, is that (a) the principal alternative
strategies to inversion do not also require corporate expatriation; and (b)
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the corporate-governance costs of inverting have waned in recent years
due to the federalization of corporate law.' 9 2
Second-and relatedly-it is instructive to consider the raw numbers:
As illustrated in Appendix B, despite the significant popular attention
inversions have garnered, the total number of announced transactions
over the last two decades has been surprisingly modest (around seventy
by the count offered in Appendix B, or around 3.3 per year). This figure
constitutes approximately five hundredths of one percent of the average
number of public companies traded in U.S. securities markets each year
during that same interval of time (thousands of which have multinational
earnings).' 9 3 If the the force of tax incentives were as irresistable as is
popularly claimed, then it is perplexing indeed that such a miniscule
fraction of U.S. MNCs have taken the bait. A plausible alternative
hypothesis is that some firms were deterred from inverting (possibly
channeled into alternative strategies) by nontax considerations, with
corporate governance concerns constituting one of them, particularly
prior to SOX and Dodd-Frank.1 9 4
Third, consider the market's reactions to inversion announcements. If
all inverting firms are in fact "inframarginal," harvesting a bounty of
considerable tax benefits with negligible costs, then it follows that such
firms should have experienced a strong and persistent windfall in their
stock price upon the announcement of a planned inversion. Indeed,
given the curiously small overall number of inverting companies noted
above, the announcement of an intent to expatriate should be both
newsworthy and significant to the lucky shareholders of those firms. On
the other hand, the existence of appreciable governance tradeoffs
coinciding with inverting would tend to dampen the tax benefits from
inverting-particularly during those years where securities law did not
play a significant role in arbitrating corporate governance.

192 It is perhaps worth noting that the fraction of inverters that left Delaware after
SOX
increased from 58% to 64%. See infra Appendix B. Although this is not a drastic sea change,
it is consistent with the claim that Delaware's market power in governance began to erode as
federal law expanded through the 2000s and beyond.
193 Although the total number of public companies in the United States has fluctuated, a
ballpark estimate puts the average at around 6,000 during this two-decade span. See Dan
Strumpf, U.S. Public Companies Rise Again: Stock-Market Listings Grow for First Time
Since Internet Boom, Wall St. J. (Feb. 5, 2014, 3:43 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SBl0001424052702304851104579363272107177430.
194 It is worth noting that all of the companies announcing an inversion also manifested an
intent to remain listed on U.S. exchanges (in some cases as a dual listing).
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Figure 8: Three-Day Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around Inversion
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Figure 8 plots the three-day cumulative abnormal return ("CAR") of
stock prices for U.S. inverters over two decades (through the end of
2014), centered on the date of announcement.195 It is immediately
apparent from the figure that announcement returns are highly
heterogeneous, and by no means are they categorically rosy: While some
issuers experience robust positive returns upon declaring an intent to
invert, others experince strong negative stock-price reactions, and many
barely register much of a reacton in either direction. This overall
heterogeneity-punctuated by the frequency of strongly negative
CARs-appears inconsistent with the view that inverters categorically
create immediate, unalloyed value for shareholders: Evidently, even
with tax incentives, the market discounts tax gains against other factors

195 An "abnormal return" reflects the extent to which the return on a company's equity exceeds what one would predict given observed market movements on that day. See Appendix
B for more details. The figure plots each inverter's "cumulative" abnormal returns over the
three-day trading period that spans the trading days before and after the announcement date.
The figure includes firms that announced but ultimately did not close an acquisition. (Approximately ten inverters are not represented in the figure because of data unavailability.)
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(such as governance considerations).196 Note further that the CAR pattern
associated with inversion announcements-while remaining heterogeneous
throughout-grows more positive overall as time progresses. While
announcement returns before SOX are statistically indistinguishable
from zero, the overall presence and magnitude of positive CARs on
announcement grows in time, and is the strongest after Dodd-Frank.
This pattern is consistent with the thesis articulated above-that over the
last fifteen years, federal law has substantially displaced state law as the
central arbiter of corporate governance, thereby removing one of the key
impediments to inverting. 197
IV. SYNTHESIS AND SOME TENTATIVE REFORM PROPOSALS

The results from Part III reveal several intuitions that are relevant to
understanding some policy tradeoffs inherent in the recent inversion
wave. Most centrally, the analysis suggests that, so long as U.S. corporate law offers a more attractive regime for corporate governance than
do salient jurisdictional competitors, then U.S. tax authorities perhaps
need not engage in hasty, tit-for-tat responses to the tax policies of foreign authorities. In particular, the most radical reforms currently on the
table-such as the complete elimination of corporate taxes or the migration to a territorial system of taxes-are dubious responses (at best) to
the existing trend, and may even prove counterproductive (both to the
United States and to general social welfare). Assuming the United States
is still able to offer a distinct (and attractive) governance product, then it
can likely afford to impose a tax premium as well. Domestic policymakers may therefore have the flexibility to approach responsive tax reform
196 One could argue that the inverters experiencing strongly negative abnormal
returns represent examples of managerial agency costs, whereby managers pursue their own interests
(while also freeing up firm capital) by inverting to a less stringent jurisdiction. Such a theory, however, would be inconsistent with the claim that governance is of second order importance. It is, in contrast, highly consistent with many of the arguments I have offered

above.
19 One could also argue, of course, that this pattern could be consistent with tax incentives

too, since during this same period of time off-shore earnings grew considerably too as did
the international gap in headline tax rates. Nevertheless, as noted above, the enhanced taxavoidance stakes would also render alternative tax management strategies more attractive.

Moreover, the tax eligibility rules governing inversions over this period also ballooned significantly, which could well push in the opposite direction-making inversions less profitable and attractive than other strategies. In addition, recall from Figure 1 that Ireland's attractive 12.5% tax rate is not a new phenomenon, but has been in place since 2003 (well before
the most recent trends).
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in a more incremental fashion, embracing changes similar to approaches
that were recently undertaken in the 2014 anti-inversion reforms without
re-imagining the entire corporate tax philosophy of the United States.
This of course does not imply that utter passivity is the optimal U.S.
response to recent extraterritorial migrations either. Clearly, something
has induced a discernible inversion exodus to take hold. To be sure, the
large (and growing) differences in nominal tax rates imposed on U.S.
resident corporations are part of this problem (see Figure 1 above), and
the U.S. may well wish to consider reducing nominal rates by some
margin to narrow (though not eliminate) the gap. However, the analysis
offered above suggests that tax differentials are perhaps only part of the
problem, and that an analogously significant concern is the extent to
which the U.S. has unwittingly undermined its own ability to secure
corporate tax revenues by unbundling corporate governance from tax
residence. As argued in Part II, over the last fifteen years, U.S. securities
law has gradually supplanted state corporate governance laws as the lingua franca (and lex franca) of U.S.-traded companies, independent of
incorporation jurisdiction. By unbundling governance from tax, the federal government has arguably compromised its ability to extract tax revenues in exchange for offering value-enhancing governance. To the extent that this unbundling trend continues, moreover, the inversion wave
could actually grow worse.
My analysis therefore suggests at least two alternative measures as
promising responses to this trend: either (1) the United States should devise a means for "pricing out" the governance services that it increasingly gives away to public companies; and/or (2) the federal government
should reverse course in its longstanding program to suffuse securities
law with a series of corporate governance requirements. I address each
(briefly and tentatively) below.
A. PricingFederal Governance
One potential response for re-bundling tax and governance would be
for the U.S. government to charge foreign corporations for their access
to U.S. securities laws, markets, courts, regulators and jurisprudence.
Perhaps the most effective way to do this would be to assess an extraordinary tax surcharge to issuers who list (or cross-list) on U.S. exchanges,
subject to an allowance for issuers who, by virtue of U.S. incorporation,
are subject to U.S. tax treatment at the parent level.
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At present, the fees charged to foreign issuers by U.S. exchanges are
not subject to any extraordinary U.S. tax, and they are trivial by comparison to typical U.S. tax obligations. For example, the NASDAQ exchange imposes an annual fee ranging from $45,000 to $155,000, depending on the market and number of shares,198 while the NYSE charges
a per-share fee ranging from a total of $25,000 to a top-end of
$500,000.199 Other exchanges, such as BATS, offer no fees, other than
an initial $5,000 listing fee, at all for securities that are traded in sufficient volumes.200 While certainly not pocket change, none of these fees
comes remotely close to the type of tax liability of most U.S. multinationals. Moreover, given the multiplicity of exchanges in the U.S. (and
their common regulatory mandates imposed by securities law), it is perhaps not surprising that listing fees appear to reflect significant price.
competition, and are not effective conduits to extract the value of U.S.
corporate governance. (A similar observation applies, at least in principle, to other intermediary actors such as investment bankers and the corporate bar.) Imposing an extraordinary levy on foreign issuers, then,
might well reduce the difference in tax burden between domestic and
foreign incorporations, effectively re-bundling the benefits of U.S. listings with tax revenues.
One potentially significant drawback to a special tax levy on foreign
issuers comes from preexisting constraints the United States faces under
international law. Although levying a listing surcharge on listed foreign
corporations may not carry the same constitutional implications as when
U.S. states discriminate against out-of-state corporations, it could face
significant challenges elsewhere. In particular, international tax treaties
typically prohibit (or heavily constrain) tax discrimination against foreign incorporated entities.201 To the extent that such taxes abrogate these
'9 NASDAQ, Initial Listing Guide 13 (Jan. 2015), available at https://listingcenter.
nasdaq.com/assets/initialguide.pdf.
1'9 NYSE Listed Co. Manual, at 902.02, 902.03 (2015), available at http://nysemanual.
nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednodechpl_10&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsectio
ns%2Flcm-sections%2F.
200 See Listings, BATS, http://www.batstrading.com/listings/ (last
visited Mar. 25, 2015).
201 See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Treasury, United States Model Income Tax Convention
of November 15, 2006, at art. 24 ("Nationals of a Contracting State shall not be subjected in the
other Contracting State to any taxation or any requirement connected therewith that is more
burdensome than the taxation and connected requirements to which nationals of that other
State in the same circumstances, in particular with respect to residence, are or may be subjected."); The Joint Comm. on Taxation, Explanation of Proposed Income Tax Treaty Between the United States and Poland (JCX-68-14) at 3 (June 17, 2014) (adopting provisions
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treaty provisions, they could well be unenforceable. This particular
problem might be addressed, however, by double-barrel reforms: simultaneously reducing tax liability for U.S. incorporated issuers (such as
through a material reduction in tax rates or transitioning to a territorial
system), combined with a uniform listing surcharge for all listed companies, foreign and domestic. Nevertheless, such fixes involve time, effort,
and creativity and may themselves run various types of risks to enforcement.
A second (and perhaps more imposing) challenge, however, might
remain. As noted above, my central thesis in this Article turns on federal
securities law displacing state corporate law, but not on whether the displacing elements of federal securities law are desirable or not. Either
way, both foreign and domestic listing entities are subject to the same
governance restrictions, and consequently the cost of leaving U.S. corporate law jurisprudence goes down. Nevertheless, if one is convinced
that the governance reforms in SOX and Dodd-Frank were an affirmatively misguided (and the jury is still out on this one-and haggling with
one another),202 then imposing a listing surcharge comes with an attendant risk: flight from U.S. securities markets as well as state corporate law. Indeed, if the governance changes during the last fifteen years
have been misguided, then they have eroded the value of a U.S. listing
writ large. Accordingly, an overly aggressive attempt to extract rents
from U.S. listed companies might bring about an undesirable consequence-flight to foreign exchanges. Thus, while a listings surcharge
may be one way to approach the unbundling dilemma, it is a potentially
risky proposition.
B. Rolling Back FederalCorporateGovernance
A second possible policy option to re-bundle tax and governance
would entail "rolling back" (either retrenching or repealing) many of the
governance reforms introduced by SOX, Dodd-Frank, and their progeny,
which-as argued above-have squeezed out state law in several domains where states were traditionally dominant. Several of the federal

substantially similar to the U.S. Model treaty, which contains nondiscrimination provisions
on tax treatment of foreign entities relative to domestic entities).
202 See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying
text.
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governance mandates delineated in Part II, for example, could be candidates for the chopping block under this approach.203
Although roll-backs are, in some ways, less legally fraught than new
tax levies, they carry appreciable risks and obstacles of their own. One
such impediment stems from task of coordinating state and federal legal
actors. When the federal government is the chief authority for both taxation and provision of governance (as is plausibly the case now), it is easier
to develop a coherent strategy for bundling the two policy instruments. In
contrast, when states (such as Delaware) are the primary producers of
corporate governance, while the federal government retains primary tax
authority, it becomes unclear whether the relevant actors have adequate
incentives and abilities to coordinate with one another in a way that internalizes relevant costs and benefits. Put simply, how strong is Delaware's incentive to build and maintain a valuable corporate governance
regime if the federal government proceeds to extract the lion's share of
that value through federal taxation?
Granted, states likely internalize some revenue benefits from offering
strong governance regimes (such as nurturing a strong regional legal
services market), but many states raise somewhat little capital from corporate taxes on domestic corporations, particularly when such businesses do their business elsewhere.20 4 All else constant, the coordination
problems that would ensue from ceding governance back to the states
represent a distinct drawback to using federal roll-backs to re-bundle tax
with company law.
Yet another impediment to using federal rollbacks to re-bundle tax
and corporate law-and an artifact of federal-state coordination problems noted above-potentially comes from firms themselves. Increasingly, incorporated entities are going to extraordinary lengths to "contractualize" their corporate governance regimes, which can have the
effect of instituting a form of private unbundling. For example, the Medtronic-Covidien inversion included a term in the surviving entity's Irish
articles of association that largely replicates a U.S.-style business com-

See supra notes 117-64 and accompanying text.
Under Del. Code Ann. tit. 30, § 1902(a) (2015), domestic and foreign corporations are
required to pay a tax of 8.7% of federal taxable income allocated and apportioned to Delaware. The apportionment formula is based on an equally weighted three-factor method of
property, wages, and sales in Delaware as a ratio of property, wages, and sales everywhere.
See id. 1903(b)(6).
203

204
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bination statute.2 05 In addition, U.S. companies have increasingly inserted choice of forum clauses in their governing bylaws, usually to steer internal affairs litigation back to their own state of incorporation.2 0 6 However, it is plausible that inverting companies may employ similar tactics
to effect the opposite result, steering corporate litigation away from their
unfamiliar new foreign home, and back into U.S. (and Delaware) courts.
It is unclear how receptive the Delaware Chancery Court would be to
adjudicating, say, corporate litigation involving the internal affairs of an
Irish or British corporation. However, it seems plausible that at least
some Delaware judges-who do not personally benefit from federal tax
revenues and who enjoy being at the helm of high-profile business litigation-might be willing to entertain such cases. It bears noting, for example, that the Delaware Chancery Court recently recognized the validity of an unconventional forum-selection bylaw for a Delaware
corporation that had opted into North Carolina courts to litigating internal affairs disputes.2 0 7 Chancellor Bouchard appealed to principles of
comity to justify the uniform interpretation of forum-selection bylaws,
no matter what their directionality. 208
To the extent such self-help strategies become routine and accepted, a
roll-back of federal corporate governance mandates would face long
odds in reclaiming U.S. market power in the regulatory competition
market. It seems plausible, then, that a federal governance roll-back
See Medtronic Holdings Ltd., Registration Statement (Form S-4), Annex D at D-46 to
D-52 (July 14, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1613103/00011
9312514267867/d741931ds4.htm#rom741931_133. The provision was fashioned after the
business combination statute in Minnesota, Medtronic's place of incorporation. See Minn.
Stat. § 302A.673 (2014).
206 See, e.g., Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939-40
(Del. Ch. 2013).
207 City of Providence v. First Citizens BancShares, Inc., 99 A.3d 229,
231 (Del. Ch. 2014).
208 As Chancellor Bouchard concludes:
Further supporting my conclusion are important interests of judicial comity. If Delaware corporations are to expect, after Chevron, that foreign courts will enforce valid
bylaws that designate Delaware as the exclusive forum for intra-corporate disputes,
then, as a matter of comity, so too should this Court enforce a Delaware corporation's
bylaw that does not designate Delaware as the exclusive forum. In my opinion, to
conclude otherwise would stray too far from the harmony that fundamental principles
of judicial comity seek to maintain.
Id. at 242 (footnote omitted). Motivated partially in response to City of Providence, Delaware has recently amended its corporate code to allow Delaware corporations to place a forum selection clause favoring Delaware in their charter or bylaws, while disallowing any
such provision that would prohibit Delaware courts from having jurisdiction. See Del. Code
Ann. tit. 8, § 115 (2015).
205
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would have to be coupled with a stronger mandate (from Congress, the
Supreme Court, or some other actor) on the sanctity of the internal affairs doctrine in the face of such "inverted" choice of law/forum provisions.
Finally, a strategy of rolling back of federal corporate governance
mandates poses challenges in prioritizing which particular mandates
should be subject to repeal. It seems plausible that at least some recent
federal mandates have enhanced average company value, while others
have been value-eroding. (The relative mixture of beneficial and misguided mandates is, as noted above, still subject to considerable debate.)
One might have an intuitive inclination to target those federal mandates
that are generally thought the least successful in enhancing company
value. However, the calculus of unbundling calls even this intuitive logic
into question. Recall that both good and bad governance mandates can
effectively displace state law, and in that sense both types incrementally
unbundle tax from governance. Somewhat counter-intuitively, one could
argue that it is paramount to pull the plug first on the most valuable federal governance mandates, since those rules represent the most significant areas where federal law provides the maximal benefit to foreign issuers without attempting to extract tax revenues. Consequently, as with
levies in U.S. listings, the option of regulatory roll-backs also presents a
variety of practical challenges.
CONCLUSION

Tax inversions have been at the center of a significant legal policy
debate for at least the last two years and one that has sporadically flared
up for decades. Such transactions have proven extraordinarily difficult
for policy makers to address, because they represent a complex intersection of tax law, capital mobility, public finance, corporate law and governance, securities law, and perfervid political jockeying about the appropriate role (if any) of corporate taxes. This Article has approached
the subject using the lens of regulatory-competition theory, arguing our
current bout with "inversionitis" is an artifact-at least in part-of a
fundamental (and largely self-inflicted) shift in the competitive landscape, where the United States has traditionally enjoyed market power
by "bundling" its tax residency rules with a strong system of state corporate law and governance, utilizing the latter to extract rents through the
former. Since the turn of the twenty-first century, U.S. market power in
the regulatory competition sphere has dwindled-perhaps unwittingly-
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as securities law has progressively unbundled these two policy levers
through a steady colonization of corporate governance. An effective palliative for our current malaise, then, may lay in securities market reforms that address the unbundling phenomenon squarely (rather than a
radical reimagining of U.S. corporate tax policy). The precise shape of
prescriptive reform, however, turns crucially on one's assessment of
(among other things) whether our fifteen-year-long experiment in federal corporate governance has been innovatively creative, or irresponsibly
destructive. And concededly, this latter question is still open to some
speculation and debate; but the dilemmas it poses may be far more tractable (and politically manageable) than those presented by radical tax reform proposals.
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A

This appendix extends and analyzes in greater detail the regulatory
competition framework underlying the illustrative example discussed in the
text.
A. GeneralFramework
Consider a continuum of profit maximizing business organizations
(firms) that make strategic decisions about their regulatory jurisdiction.
The total size of the population of firms is normalized at size 1. Each
firm chooses from a "menu" of regulatory offerings of various jurisdictions, and in particular a firm's choice commits it to the jurisdiction's
corporate governance regime as well as its tax rules (that is, tax and corporate governance are bundled). Each firm in the population generates a
baseline gross payoff of 7r> 0, which is assumed constant across all
firms in the population. Each firm's payoff, however, is subject to both
upward and downward revisions from this baseline as a by-product of
the regulatory and tax environment it selects (detailed below). I assume
that firms in the population choose their regulatory environment in order
to maximize their payoffs net of such revisions.
Firms select their regulatory home from among n > 2 jurisdictions,
indexed as J;, where i e {1, 2 . . ., n}. The jurisdictions are assumed to
compete with one another for incorporations and the resulting tax revenues. Specifically, I suppose that jurisdictions are interested in maximizing their expected tax revenues less the administrative cost of installing
and maintaining their regulatory structure.
Interjurisdictional competition plays out through a bundle of regulatory attributes offered by each jurisdiction to firms that are incorporated
there. Each jurisdiction offers a package of regulatory instruments denoted (;, r). The term r denotes a tax levy imposed on firms incorporating in J. Intuitively, higher values of ri correspond to larger per-firm
tax levies in J;. Tax levies are normalized to be non-negative. The vector
x; embodies the nontax elements of corporate regulation, to which I refer
collectively as the "corporate governance" attributes of each jurisdiction.
In the most general setting, Z; would have h > 1 elements, and thus x;
can be decomposed into its components {xi1 , xi2 , - . , Xih}. These variables embody canonical corporate law and other regulation commitments
thought to affect firm value (such as minority shareholder protections,
fiduciary duties, judicial quality, board structure, shareholder govern.
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ance rights, network externalities, and the like). For the purposes of this
analysis, however, I will concentrate on the case of h = 1 (so that corporate governance is reflected along a scalar index), but it is relatively
straightforward to extend the model to higher order dimensions, with little change to the core analytic results derived below.
The net profits of each firm stem from two deviations away from their
gross values. Specifically, for a firm choosing jurisdiction i, net profits
are given by:
Er+0- Xi -t

(1)

where 0 denotes the marginal value that the firm places on the quality of
the governance regime. I assume that firms are heterogeneous, and that
Oe[, 0] is distributed according to probability density functionf() > 0,
and associated cumulative distribution function F(0). Moreover, assume
that f() and F() satisfy conventional monotone hazard rate properties
(so that F()/f(O) is non-decreasing in 0, and [1 - F(9)]/f(0) is nonincreasing in 9).
Although incorporating firms value strong governance (high values of
x;), installing and maintaining high quality governance is costly to the
jurisdictions. Specifically, I assume that in order to install governance
level x;, J must expend c(x) in costs, where c(O) = 0, c'(x; ) 0, and
c"(x;) > 0. I also assume that limx,,o+c'(xi) = 0, so that sufficiently
small investments in corporate governance visit-in the limitarbitrarily small costs on the jurisdiction.20 9
The order of the game proceeds in three stages:
In Stage 1, jurisdictions sequentially choose their governance regimes
{x;, x 2, . . *, xn }. I normalize the sequence to follow the jurisdictions'
index numbers, so that J, is the first mover, followed by J2, and so
forth.
In Stage 2, once jurisdictions have committed to a governance regime,
all jurisdictions simultaneously choose tax levies {rl, r 2, . . . , r; }
which are assumed to be bundled with governance.

209

I explore the implications of relaxing this last assumption below.
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In Stage 3, firms select their jurisdiction so as to maximize expected
net profits, paying corresponding jurisdictional taxes.
I analyze Bayesian perfect equilibria of the above extensive form, characterizing optimal strategies and associated payoffs moving backwards
through the stages of the game.

1. Firms' JurisdictionalChoice
Consider first the final stage, where firms choose their incorporation
jurisdiction, assuming all jurisdictions have committed both to a governance regime and a tax levy. If firms are value maximizing, then each
strictly prefers to incorporate in Jk if that jurisdiction offers a net value
exceeding that available in all other jurisdictions:
!+OXk

i-r Vi# k.

Vk >T+9Xi

(2)

(I assume that if the maximal attainable net value for a firm is offered by
two or more jurisdictions, the firm randomizes in choosing between
them). Consequently, a firm of type 0 will strictly favor jurisdiction k
over all other jurisdictions ifA k whenever:
0*(xk-Xi)>rk-i

Vi

k

(3)

Note that this condition immediately suggests that were two jurisdictions
J and Jk to offer identical corporate governance regimes (x, = xk), then
those jurisdictions will compete for firms on the basis of tax rates alone
(r and Tk), with firms strictly favoring the lower-tax jurisdiction. (As
noted in the text, a similar argument holds for any jurisdictions that unbundle their governance regimes from their tax regimes.)
Alternatively, when jurisdictions offer differentiated regimes (so that,
say, xi < Xk without loss of generality), a firm of type 0 will favor jurisdiction k over i whenever:

9>

4k

-

k
xk

i
Xi

V k(4)
k
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The variable 9 i,k represents the type of firm (in 0 space) that would be
indifferent between the bundled offerings of J; and Jk. As is immediately
evident from condition (4), should any jurisdiction i offer a corporate
governance regime that is weaker than that offered by some other jurisdiction k (and thus x; < xk), then a necessary condition for jurisdiction i
to have a non-zero market share of incorporations is that it levies a
strictly lower tax than jurisdiction k (and thusr; < rk).
2. Tax Levy Stage
Moving back to Stage 2, suppose all jurisdictions have installed governance regimes (in Stage 1), and they must set tax levies simultaneously in the light of these installed regimes and firms' anticipated jurisdictional preferences (described above). It facilitates exposition to develop
an alternative indexing scheme, where jurisdictions are ranked according
to their chosen governance regimes, from "highest" to "lowest." Specifically, let x(l) denote the highest-quality regime chosen by any jurisdiction, X( 2) the second-highest regime, and so forth. 210 Note that these alternative indexes {x(1), X( 2 ), - - - X(n)} need not coincide with the
sequential indexing of the firms above (that is, {xI, x 2, - - - , X, ), since it
is not clear (at least yet) how the quality of installed governance relates
to the sequential order of play in Stage 1-a topic taken up below.
The first important insight comes from understanding how tax
competition between jurisdictions relates to the similarity of their
governance regimes. In particular, suppose that two (or more) jurisdictions had chosen identical governance regimes (so that, say,
X(m + 1)

=

X(m + 2)

-- -

X(m + i)).

As noted above, in selecting between

these jurisdictions, firms will concentrate solely on minimizing tax liabilities, since there is no difference in governance. Accordingly, the jurisdictions will face pure price competition in taxes, and the only equilibrium entails both jurisdictions charging zero taxes. This intuition is
stated formally in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1: If any subsequence of ordered jurisdictions
(m + 1, . . . ,m + i} install identical governance structures (and thus
x(m + 1) = x(m + 2) = ...

= x(m + i)), then in equilibrium all such
...
t(m + i) = 0,

jurisdictionslevy taxes of r (m + 1) = t (m + 2)
and realize zero gross payoff
210 This notation
x(I)

x2

may appear unintuitive at first, since it implies the ordering

. > > x( which is the reverse indexing from conventional "order statistics" with-

in sampling theory. As shall become apparent below, however, this convention makes for a
more natural alignment of the two indexing schemes in equilibrium.
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Lemma 1 is analogous to the familiar result in Bertrand competition
models, where total market size is bounded (as is present here). As is
well known in the literature,21 1 the only equilibrium in such situations
involves marginal cost pricing-and in this framework all costs are quasi-fixed, and thus marginal costs are zero. Alternatively, if jurisdictions
offer differentiated governance regimes, then firms may sort depending
on their marginal values of governance. In particular, firms that value
governance relatively little (and thus Ois close to zero) will tend to
choose the lowest tax regimes, while firms that value governance more
(and 0 is relatively high) are willing to pay more for governance through
taxes, and thus may choose to be governed by a higher tax regime.
A concomitant of the reasoning above is that if any jurisdiction with
governance regime x(m) assesses a levy of r(,,) = 0, then this strategy will
have significant "trickle-down" effects on any jurisdictions that have installed a less attractive governance policy.
Lemma 2: If any jurisdiction with profile x(m) charges levy of
r(m) = 0, then in equilibrium all jurisdictions with strictly weaker
governance regimes (that is, {i I x(i) <x(m)}) realize zero gross payoff and zero market share.
Lemma 2 establishes the vulnerability of laggard jurisdictions to strong
price competition from jurisdictions with stronger governance regimes.
Indeed, because of the ordering of the x(p), we know that x(,) < x(m) for all
i > m. All such jurisdictions are not able to offer a stronger governance
regime than x(m), and even if they reduced their tax levy to zero, consumers would prefer to incorporate under regime x(m) and pay r(m) = 0.
Combining Lemmas 1 and 2 immediately yields the following:
Lemma 3: If any subsequence of ordered jurisdictions
(m + 1, . . ,m + i} installs identical governance structures (and thus
. . = x(m + i)), then in equilibrium all jurisdictions
X(m +1) = x(m + 2) =
with strictly weaker governance regimes (that is, {i | x(, < x(m)}) realize zero profits and zero market share.

211 Michael R. Baye & John Morgan, A Folk Theorem for One-Shot Bertrand Games, 65
Econ. Letters 59, 59-60 (1999); Todd R. Kaplan & David Wettstein, The Possibility of
Mixed-Strategy Equilibria with Constant-Returns-to-Scale Technology Under Bertrand
Competition, 2 Span. Econ. Rev. 65, 65-66 (2000).
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The above lemmas convey different ways in which the tax levy game
can devolve into "ruinous" competition (via Bertrand pricing). However,
ruinous competition need not follow when jurisdictions are differentiated, and can therefore exercise some market power, as elucidated below.
For the sake of precision, I introduce two definitions. First, let Y(m+1)
denote the largest non-unique value in the sequence {X(l), X(2), * . . , X(n)}

(and thus by implication x(m + 1) = 3(m+2)). Lemmas 1-3 imply
that 7~m+1) = 0, and moreover that all firms with governance structures
weaker than x(m+1) must enjoy zero profits and zero market share. By
construction, then, all jurisdictions offering governance regimes {x(l),
X(2), .**, X(m)} offer governance regimes that are fully differentiated from
one another, so that x(I) > X(2)> - > X(m). If all jurisdictions have positive market share (an assumption that will be borne out in equilibrium),
firms will tend to favor regime x,;; over those of its immediate ordinal
neighbors (x(; + 1) and x(i - 1)) whenever the following condition holds:

T(i) - r(i+l)
(X(j) -X(j+ 1 )

x(i-1) - T(i)
X(j...) -x~)

(5)

O+1, i I i, i-1)

With these definitions in hand, the equilibrium of the taxation stage
game can be characterized as follows:
Proposition la: Suppose SE(m+1) = o and thus all n governance re-

gimes are distinct. The unique equilibrium of the tax levy stage game
involves all jurisdictions capturingpositive market share, all making
positive profits, and all imposing taxes oft(J) > T( 2 ) > . . . > T(n) characterized by the system:

i

N:(N

f

INI

FN,N-)

(X(N1-) - X(N)

(2(...,m

i+
1,i

:ii-1

I- F

i+= 1:To)
(X(I) - X(2))

2,

= (F(ii-1)-

F(di+1

)

i
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Proposition lb: Suppose R(m+1) > x(,) and thus at least two governance regimes are not unique. The unique set ofpayoff-equivalent equilibria of the tax levy stage is as follows:
All jurisdictions with governance regimes x, = 3(m+1) levy tax of
r( = 0, capturingzero profits;
All jurisdictions with governance regimes x, < R(m+1) capture zero profits and zero market share;
All jurisdictions with governance regimes x,) > x(m+1) earn positive profit share, imposing positive taxes T(J) > T(2 ) > . . . > T,
where:

f Oi,i-i

i C42,..m):r(i)

i = 1:rTo)

2,l

f 0i+,i

=Fii1)

+,

=1-F(2,l

Proof- Consider first Proposition la, and thus assume that all values of
x(;) are distinct. First, realize that z(1) > 0 in any equilibrium. To see this,
suppose that there exists an equilibrium where the leader charges -Zr() = 0.
By Lemmas 1 and 2 above, in equilibrium all other jurisdictions must
either also charge ; )= 0, or have no market share (or both). Here, however, if x(1) is distinct from others, there exists a profitable unilateral deviation for the leader away from zero pricing. Indeed, note that the lead-

er's marginal profit (as a function of r(1)) is given by:
(1-F(d?2,1 ))-r(1)

2,l"

(6)

Note that if r(1) = 0 (as is assumed arguendo) the leader must have positive market share in this posited equilibrium (indeed 100%), and thus
when evaluated at rZl) = 0, the leader's marginal profit must be strictly
positive; consequently, the leader will have an incentive to deviate by
increasing its assessed levy. This exposes a contradiction, and thus in
any equilibrium, it must be the case that rjlj > 0. The remainder of the

[Vol. 10 1: 1649
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proof of Proposition la is by induction. Suppose there were an equilibrium in which r, > 0 for all i ={ 1, . . . , k - 1}, but that the jurisdiction
with governance regime x(k) levies a tax of r(k) = 0. Jurisdiction k's marginal profit as a function of its tax levy is:

(F(dk,k-1

)

F(k+1,k ))

T(k)

k,k-)

+

k,k)

(x~-1)(k)(k) -

(k+1)

Because x(k) is unique by hypothesis, it follows that xk 1 > Xk >X(k+ I).
Consequently, it also follows that 9,,j = 0 for all j ? k, since x(k) provides a better governance structure at zero price (see Lemma 3). Moreover, because qa _1) > 0, by hypothesis, it also follows that when evaluat> 0. The above marginal profit condition is
ed at r(k) = 0, Ok, k(k)
ak) r = 0, and thus the jurisdiction offering x(k)
therefore strictly posit
will have an incentive to deviate by increasing its assessed levy up to
some level strictly (k) E (0, rk- 1)). By induction then, it becomes clear
that if all firms are fully differentiated in governance, all will charge
positive levies of z(,) > . . . >q,) > 0, claim positive market share, and

make positive gross profits. The conditions in Proposition la are simply
the first order conditions for an optimum, assuming all firms have positive market share (as shown above).
The proof of Proposition lb is identical to Proposition la, up to the
consideration of the jurisdiction offering x(m+1). This jurisdiction (by
definition) offers a non-unique governance structure that is identical to
at least one other jurisdiction's offering. By Lemma 1, we know all such
jurisdictions offering X(m+1) must charge levies of r() = 0, dividing what
is left of the market but making no profits. All others in the market with
inferior governance regimes fail to capture market share (regardless of
the levy they charge).
3. Governance Regime Choice Stage
Finally, consider how jurisdictions will select their regime choice at
the ex ante stage. Recall here, under the alternative indexing regime, J
moves first, installing corporate governance regime xi, followed by J2
with x2 , and so forth. Recall also that installing regime x; requires an expenditure (of effort and/or monetary resources) of c(xd, where c(0) = 0,
c' (x;) > 0, and c" (xi) > 0, and limxe-o+c'(xi) = 0. This observation, in
turn, generates the following result:
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Proposition2: In any equilibrium of the regime choice game, all jurisdictions install unique governance regimes in which xi > 0, with
one jurisdiction installing a regime of xi = 0. Equilibrium levies increase in the quality of the governance regime offered by the jurisdiction.
Proof First note that no jurisdiction J would install a strictly positive
regime choice x; coinciding with the regime choice of some earlier mover, Jr. Indeed, by setting x; = Xk, jurisdiction i incurs strictly positive
costs of c(x) and generates zero gross profits in equilibrium (see Propo-

sition lb). Consequently, Ji's expected net payoff would be -c(xk), which
cannot be an equilibrium since a payoff of no less than zero was obtainable by setting xi = 0. To show that only one jurisdiction installs a governance regime of xi = 0, suppose in equilibrium some set of m jurisdic-

tions selected identical regimes of x; = 0 for all I e m. Applying Lemma
1, it follows that all such jurisdictions must generate zero net profits. Let
xmin constitute the lowest governance regime selected by any jurisdiction
outside of m. Some member of m would find a profitable deviation by
selecting x; = c, where 0 < e < xmin. By Proposition lb, such a jurisdiction would earn strictly positive gross profits, and because

limxi-so+c'(x) = 0, there exists a value of e sufficiently small that installing such a regime would generate strictly positive net profits.2 12 This
logic remains valid for any m > 1, and thus at most one jurisdiction will
install a regime of x; = 0. Because all jurisdictions earn strictly positive
profits, they must capture market share as well, and this is possible only if
equilibrium tax levies (Ti) are increasing in the quality of governance (x;).
Proposition 2 demonstrates that any equilibrium of the regime choice
stage will involve differentiated locations. Moreover, we know that such
an equilibrium exists, since both the maximum tax levy and the maximum governance level are effectively bounded by the structure of the
jurisdictions' payoffs. 2 13 However, as with other endogenous entry
212 If the limiting conditions on c'(xd are not satisfied, then there may not be
a profitable
deviation for a laggard jurisdiction offering x, = 0 to separate from other laggards also offering x; = 0. In this case, the equilibria would be similar to Proposition 2, but there would be a
cluster of "tax haven" jurisdictions each offering regime x,= 0 and charging zero equilibrium
levies. So long as c'(xj is sufficiently small, however, the first moving jurisdiction will find
it profitable to separate from the havens, installing x, > 0 and earning positive net revenues
in equilibrium.
213 As to tax levies, it is clear that the most any firm would be willing to pay to incorporate
in J would be 7r + 0, and this is the maximal bound on any tax levy that any jurisdiction
could charge. As to locations, although the choice of x; is unbounded the convexity of c(x)
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games with quality differentiation in industrial organization, 21 4 there
may be many equilibria of the regime choice game. In the special case of
the uniform distribution, there turns out to be a unique equilibrium,
which can be computed using numerical methods. Moreover, in that
context, it turns out that sequential order corresponds with governance
order, so that x; = x(i) for all i E {1, 2, . . . , n}. The next subsection explores this special case in detail.
B. Numerical Example for Three Jurisdictions
This subsection utilizes the analysis above to compute the equilibrium
of the three-jurisdiction model where 0 U[O,1]. As noted above, in
equilibrium no two jurisdictions offer duplicative governance. The discussion below distinguishes between the "laggard" jurisdiction (J3), the
"middling" jurisdiction (J2), and the "leader" jurisdiction (JI). I assume
(arbitrarily at this stage) that xi > x2 > X3-an assumption that must be
verified in equilibrium. Because the firm choice stage remains identical
to the general case, we begin with Stage 2 (the Tax Levy Stage).
1. LaggardJurisdiction'sTax Levy Problem
Consider first the laggard jurisdiction J3, and assume that it has installed the lowest governance level x 3. At the taxation stage, J3 chooses
r3 to maximize its expected gross revenues, given its opponents' strategies (ri and r2):

'r *F

l3

12

3

(X2

X3

8,)2

The first order conditions associated with maximizing this expression
yield (after simplification):
2

(9)

similarly applies that there a critical value of x, beyond which not even a monopolistic jurisdiction
would venture.
2 14
W. J. Lane, Product Differentiation in a Market with Endogenous Sequential Entry, 11
Bell J. Econ. 237, 237-38 (1980).
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which defines J3 's reaction as a function of other players' conjectured
taxation strategies. Note that the laggard jurisdiction responds only to
the conjectured strategy of its immediate neighbor (the middling jurisdiction J2), and thus any shocks to the leader's (Ji's) strategy affects the
laggard only indirectly (through J2'S reaction, as analyzed below).
2. Middling Jurisdiction'sTax Levy Problem
Recall that the middling jurisdiction's market is defined by an interior
interval in 6-space:
'rT2 - 3

23,2)2,l

Ix2

X3

(10)

i - 2]
1X X2

J2 's tax problem takes competitors' locations and levies as given, and
maximizes:

r2 . (F(

2 1 )- F

-r -2 r

r2

3 ,2

-x

3

X2

X 32

2

2

(11)

The first order conditions associated with maximizing this expression
yield (after simplification):
I

2

(X

2

x2-x

-3 X

3
3

2

2

(12)

x - X3

which defines J2 's best response correspondence. Note that a conjectured strategy change by either J, or J3 elicits a reaction from the middling jurisdiction, but the reaction is more attenuated for any specific
shock than in the previous case of the laggard. In particular, the middling jurisdiction is most responsive to strategic shocks by one of her
immediate neighbors if her location is relatively distant from her other
immediate neighbor (allowing her to respond to the former without cannibalizing her competitive posture with the latter). Note as well that a
version of this condition holds for any intermediate jurisdiction in the
more general case of n > 3 firms-a simple extension of this framework.
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3. Leader Jurisdiction'sTax Levy Problem
Finally, consider the leader jurisdiction, J, who sets r1 to maximize:
'(
r,(I F(i-

,

(13)

7"1 - T2

1

For J, the conditions associated with a maximum yield the following
best response correspondence:
xI - x

(14)

2

2

2

Notice that, like the laggard, the leader responds only to conjectured
changes in the middling jurisdiction's strategy, and the laggard's does
not directly enter. Note further that the leader is the only jurisdiction
charging a positive price regardless of other players' strategies. That is,
even if the laggard and the middling jurisdiction charge zero levy, the
leader imposes a minimal levy of

2

(XI -X 2)

>

0.

4. Tax Levy Stage Game
Collecting the best response functions for the jurisdictions (denoted
above), it is possible to solve for the equilibrium tax, market share, and
profitability values for each jurisdiction (as a function of the chosen jurisdictional regimes), recorded in the following table:
Table 2: Equilibrium Tax, Market Share, and Profitability for
Three Jurisdictions

JI

(xl-x2) +

1 (x2-x3)(xI-x2)

6

2

J2

3

J3

6

Gross profits

Mki. share

;
(xI-x3)

(Xj-3)

I (X2-3)(x-)

(VI-3)

1 +
2

I (x-x2)
6 (xI-x3)

3
j (X2-3)
6 (xI-3

1

(XI-x2)(3xI+x,-4x3)
2

(xI-x3)

36

9

(XI-3)

1j

-*1_)

36

(X 1-3)

2

2
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A few aspects of this table are worth noting. First, it is clear that levied
taxes increase in the quality of corporate governance, with J (the leader)
charging the most. Second, note that the leader always commands at
least half the market, while the laggard controls no more than one-sixth.
5. Investment Stage
Finally, we move back to the first stage of the game, in which jurisdictions sequentially install corporate governance regimes to maximize
their expected net payoff (that is, their gross payoff less costs of installation). Following the assumption from the text that the costs of installing
x; are quadratic, and given by c(x;) =/2(Xi) 2 , the net payoffs of the respective jurisdictions are given by:
1 1 (X],X 2 ,X 3 ) = 1 (xI - X2)X3x + x

36

2 (XX 2 ,X 3 )=1

(x2 -X3

9

2

- 4x 3

XxI - x 2)

(X 1 - x 3 )

fl 3 (x,x2 , 3 )--1

Y

(x- x3 Y

(x2 -X

3

Xxi-x

(x2-x3y

36

2

(x1

2

(15)

(X 2
2
(X3

2

8013
8x 3

_

(x2 -X 3 XXI-X 2

a

1

&

36

3

(x -x
2

(x1 1-x
x3 -2x 2) (x

(16)

+

36(xi - x3

3

(X3 Y
2

(

Start with last mover, J3, who installs its regime observing what first
two movers have already installed; that is, x, > x2 > 0. Assuming the last
mover is a laggard, and sets x 3 < X2 (an assumption that must be confirmed below), its marginal profit as a function ofx 3 is:

Y

Note that this expression is strictly negative 2 15 if X3 > 2X 2 - x 1, which is

always satisfied if x 2

< 1

xi, in which case the optimal value of x 3 is a

215 Note the marginal profit is also strictly negative if x > x , but in this
case the above
3
1
profit function would no longer be appropriate because J3 would no longer be a laggard. This
possibility is discussed later.
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corner solution at x 3 = 0. (As will be shown below, the unique equilibrium of this game satisfies the above sufficiency condition, and thus the
laggard will optimally choose to install the minimum quality corporate
governance regime).
Now consider the middling jurisdiction, which observes x, and conjectures that the laggard will install x; as above. Assuming this jurisdiction chooses x2 E (X3, x 1), it maximizes:
(X 22)

(x2 -1XX3-X2)

(17)

2

9(x 3 -x 1 )

The first conditions associated with a maximum are (after simplification):
X1 +x3
X2= 9 x,- 9 x3 + 2

(18)

It is straightforward to show that the above condition implies x* < 2 X1,216
and thus x3 *= 0. Imposing this condition allows one to simplify the middling jurisdiction's optimal governance choice condition:
29xx+2

(19)

1

Anticipating the behavior of the middling and laggard jurisdictions
(as described above), the leader jurisdiction sets x, to maximize:
1 (x
36

216

- x 2 X3xI +X2

(x 1 - x3

- 4x 3 )2
2

(

(20)

)2
2

Given the above optimality condition, we know that X 2 <
x2

xI+ X 3

1l

so long as
2

2
9xI -9x 3 +2
For this condition to hold, however, it must be the case that X 3 > 9x . However, it is easi9x,+2
ly verified that for any such values of x 3, the marginal payoff of the laggard jurisdiction is
strictly negative.
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Subject to the backwards induction conditions that when called into
play, suggest that J2 and J3 will play their equilibrium governance strategies derived above, and that the equilibrium of the resulting tax levy
game then ensues. Substituting these conditions into the leader's payoff
yields:
1 x,(9x1 +1X27x, +7)2
(9x, + 2)3
36

(X ) 2

2

The associated maximum of this function occurs at x, = 0.24095, which
then allows one to generate the remaining equilibrium values, as reflected in the table from the main text.
Finally, to confirm this is an equilibrium, it is necessary to check that
neither J2 nor J3 would have an incentive to leapfrog any other jurisdiction in installing its corporate governance regime. Consider first whether
the middling jurisdiction would have an incentive to leapfrog Ji, installing a governance regime x2 > X1 in order to become the leader. Assuming the leader acted according to the above equilibrium, installing
x, = 0.24095, the optimal governance value for x2 to install if she were
interested in leading would be given by x2 = 0.3397. J2's resulting profits
in this case would be -0.0 1996 < 0, clearly less than her profits under the
posited equilibrium. Consequently, J2 is better off by not leapfrogging
the leader.
Similarly, consider the laggard's incentive to leapfrog J1. Here J3
would set x 3 to maximize its profits as a leader given the installed governance of the other jurisdictions. Similarly, the optimal leapfrogging
governance level for J3 is x 3 = 0.3298, yielding profits of -0.02108 < 0.
As before, the laggard would not have an incentive to leapfrog the leader. Finally, it is necessary to check whether the laggard might attempt to
leapfrog only the middling jurisdiction. In this case, the laggard would
set x 3 = 0.081887, yielding profits of -0.01029 < 0. Once again, it is not
optimal for the laggard to leapfrog the middling's position.
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B: ANNOUNCED INVERSION TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING U.S.
TARGETS BETWEEN 1994 AND 2014217
U.S.

3-Day

U.S.
Target Name

Target
Jurisdiction

Forei
Acquirer
Name

Destination
Jurisdiction

Ann.

Helen of Troy

TX

Self

Bermuda

Dec-93

1994

100%

-0.05%

DE

Self

Cayman Is. Feb-96

1996

100%

-0.59%

NY

Self

Bermuda

Jan-96

1996

100%

25.99%

MA

ADT Ltd.

Bermuda

Mar-97

1997

64%

-4.34%

DE

Self

Antigua

May-98

1998

100%

N/A

Corp. ergy
Triton Energy
Corp.
Loral Space &
Commun. Inc.

Tyco Inteda
tional Ltd.
Playstar Corp.
Xoma Ltd.
Gold Reserve

DE

Self

Bermuda

Nov-98

1999

100%

-4.18%

Self

Canada

Feb-99

1999

100%

6.13%

DE

Self

Cayman Is. Mar-99

1999

100%

-3.13%

DE

Self

Cayman Is. May-99

1999

100%

-5.98%

DE

Self

Bermuda

Oct-99

1999

100%

-2.87%

DE

Self

Bermuda

Oct-99

1999

100%

1.38%

DE

LaSalle Re
Holdings
Ltd.

Bermuda

Dec-99

1999

46%

-9.72%

DE

Self

Bermuda

Sep-99

2000

100%

0.97%

WI

Self

2000

100%

-1.94%

Loom, Inc.

Transocean Offshore Inc.
White Moun-

tains Insurance

A
U.S
Tage
Target

WA

Corp.

Fruit of the

Target
Closed Ownership
% of
Survivor

Group, Inc.

PXRE Corp.
Trenwick
Group, Inc.
Everest Reinsur-

ance Holdings,
Inc.

Applied Power
Inc.

217

Bermuda
I

I

Jul-00

I

Source: SEC Edgar Filings (URLs on file with author). The criteria for identifying
an

outbound inversion were (1) the transaction involved an acquisition of a publicly traded U.S.
company; (2) the surviving entity was incorporated abroad; (3) the surviving entity remained
traded in at least one public securities market; and (4) owners of the U.S. target retained at
least 45% ownership (by value) of the surviving entity. Cumulative abnormal returns were

estimated with available CRSP data, using a boot-strapped market model estimated prior to
the event window; the event window consists of the trading day immediately before announcement plus the following two trading days.
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U.S.
3-Day
Target
CAR of
Closed Ownership U.S.
% of
U.S.
Target
Survivor

U.S.
Name
Target

Target
Jurisdiction

Foreign
Acquirer
Name

Destination
Jurisdiction

Ann.

Arch Capital
Group Ltd.
Foster Wheeler

DE

Self

Bermuda

Sep-00

2000

100%

-1.55%

NY

Self

Bermuda

Dec-00

2001

100%

13.76%

Cayman Is. Sep-01

2001

50%

N/A

Corp.

GlobalMarine

DE

Ingersoll-Rand
Co.
Cooper Industries, Inc.
Noble Drilling
Corp.
Weatherford

NJ

Self

Bermuda

Oct-01

2001

100%

0.91%

OH

Self

Bermuda

Jun-01

2002

100%

-2.04%

DE

Self

Cayman Is. Jan-02

2002

100%

7.65%

DE

Self

Bermuda

Jun-02

2002

100%

-9.71%

Nabors Industries Inc.

DE

Self

Bermuda

Jun-02

2002

100%

4.64%

Luna Gold Corp.

WY

Self

Canada

Oct-05

2005

100%

N/A

Lazard LLC
Patch International Inc.

DE

Self

Bermuda

Dec-05

2005

100%

-2.39%

NV

2006

64%

N/A

Star Maritime
ar Martm
Acq. Corp.

DE

Damascus
Canada
Dec-06
Energy Inc.
Star Bulk
Carriers
Marshall Is. Mar-07
Corp.
PXRE
Bermuda Mar-07
Group Ltd.
e.Pak Res.
Bermuda
Jul-07
(S) Pte. Ltd.
Offshore
Group Inv. Cayman Is. Aug-07
Ltd.
Self
Canada
Sep-07

2007

100%

2.03%

2007

73%

1.18%

2007

50%

N/A

2007

100%

1.54%

2007

100%

N/A

May-07 2007

100%

N/A

Nov-08

96%

-10.02%

100%
Marshall Is. Jun-08 Failed
I
I
BVI
Jul-08 2008
100%

-0.10%

Into

p.

Int'l Inc.

Argonaut Group
Inc.
Ascend Acquisition Corp.

DE

Vantage Energy
Services, Inc.

DE

Lincoln Gold
Corp.
Western Goldfields Inc.
Hungarian Tel.
& Cable Corp.
Energy Infractructure Acquisition Corp. I
InterAmerican

NV

Acquisition

DE

ID

Self

Canada

DE

Invitel Holdings

Denmark

DE

Self

DE

Self
I

I

2009

I

I

N/A
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U.S.
Target Name

Target
Jurisdiction

Arcade Acquisition Corp.
Foster Wheeler
Ltd.
AlphaSecurty
Alpha Security

DE

FDestinationDetnai
Acqie
n
Acquirer
Jurisdiction
Nameo

Bermuda

Conbulk
Corp.
Self

DE
DE

Soya China
Pte.Ltd.

n.

Marshall Is. Sep-08

2008

52%

N/A

Switzerland Dec-08

2009

100%

7.64%

65%

0.76%

2009

56%

0.23%

2009

100%

-4.40%

B
Bermuda

Dec-08 Failed

Ideation Acquisition Corp.
Tim Hortons
Inc.
2020 ChinaCap
Acquirco Inc.
ENSCO Int'l
Inc.
Plastinum Polymer Tech Corp.

DE

DE
D

Self

Valeant Pharmaceuticals Int'l

DE

Biovail
Corp.

Canada

Jun-10

Alkermes, Inc.
Jazz Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

PA

Elan Corp.

Ireland

DE

Azur Pharma Ltd.

Tronox Inc.

DE

Exxaro Res.

DE
DE
DE

________

AON Corp.

DE

Pentair, Inc.

MN

Stratasys Inc.

DE

Eaton Corp.

OH

Tower Group,
Inc.

DE

Liberty Global,
Inc.

DE

SearchMedia Cayman Is. Apr-09
Int'l Ltd.
Self
Canada
Sep-09
Windrace
Int'l Co. Ltd.
Self

Ltd.

3-Day
Target. CAR
Closed Ownership
us of
os of
U.S.
Tre
Survivor
Target

BVI

May-09 2009

51%

1.69%

UK

Nov-09

2009

100%

-8.77%

Netherlands Jun-10 Failed

100%

N/A

2010

50%

28.10%

May-11

2011

75%

10.77%

Ireland

Sep- 11

2011

79%

7.19%

Australia

Sep-11

2011

62%

N/A

____

__

_______

Jan-12

2012

100%

-0.20%

Tyco Inter- Switzerland Mar-12
national Ltd.
Israel
Apr-12
Objet Ltd.

2012

48%

19.11%

2012

55%

17.67%

May-12 2012

73%

23.86%

Bermuda

Apr-12

2012

78%

1.82%

UK

Feb-13

2013

64%

-7.04%

May-13 2013

77%

4.11%

71%

-4.32%

AON PLC

Cooper Industries PLC
Canopius
Holdings
Bermuda

UK

Ireland

Ltd.

NV

Actavis, Inc.
[______

_PLC

Perrigo Co.

MI

Virgin Media Inc., UK
Warner
Chilcott

Ireland

Blisn Ltd.

Ireland

Jul-13

2013

1751
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U.S.

U.S.
Name
Target

Target
Jurisdiction

Omnicom Group
Inc.
Applied Materials, Inc.
Endo Health Solutions Inc.

NY
DE
DE

Foreign
Acquirer
Name

Destination
Jurisdiction

Ann.

3-Day
Target. CAR of
Closed Ownership
U.S.
% of
TaU.S
Target
Survivor

Publicis
UK
Jul-13 Failed
Groupe UK
Tokyo Elec- Netherlands Sep-13 Failed
tron Ltd.
Paladin Labs
Ireland
Nov-13 2013
Inc.
Vidara
Ireland
Mar-14 2014
Therapeutics
Int'l Ltd.
Fyffes PLC
Ireland
Mar-14 2014

50%

-0.83%

68%

12.48%

78%

27.04%

74%

17.71%

51%

11.16%

Horizon PharHorIzn.
ma, Inc.

DE

Chiquita Brands
Int'l, Inc.

NJ

Theravance Inc.

DE

Self

Cayman

Apr-14

2014

100%

6.37%

Questcor Pharmaceuticals Inc.
Pfizer
Mondelez International, Inc.

CA

Mallinckrodt
PLC
Astrozenica

Ireland

Apr-14

2014

50%

13.95%

74%

3.64%

VA

D.E. Master Netherlands May-14
Blenders

2014

49%

7.00%

Medtronic Inc.

MN

Covidien
PLC
Abbott La-

Jun-14

2014

70%

0.51%

Mylan Inc.

PA

2014

79%

2.25%

C&J Energy
Services, Inc.
AbbVie
Burger King
Worldwide Inc.
Auxilium Pharmaceuticals Inc.
Auxilium Pharmaceuticals Inc.
Wright Medical
Group, Inc.

DE

boratories
Non-US
As- Netherlands Jul-14
sets
Nabors InBermuda Jun-14
dustries Ltd.
Jul-14
UK
Shire PLC

2014

53%

1.12%

Failed

75%

-1.94%

Steris Corp.

OH

DE

DE
DE
DE
DE
DE

Tim Hortons
Inc.
QLT Inc.

Islands_____

UK

Ireland

Apr-14 Failed

Canada

Aug-14

2014

51%

15.67%

Canada

Jun-14 Failed

76%

9.84%

Endo InterIreland
Oct-14
national
Tornier N.V. Netherlands Oct-14
I

2014

76%

0.49%

2014

52%

-2.29%

Oct-14

2014

70%

-1.47%

Synergy
Health PLC I

UK

